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THESIS SUMMARY 
The notion that unconscious Bayesian inference underlies perception is gaining 
ground. Predictive coding approaches posit that the state of the world is inferred 
by integrating, at each level of the perceptual hierarchy, top-down prior beliefs 
about sensory causes and bottom-up prediction errors. In this framework, 
percepts correspond to a top-down stream of beliefs that best 'explain away' 
sensory signals. Although such frameworks are gathering empirical support, 
subjective facets of perception remain unexplained from these perspectives. 
This thesis combines behavioural, computational and neuroimaging methods to 
examine how subjective visual confidence can be accounted for in a predictive 
coding framework.  
Experiment one shows that, behaviourally, perceptual expectations about target 
presence or absence both liberalise confidence thresholds and increase 
metacognitive accuracy. These results are modelled in a signal detection-
theoretic framework as low-level priors shifting the posterior odds of being 
correct. Using EEG, experiment two reveals that influence of expectations on 
decision and confidence oscillates with the phase of pre-stimulus alpha 
oscillations. This means that prior to target onset, both objective and subjective 
decisions have been rhythmically biased by the periodic recruitment of 
expectations to visual areas. Using fMRI, experiment three shows that in the 
post-stimulus period, expectations and sensory signals are integrated into 
confidence judgements in right inferior frontal gyrus (rIFG). Furthermore, this 
process recruits orbitofrontal cortex and bilateral frontal pole, which represent 
top-down influences, and occipital lobe, which represents bottom-up signals. 
Together, these results suggest that expectations shape subjective confidence 
by biasing the posterior probability of the perceptual belief.   
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1 
INTRODUCTION 
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1.1 OVERVIEW 
Accompanying our perceptual content is a sense of confidence in what we see. 
Sometimes our perceptual content is clear, and we feel able to identify the 
source of our sensory signals. However under sensory uncertainty, for example 
in the dark or when looking out the corner of our eye, we may become unsure. 
Subjective perceptual confidence is an important facet of our visual experience, 
that often reflects our conscious content (Kanai, Walsh, & Tseng, 2010; 
Sandberg, Timmermans, Overgaard, & Cleeremans, 2010; Seth, Dienes, 
Cleeremans, Overgaard, & Pessoa, 2008), but that also indicates an ability to 
evaluate our own judgements. 
In many cases we are able to accurately judge the correctness of our perceptual 
inferences, that is, we demonstrate reasonably high metacognitive accuracy 
(Fleming & Dolan, 2012; Kentridge & Heywood, 2000; Yeung & Summerfield, 
2012). We know when we know, and we know when we do not, meaning that 
our confidence correlates with our perceptual performance. However, 
confidence is subject to specific biases, such as a systematic underestimation 
of uncertainty in our environment (Zylberberg, Roelfsema, & Sigman, 2014) and 
a tendency to avoid evidence for unselected perceptual inferences (Maniscalco, 
Peters, & Lau, 2016; Zylberberg, Barttfeld, & Sigman, 2012). Despite such 
biases, little is known about how non-sensory influences shape our sense of 
confidence. 
For objective perception, research increasingly points to a more complicated 
picture than simple feature extraction, revealing that non-sensory influences 
such as motivation and beliefs exert powerful, shaping effects. There is now a 
wealth of evidence showing that perceptual prior expectations about the 
probable causes of sensation bias perceptual inference, and are associated 
with a suppression of ERP and BOLD activity (den Ouden, Kok, & de Lange, 
2012; Gilbert & Li, 2013; Summerfield & de Lange, 2014). These influences, of 
“seeing what we believe”, can be formulated in Bayesian terms. Bayesian 
frameworks propose that perception can be modelled as an integration of prior 
expectations and sensory data, where the ‘winning’ inference is that with the 
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 highest posterior probability (see section 1.2.2). In this way, we will perceive 
that which best explains our incoming sensory data. ‘Predictive coding’ 
frameworks extend this notion, proposing that the brain refines and shapes top-
down predictions until most of the bottom-up sensory data has been explained 
away (for a review, see Spratling, 2016).  
Predictive frameworks are increasingly being applied to high-level cognition, for 
example cognitive control (Pezzulo, 2012), theory of mind (Koster-Hale & Saxe, 
2013) and sense of agency (Friston, 2014). These frameworks are even being 
extended to try and explain conditions such as autism (Van de Cruys et al., 
2014) and schizophrenia (Horga, Schatz, Abi-Dargham, & Peterson, 2014). In 
many ways this is not surprising: as will be described in Section 2.2, these 
frameworks are very rich. Remarkably, subjective facets of perception remain 
largely unexplored from this perspective, despite a considerable body empirical 
work on objective perceptual decision-making. There has been some work, both 
theoretical and empirical, that has examined effects of expectation on the 
contents of visual consciousness (Hohwy, Roepstorff, & Friston, 2008; Jakob 
Hohwy, 2012; Melloni, Schwiedrzik, Müller, Rodriguez, & Singer, 2011), on 
sense of presence (Seth, Suzuki, & Critchley, 2011) and even on synaesthetic 
experience (Seth, 2014b). However, the extension of predictive processing 
frameworks to the domain of consciousness remains in its infancy. The feeling 
of confidence that accompanies perceptual judgements has been particularly 
neglected.  
This neglect persists despite confidence being particularly amenable to 
Bayesian frameworks. Confidence is often conceived as a subjective probability 
that a decision was correct (Meyniel, Sigman, & Mainen, 2015; Pouget, 
Drugowitsch, & Kepecs, 2016), and accordingly, it must involve some inference 
on internal states or sensory representations. Recent theoretical work has 
suggested that constructing our sense of confidence involves reading out the 
posterior probability of the perceptual choice made (Meyniel, Sigman, et al., 
2015). Alternatively, confidence could be conceived as a meta-decision, in 
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which the probability of the decision having been correct is inferred in a manner 
analogous to objective decision-making.  
This thesis attempts to bridge research on subjective perceptual confidence and 
on predictive influences on objective decision-making. It will investigate how 
top-down influences of prior perceptual expectations, controlling for influences 
of top-down attention, shape the construction of subjective visual confidence. 
Using a novel paradigm, work here uses visual psychophysics, EEG and fMRI 
to show that we are more likely to assign high confidence to predicted percepts 
This process of integrating expectations into confidence recruits both sensory 
and frontal brain regions, and begins prior to stimulus onset. Therefore, the 
work here reveals that predictive processing frameworks can be naturally 
extended to the domain of subjective decision-making.  
This Chapter will briefly introduce perceptual decision-making and 
metacognition, with the goal of outlining underlying principles of the work in this 
thesis and prefacing the subsequent Chapters. 
1.2 PERCEPTION AS A DECISION 
Perception is often regarded as decision-making, in that the processing of 
sensory signals leads to changes in the evidence for one perceptual inference – 
or decision – over another. In common to many perceptual decision-making 
(PDM) models is the notion of a decision threshold, which determines the point 
at which enough evidence has been accumulated for alternatives to be 
distinguished. On this account, top-down effects of expectation may push 
decisions towards one or another alternative by reducing the evidence required 
for selection. The specifics of these models do not form the focus of this thesis, 
but they motivate the theoretical foundation of this work. Accordingly, this 
section will give a broad overview of perceptual decision-making models and 
decision theory.  
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1.2.1 SERIAL SAMPLING 
Normative models describe PDM as a process of serial sampling evidence 
accumulation, whereby noisy evidence accumulates linearly towards a decision 
bound, and a decision is made when either the relative evidence (diffusion 
models, for reviews see Forstmann, Ratcliff, & Wagenmakers, 2016; Ratcliff, 
Smith, Brown, & McKoon, 2016) or absolute evidence (race models, e.g. Brown 
& Heathcote, 2008; Vickers, 1979) reaches the bound. These are illustrated in 
figure 1.1. 
These serial sampling frameworks model the accumulated evidence over time, 
stating that at each time point, the change in evidence is equal to some 
accumulated evidence and some noise. Evidence accumulation begins at the 
baseline level x(0) = x0, where x0 is taken to be zero in the absence of prior  
 
Figure 1.1 Evidence accumulation 
On the left, noisy evidence is accumulated to a decision threshold, or bound, 
separately for each response type. Whichever accumulator reaches the bound 
first is selected as the decision. On the right, the relative evidence between the 
two choices is accumulated. The starting point of evidence accumulation may be 
biased towards one of the decisions (see left), or the thresholds might be 
unequal, meaning that one choice needs less evidence than the other for 
selection (see right). 
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information. Race models are defined in the same way, except that the 
evidence for each choice is considered separately, and is accumulated under 
distinct drift rates with distinct starting points. 
In these models, top-down influences could be modelled as a change in x0, but 
also as a change in the drift rate, or as a change in the decision bounds, which 
determine the point at which evidence accumulation should halt (Summerfield & 
Egner, 2009). Alternatively, priors could simply add noise to the evidence  
 
Figure 1.2 Effect of priors in serial sampling frameworks 
Here, the participant has to determine the mean direction of motion (‘up’ or 
‘down’) in a random dot kinematogram (RDK). There are four points in the 
decision-making process at which priors could shape decision-making: (A) 
The baseline evidence could increase for the choice with higher prior 
probability. This would occur in the anticipatory stage, prior to stimulus 
onset and is modelled as a change in initial evidence; (B) Following stimulus 
onset, expectations could change the gain, or signal to noise ratio, which 
would be modelled as an increase in drift rate for the expected choice; (C) 
Internal noise could be added, artificially pushing evidence accumulation in 
favour of the expected choice; (D) Expectations could alter response 
biases, which would be modelled as a lower decision threshold for expected 
choices. Adapted from Summerfield & Egner (2010).  
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accumulation process so that ‘false’ evidence in favour of the preferred option is 
collected. Thus, these models offer four key targets at which top-down 
influences could act, and this is illustrated in figure 1.2. 
1.2.2 STATISTICAL DECISION MAKING 
An alternative formulation for PDM models describes perception in Bayesian 
terms. Here, for sensory evidence x, evidence for one choice, P(C1|x), is 
compared against that for  the alternative, P(C2|x), in the form of the log-
likelihood ratio, LLR. This is defined as: 
𝐿𝐿𝑅 = log 𝑃 𝐶! 𝑥)𝑃 𝐶! 𝑥) . 
When sensory evidence for C1 exceeds that for C2, R will take positive values 
whereas in the opposite case, R will be negative. Accordingly, we can 
determine a decision rule that determines which choice C should be made given 
the evidence: 
𝐶 =  𝐶!    𝑖𝑓 𝑅 > 0𝐶!    𝑖𝑓 𝑅 < 0 
In this framework the decision rule does not usually change in the presence of 
expectations. Rather, to model expectations we simply consider prior odds of C1 
relative to C2 and add this to the LLR. Now, LLR becomes 
𝐿𝐿𝑅 = log 𝑃 𝐶! 𝑥)𝑃 𝐶! 𝑥) +  log 𝑃 𝐶!𝑃 𝐶!  
The addition of these prior odds pushes R towards positive or negative values 
and thus towards the response that the prior favours. By Bayes' rule, LLR is 
now equivalent to the posterior odds ratio: the relative probability of the two 
decisions, conditioned upon the evidence and prior odds. 
We can also incorporate uncertainty into Bayesian decision theory. Under 
uncertainty, both the sensory data (modelled as the likelihood) and the prior are 
represented as Gaussians. The degree of uncertainty about each of these 
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variables can be represented as the respective variances of these distributions. 
When combined, the posterior will also be Gaussian, with mean 
µ!"#$%&'"& =  µ!"#$%"!!!"  σ!"#$"! +  µ!"#$"  σ!"#$%"!!!"!σ!"#$%"!!!"! +  σ!"#$"!  
Here, the mean of the likelihood and the mean of the prior are weighted by the 
variance of the other variable. This is important, because the posterior odds 
(and therefore the decision) will be weighted according to relative sensory 
uncertainty. High sensory uncertainty will push the posterior mean towards the 
prior mean, whereas low sensory uncertainty will push it towards the mean of 
the likelihood. Accordingly, Bayesian decision theory predicts that decisions will 
be based upon expectations more when sensory uncertainty is high, and less 
so when sensory uncertainty is low. Similarly, if there is high uncertainty about 
the prior, for example if the environment is volatile and rules frequently change, 
expectations will carry greater weight upon the decision.  
1.3 DECISION CONFIDENCE 
In the decision-making literature – in perception, or learning and memory - 
participants are generally asked to make a forced choice about stimuli 
presented to them: ‘is this word old or new?’ (a yes/no task), or ‘was the target 
presented on the left or on the right?’ (2AFC). Answers to these decisions tell us 
about how stimuli are processed and reported, but these decisions are also 
accompanied by a sense of subjective confidence in our choice. These 
confidence judgements represent the subject’s probabilistic belief that they have 
made the correct decision, and usually correlate with decision accuracy 
(Grimaldi, Lau, & Basso, 2015). This tells us that we are not just good 
perceptual decision-makers, but are able to evaluate those decisions 
appropriately: we ‘know when we know’. 
Understanding how these confidence judgements are constructed informs us 
about how we make and evaluate our decisions, for example about how we are 
able to learn from our mistakes (Yeung & Summerfield, 2012). Determinants of 
high confidence may also help us understand the way in which knowledge or 
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perceptual content becomes conscious (Seth et al., 2008; Wierzchoń, 
Paulewicz, Asanowicz, Timmermans, & Cleeremans, 2014). Confidence has 
post-decisional benefits as well. For example, confidence can guide perceptual 
learning (Guggenmos, Wilbertz, Hebart, & Sterzer, 2016), it may act as a 
‘common currency’ between perceptual inferences, facilitating the integration of 
several information sources (de Gardelle, Le Corre, & Mamassian, 2016; de 
Gardelle & Mamassian, 2014), and communicating decision confidence with 
peers improves group decision-making (Bahrami et al., 2010; Zarnoth & 
Sniezek, 1997). 
The notion that we can ‘know that we know’ – that metacognition is intimately 
tied to knowledge – has a long tradition in philosophy. It can be traced back to 
Aristotle, who posited that memory requires reflection or conception (Sorabji & 
Aristote, 1972), and Augustine, who proposed that the mind continually reflects 
upon itself to understand and develop (Perricone, 2011). In psychology, 
introspection – the process of evaluating or reflecting upon one’s internal states 
– was revisited by Peirce and Jastrow in 1884, who revealed that decisions on 
stimuli associated with very low signal strength (small changes in weight) can 
be above chance, yet be reported with no confidence (Peirce & Jastrow, 1884). 
They claimed, as we still do, that decision confidence reveals current states of 
knowledge, concluding with the observation that sensation can be unconscious: 
“[This set of findings] gives new reason for believing that we gather what is 
passing in one another's minds in large measure from sensations so faint that 
we are not fairly aware of having them, and can give no account of how we 
reach our conclusions about such matters.” 
Though now we know that confidence is not purely a function of signal intensity 
(see Chapter 2), Peirce and Jastrow crucially showed that accuracy and 
confidence can dissociate, revealing that conscious knowledge or awareness 
seems to be a ‘privileged’ state that not all sensations are granted.   
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1.5 THESIS OVERVIEW 
This thesis will empirically address the question of whether and how perceptual 
prior expectations shape subjective judgements of perceptual confidence using 
visual psychophysics, signal detection theory, scalp electroencephalography 
(EEG) and functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI).  
Chapter 2 presents an overview of the theoretical and empirical literature on 
Bayesian brain frameworks and subjective confidence judgements that 
motivates this thesis. The ways in which confidence and metacognition can be 
studied empirically are detailed in Chapter 3. Chapter 4 presents a 
comprehensive analysis of behavioural data, showing that prior expectations 
increase subjective confidence and improve metacognitive sensitivity. 
Furthermore, it presents a Bayesian signal detection theoretic framework that 
accounts for these results. Using EEG, Chapter 5 shows that perceptual priors 
begin to bias objective and subjective judgements prior to stimulus onset. Using 
fMRI, Chapter 6 combines general linear modelling (GLM), psychophysiological 
interaction analysis (PPI) and voxel-based morphometry (VBM) to reveal a 
functional network in which confidence is shaped by perceptual priors. Chapter 
7 consolidates these findings with respect to the literature and presents a 
simple hierarchical Bayesian scheme that offers one plausible solution for how 
confidence could be modelled in a hierarchical predictive coding framework.       
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2.1 OVERVIEW 
What we perceive is not only a function of the external world, but also of what is 
expected by the observer (Gilbert & Li, 2013). Such expectations may be in the 
form of contextual information, or on previous experience in similar 
environments. One might imagine that these top-down influences act at late 
response stages of perceptual processing, however evidence increasingly 
points to expectations exerting effects at very early stages (Rauss, Schwartz, & 
Pourtois, 2011). This means that these top-down influences cannot simply arise 
from post-hoc reasoning, but rather, that perceptual inference is constrained by 
prior beliefs. These prior beliefs can pertain to knowledge of natural scene 
statistics, for example, that luminance changes at the edges of an object. 
Alternatively, they can reflect the probability of a given object in the current 
environment, or even beliefs passed down by evolution. This influence of prior 
beliefs on perception has led to growing interest in formulating perception in 
Bayesian terms (see Friston, 2012b; Knill & Pouget, 2004). Here, perceptual 
content corresponds to the hypothesised cause of sensation that is most 
probable, given the sensory signals and priors. Under these frameworks, 
probable causes are more likely to be selected, and unlikely causes are more 
likely to be suppressed. These ‘Bayesian Brain’ frameworks motivate the work 
presented in this thesis, though the work here neither directly tests them, nor 
depends upon them.  
This overview chapter will describe process models that attempt to explain how 
perception is shaped by top-down influences. Next, it will outline the current 
state of knowledge on how top-down influences shape perceptual decisions, 
including the neural substrates underlying subjective decisions. Finally, this 
section will bring these findings together and give a brief overview of how top-
down expectations might shape confidence judgements. This final question 
forms the topic of the present thesis.  
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2.2 THE BAYESIAN BRAIN HYPOTHESIS 
How can the brain infer the state of the world from only indirect, ambiguous 
sensory signals for which there is no one-to-one mapping between sensation 
and cause? A shadow, as depicted in figure 2.1A, may appear to have only one 
plausible sensory cause – a guitar – however there are many alternative 
causes, such as that depicted in figure 2.1B. We can also perceive, at distinct 
points in time, multiple perceptual interpretations of the same stimulus. This is 
made apparent in bistable phenomena such as Ruben's face/vase illusion (fig. 
2.1C), which can be perceived either as two faces or as a vase. Yet despite 
these conflicts, our survival indicates that we are able to infer the causes of our 
sensations with high degree of accuracy. 
Bayesian brain frameworks propose that perception is achieved via Bayesian 
inference, that is, in a manner consistent with Bayesian statistical decision 
making. Here, perceptual content is said to be the hypothesised cause of 
sensation that has maximum posterior probability, given the data and prior 
beliefs. Sensory signals and prior beliefs are combined into the posterior belief 
using Bayes’ rule, which states: 
𝑃 𝐻𝑦𝑝𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑠  𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑎) = 𝑃 𝐻𝑦𝑝𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑠  × 𝑃 𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑎  𝐻𝑦𝑝𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑠)𝑃(𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑎)  
However, the probability of the data is just a constant as it is invariant to the 
hypothesis. Therefore, we get:  𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟 ∝ 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟 × 𝐿𝑖𝑘𝑒𝑙𝑖ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑑. 
This arises via a process of hypothesis testing, in which decisions are 
unconsciously guided by learned regularities in the world (Helmholtz, 1860). By 
simulating the expected probabilistic outcomes (posterior) under each 
perceptual hypothesis, the most explanatory hypothesis can be determined 
(Gregory, 1980). Thus, perceptual content arises from this process of iteratively 
testing sensory signals against hypotheses until as much of the sensory data as 
possible are ‘explained away’. The most explanatory perceptual hypothesis is 
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that which maximally explains the sensory signals, given context-dependent 
prior beliefs.  
This account assumes that the brain represents internal models that represent 
both these learned regularities (prior beliefs on sensory causes), and mappings 
between sensory causes and sensory data (likelihoods). That is, it must 
represent rules that govern sensory effects. However, in order to calculate the 
posterior the brain must infer unknown (hidden) causes from known, internally 
modelled effects, that is, perform ‘backwards’ inference. More formally, this is 
referred to as inverting the generative model.  
If perception is achieved by hypothesis testing, where do the priors come from? 
How should, and why can, perception arise in this way? These questions are 
 
Figure 2.1. Multiple perceptual interpretations  
A. The most probable sensory cause of this shadow is a guitar, however as shown in 
B. there are also unlikely sensory causes (a cat holding a toilet brush). This image 
illustrates how we often constrain our inferences according to prior probabilities.  
C. Ruben’s face/vase illusion. This image is considered bi-stable because it has two 
possible interpretations: the black shape can be perceived as a vase, or the negative 
space can be perceived as two people facing each other.  
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arguably best addressed in a biologically plausible fashion in the free-energy 
principle (FEP; Friston, Adams, Perrinet, & Breakspear, 2012; Friston, 2009, 
2010). In FEP, the Bayesian brain hypothesis is a corollary that follows from a 
unifying explanation of why living organisms operate or behave as they do.  
This principle starts with the premise that the goal of any living organism is to 
maintain its homeostasis, and that this is achieved by maximising the probability 
that the organism will remain in a small set of possible states (minimising 
entropy). In order to remain in a small set of possible states, the agent must 
minimise its long-term average surprise. What is surprising depends on the 
organism. For example, a fish out of water would be in a surprising state for a 
fish (Friston, 2010), but this would not be surprising for a human.  
How can surprise be minimised? FEP recruits the fact that free-energy is an 
upper-bound on surprise to propose that organisms maintain their homeostasis 
by minimising free-energy, that is, maximising their internal model evidence. 
With some assumptions (see 2.2.1), all the organism has to do is minimise the 
discrepancy between its sensory states and expected sensory causes (beliefs, 
or expectations). Minimising this discrepancy will minimise free energy, thereby 
minimising surprise and supporting homeostasis. The discrepancy between 
sensory states and expectations can be minimised in two ways. One possibility 
is to act upon the world to change sensation; another is to change internal 
states by altering beliefs (figure 2.2). More informally, one can think of the brain 
as a sophisticated but corrupt scientist, who over time tweaks his predictions 
and manipulates his data in order to consistently support his own larger theory. 
 
Figure 2.2 The perception-action loop 
under the free-energy framework 
The brain has only indirect access to the 
world, achieved via action and sensation. 
The agent can change sensation via 
action, or change perception by altering its 
prior beliefs. 
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2.2.1 VARIATIONAL BAYES AND HIERARCHICAL PREDICTIVE CODING 
Under this theoretical foundation for why the brain is a Bayesian hypothesis 
tester, we can ask how this might be achieved. How is the posterior belief 
inferred? The free-energy principle (FEP) relies upon a form of Variational 
Bayesian inference, implemented by the brain in the form of hierarchical 
predictive coding (for a technical formulation, see Friston & Kiebel, 2009). Note 
that there those who are proponents of predictive coding as a functional 
architecture who do not necessarily subscribe to FEP (e.g. Spratling, 2008).  
FEP takes a Variational Bayesian approach to approximating the posterior 
density P(cause | data). Here, the posterior is approximated by a recognition 
density Q(cause). The goal is to minimise the discrepancy between P and Q. In 
perception the data do not change (data change via action); the priors (i.e. the 
recognition density) must be optimised to minimise the distance between these 
distributions. FEP assumes that the brain uses the Laplace approximation, 
meaning that (i) these densities are Gaussian and (ii) the variance of these 
Gaussians is a function of their mean.  
Recall that the brain is thought to use hierarchical generative models. These 
furnish a stream of empirical priors, that is, conditionally dependent beliefs 
about sensory causes. In the brain, this maps well onto modular or hierarchical 
processing. We can imagine priors for edges in V1, for object shape in lateral 
occipital complex (which are dependent upon edges), and for semantic 
recognition of the object in fusiform gyrus (which are dependent upon edges 
and shape). Within this hierarchical scheme, optimising the recognition density 
entails optimising interdependent priors across the cortical hierarchy. Together, 
this process gives an approximation of the true posterior. FEP proposes that the 
brain performs Variational Bayesian approximation by implementing a 
hierarchical predictive coding scheme with the Laplace approximation (for a 
review, see Spratling, 2016).  
Hierarchical predictive coding is a message-passing algorithm that optimises 
sufficient statistics in each level of the hierarchy by minimising the discrepancy 
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between top-down priors and bottom-up prediction errors, until all prediction 
errors converge within some small margin of error (figure 2.3). Prediction error 
corresponds to the discrepancy between the prior and the data. The idea here is 
that separate units (in the brain, neurons) will represent priors and prediction 
errors. Each task-relevant region of the perceptual hierarchy receives top-down 
priors and bottom-up prediction errors, and from these, estimates the posterior. 
This posterior forms the prior for the level below, and any unexplained data that 
remains is communicated to the hierarchical level above as prediction error, to 
be 'explained-away' at increasing levels of abstraction. In parallel, prediction 
error will be used to update the generative model such that predictions are 
optimised in the longer-term as well.  
Thus, predictive coding assumes that perceptual inference is achieved via a 
cascade of reciprocal exchanges of predictions and prediction errors, which 
minimises prediction error across the cortical hierarchy. In this way, (some) 
priors are empirical, meaning that they do not have an origin, but rather are 
constrained by inferences across the brain, as well as across timescales.  
2.2.2 ATTENTION AS PRECISION WEIGHTING 
Crucial to Bayesian statistical decision theory, independently of neural 
implementation, is the notion of precision. Here, priors and data can be 
represented as Gaussian probability distributions, which means that they will be 
associated with a precision (variance) representing their reliability. In volatile 
environments, where governing rules frequently change, or if these rules are 
unclear (you are in a novel environment, say) it would be unwise for inference to 
place too much weight on the prior belief. Its precision will be low. Similarly, if 
sensory uncertainty is expected to be high – say it is a dark night and you are 
outside – it would be unwise for inference to place too much weight on these 
sensory signals. Bayes rule ensures that priors and likelihoods (sensory 
signals) will be combined with respect to their precisions (see section 1.2.2 and 
figure 2.4). 
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Figure 2.3 Hierarchical inference. 
(A) Hierarchical Bayesian inference of a forest scene. Top-down 
prior beliefs (blue) and bottom-up sensory signals (red) are 
combined at each hierarchical level into a posterior belief using 
Bayes rule. At higher levels of the hierarchy, inference 
corresponds to  more abstract or global representations. Here, 
inference moves from perception of edges, to perception of 
objects, to perception of the wider environment.  
(B) Hierarchical predictive coding. This is similar to hierarchical 
Bayesian inference. The crucial difference is that the bottom-up 
information is prediction error (PE), not sensory signals. At each 
level of the hierarchy, top-down priors are received from the level 
above and bottom-up PEs are received from the level below (and 
in lateral connections).The inference at each stage constrains 
that at the level below by becoming the prior. It also constrains 
the level above, by feeding-forward remaining PE. 
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Figure 2.4 Combining priors and likelihoods 
The top panel shows that when the prior distribution is wide relative to 
the likelihood function, i.e. there is high prior uncertainty, the posterior 
will be weighted more by (i.e. look more similar to) the likelihood. In 
the bottom panel the prior is very precise. Accordingly, the posterior is 
weighted more by the prior than the likelihood. Picture taken from 
(Edwards, Adams, Brown, Pareés, & Friston, 2012). 
 
So, within the free-energy principle what is the role of top-down attention, for 
example selective attention? One intriguing proposal is that attention is the 
process of adjusting precision weightings according to top-down goals and 
motivations, like tuning a radio or tweaking an amplifier (Clark, 2015; Kanai, 
Komura, Shipp, & Friston, 2015). In this way, the relative contributions of top-
down priors and bottom-up prediction errors can be adjusted by top-down 
beliefs on precisions, accentuating the signals that are most relevant to the 
agent. To illustrate, imagine you are on an Easter egg hunt, and desperate to 
win. You will be looking hard for anything remotely egg-shaped, but anything 
irrelevant to the task (even if it is usually motivationally salient), you will try to 
ignore. Within the free-energy framework, this would be modelled as an 
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expectation that you will win the hunt – that prior represents the motivation. This 
belief (motivation) shapes second-order prior beliefs on the precisions in 
stimulus-relevant sensory and association cortices. These beliefs are that egg-
coloured or egg-shaped objects have high precision, and anything else has low 
precision. The result of these beliefs is that information that is consistent with 
the sensory causes that are relevant to your goals – Easter eggs – will be 
prioritised, and all other information will be suppressed. In figure 2.4, this would 
mean changing the variance of the prior and likelihood functions, so that the 
posterior distribution is biased towards the more reliable evidence. 
This concept has received only preliminary and circumstantial support, primarily 
from modelling work (Brown & Friston, 2012; Feldman & Friston, 2010; Kanai et 
al., 2015; Vossel et al., 2014), however its utility is primarily in the explanatory 
power it affords. Under this framework, predictive processing governs not only 
perception, but a host of high-level cognitive processes (Clark, 2015) such as 
motivation and value (Friston & Ao, 2012; Friston et al., 2015).  
2.2.3 NEURAL ARCHITECTURE UNDERLYING A BAYESIAN BRAIN? 
So far, it has been proposed that interactions between the brain and its 
environment are mediated by perception and action, such that perception 
optimises predictions and action changes the sensory inputs. Together these 
processes maximise an agent's internal model evidence. As yet, much of the 
neuroanatomical and neurobiological evidence for such a framework is 
circumstantial, though plausible neural architectures have been proposed in 
considerable detail (Bastos et al., 2012; Friston & Kiebel, 2009a; Kanai et al., 
2015). One prediction of these architectures is that priors are communicated in 
beta band oscillations, precision-weighted prediction errors are communicated 
in the gamma band, and precision-weighted priors are communicated in the 
alpha band. This hypothesis has received recent support from model-based 
analyses on human electrocorticography (eCoG) data (Sedley et al., 2016).  
However, evidence for the existence of neurons that signal perceptual 
prediction error remains elusive. Their existence is not implausible, given 
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evidence for the existence of reward prediction error neurons in midbrain (Bayer 
& Glimcher, 2005; Nakahara, Itoh, Kawagoe, Takikawa, & Hikosaka, 2004; 
Schultz & Dickinson, 2000), but this assumption – of prediction error neurons – 
renders FEP particularly controversial. So, what are alternative neural codes for 
Bayesian inference, if not priors and prediction errors? One possibility is that 
neurons, at least in visual cortex, represent the entire posterior probability 
distributions (Fiser, Berkes, Orbán, & Lengyel, 2010; Hoyer & Hyvarinen, 2003; 
Paulin, 2005). This idea is lent circumstantial support from the fascinating 
finding that visual cortex neurons vary in the degree to which their activity is 
correlated with their neighbours’ (Okun et al., 2015). This is what we would 
expect if probability distributions were represented at the group level: most 
neurons signal similar information (are close to the peak), while fewer neurons 
signal deviant information (are close to the tails). Alternatively, some 
frameworks propose that neurons encode the sufficient statistics, that is, the 
mean and standard deviation of the posterior density functions (Knill & Pouget, 
2004), or that their activity reflects the inference itself (Lee & Mumford, 2003).  
The ideas summarised in this section – of the brain as a Bayesian inference 
machine, and particularly the free-energy principle – are not argued to be ‘true’, 
and are not presented in order to introduce work aiming to lend support to this 
framework. Rather, this framework offers us a set of unifying principles under 
which to consider cognition, and allows us to conceptualise processes from 
perception to attention, expectation, value, motivation and more, in terms of just 
a small set of concepts common to all function: hierarchy, priors, prediction 
errors and precision. This set of unifying principles, which, in its free-energy 
formulation, has been proposed as a unifying theory of the brain (Friston, 2010), 
motivates a key question which forms the focus of this thesis: if all brain function 
can be described in terms of priors and precision, consciousness should be 
explicable in these terms too. Thus, this thesis focuses on the role of priors in 
one particular facet of consciousness that is relatively amenable to 
quantification: subjective perceptual confidence.  
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2.3 ATTENTION AND EXPECTATION SHAPE PERCEPTION  
The way in which priors and precisions should shape perceptual content is 
largely consistent with empirical work on expectations and top-down attention. 
These top-down influences are usually studied separately, yet many paradigms 
thought to manipulate one may additionally manipulate the other. For example, 
Posner cueing (see figure 2.5) should divert attention towards the location at 
which the stimulus should appear. However, while this paradigm is used to look 
at attentional effects on reaction time, the cue concurrently induces a 
probabilistic expectation that the probe will appear in a particular location 
(Summerfield & Egner, 2009). Therefore, before considering how attention and 
expectation might shape confidence, it is important to determine how they 
shape objective perceptual judgements. 
 
Figure 2.5 Posner cueing paradigm 
Here, a spatial cue (usually with 75% validity) is presented before stimulus onset so 
that covert attention can be allocated to the task-relevant spatial location. A probe is 
then presented, either in the cued or uncued location. Here, the probe appears in the 
cued location. After the probe has been removed from the screen participants are 
asked to report the side on which the target appeared as fast as possible. The critical 
comparison in this task is reaction time differences between cued (attended) and 
uncued (unattended) probes.  
2.3.1 TOP-DOWN ATTENTION  
The multiple forms of attention are generally divided into two categories: one is 
stimulus-driven attention, often termed attentional capture; the other is top-down 
attention, which is driven by the agent’s goals or desires, and is under volitional 
control (Theeuwes, 2010).  
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Behaviourally, top-down attention improves the quality of information, adjusting 
the signal to noise ratio for relevant targets by determining features that should 
receive priority versus those that should be suppressed (Knudsen, 2007). 
Accordingly, attention increases the responsiveness of early visual cortex 
neurons to task-relevant signals (Martinez-Trujillo & Treue, 2004; McAdams & 
Maunsell, 2000; Saenz, Buracas, & Boynton, 2002). One popular idea is that 
top-down attention acts after a feedforward ‘sweep’ so that goals and motivation 
can target appropriate regions of the visual field (Bar et al., 2006; van Gaal & 
Lamme, 2012) and bias competition in favour of more important targets (Beck & 
Kastner, 2009; Desimone & Duncan, 1995; Hickey & Theeuwes, 2011).  
While attention tends to target signals in sensory and parietal cortices, its 
deployment seems to originate in the dorsal attention network: the frontal areas 
frontal eye fields (FEF) and intraparietal sulcus (IPS, see figure 2.6). Both FEF 
and IPS are candidate regions for representing salience or priority ‘maps’, 
representing regions of space according to their behavioural relevance, that can 
be read by perceptual or oculormotor regions (Serences & Boynton, 2007). 
 
Figure 2.6. Dorsal and ventral attention networks. 
Both networks are connected with visual cortex (V). The dorsal 
attention network consists of frontal eye fields (FEF) and 
intraparietal sulcus, (IPS), whereas the ventral network consists of 
ventral frontal cortex (VFC) and temporoparietal junction (TPJ). 
Figure from Vossel, Geng & Fink (2014). 
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Stimulus-driven attentional processes, particularly the detection of behaviourally 
relevant but unexpected targets, have been associated with a second network - 
the ventral attention network. This consists of temporoparietal junction (TPJ) 
and ventral prefrontal cortex (VPF; Corbetta & Shulman, 2002). These two 
networks most likely interact, deploying attention according to both top-down 
and bottom-up influences (Vossel, Geng, et al., 2014).  
In summary, top-down attention is conceived as a prioritisation process, which 
improves the quality of goal-relevant signals. Predictive processing frameworks 
model these effects as top-down modulation of precision-weighting, adjusting 
neural gain according to those signals that are of most importance.  
2.3.2 PRIOR EXPECTATION 
Top-down attention and prior expectations are conceptually distinct: while 
attention is allocated to signals or processes on the basis of priority or 
relevance, expectations tell us about what those signals are most likely to be 
(Summerfield & Egner, 2016). Their effect on perception is undoubtedly 
powerful (Gilbert & Li, 2013; Rauss et al., 2011; Sarter, Givens, & Bruno, 2001; 
Theeuwes, 2010). When a target is expected, for example it is predicted by a 
cue, because it is associated with the context, or because it occurs frequently, 
reaction times substantially decrease (Coste, Sadaghiani, Friston, & 
Kleinschmidt, 2011; Eickhoff, Pomjanski, Jakobs, Zilles, & Langner, 2011; 
Jaramillo & Zador, 2011), even after controlling for response preparation or 
anticipation (Umbach, Schwager, Frensch, & Gaschler, 2012). These findings 
are often interpreted as evidence that priors shape evidence accumulation, 
either by changing the initial evidence for more probable inferences, or by 
lowering decision thresholds for expectation-congruent choices (see section 
1.2.1). 
Whether expectations about perceptual content also increase perceptual 
sensitivity is a matter of debate. Accuracy and sensitivity measures tend to 
remain unaffected by expectation manipulations (e.g. Kok, Brouwer, van 
Gerven, & de Lange, 2013; Kok, Rahnev, Jehee, Lau, & de Lange, 2011; 
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Morales et al., 2015), but reverse correlation analyses suggest that 
expectations may increase signal to noise ratio (Cheadle, Egner, Wyart, Wu, & 
Summerfield, 2015; Wyart, Nobre, & Summerfield, 2012). These positive results 
are consistent with a role of expectations in facilitating the evidence 
accumulation process, for example, by adjusting neural gain, or precision, such 
that the neural response to probable features is amplified (Summerfield & 
Egner, 2016). While the role of expectations in perceptual sensitivity remains 
unclear, we know that expectations can bias decisions in favour of the more 
probable sensory cause, consistent with Bayesian principles (den Ouden, Kok, 
& de Lange, 2012; Summerfield & de Lange, 2014; Summerfield & Egner, 
2009).  
Indeed, there is now a wealth of evidence showing that a lot of perceptual 
decision-making is Bayes-optimal, in the sense that sources of information are 
combined in such a way that the influence of the most reliable information is 
maximised (see Chapter 1). For example, de Gardelle and Summerfield (2011) 
presented participants with a circular array of hues and asked participants to 
report the average hue. They factorially manipulated the mean (i.e. expected) 
hue and the variability of hues, and found that high means and low variances 
independently improved accuracy and sped decisions on task-relevant feature 
dimensions. Crucially, hues that were closer to the mean hue carried greater 
weight in participants’ averaging than outliers. This appropriate use of summary 
statistics when down-weighting outliers can be interpreted as optimal Bayesian 
inference (Feldman, Griffiths, & Morgan, 2009). Bayes-optimal incorporation of 
priors has been evidenced in a wide range of domains, including the estimation 
of motion trajectories (Körding & Wolpert, 2004), the application of force 
(Koerding, Ku, & Wolpert, 2004; Singh & Scott, 2003), object perception 
(Kersten, Mamassian, & Yuille, 2004), and cross-modal cue integration, such as 
across the visual and haptic domains (Ernst & Banks, 2002).  
The Bayes optimal observer provides a benchmark against which human 
performance can be compared. When behaviour is fit well by Bayesian decision 
theory, minimal conditions for the brain being Bayesian, or engaging in 
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predictive processing, have been met. However, non-Bayesian or suboptimal 
inference does not necessarily refute the Bayesian brain hypothesis. Rather, 
suboptimal inference may reveal constrains on the cognitive system, or reflect 
non-trivial priors and/or utility functions that we hold but that are not modelled, 
such as learned preferences and goals. For example, the size-weight illusion, 
where larger items are perceived as lighter than smaller items, is considered 
‘anti-Bayesian’, because inference goes in the opposite direction from the prior 
expectation that larger objects are heavier (Brayanov & Smith, 2010). The 
potential to accommodate anti-Bayesian phenomena in Bayesian schemes has 
led to criticisms that the framework is unfalsifiable (e.g. Bowers & Davis, 2012). 
One recent proposal has put forward the idea that the perceptual system does 
behave according to Bayesian principles, but uses an efficient coding scheme 
that maximises mutual information between the stimulus and the sensory 
representation. The authors show that under certain loss functions and when 
there is internal noise, this efficient coding scheme can lead to skewed 
likelihood functions, resulting in posteriors that are pushed away from the prior: 
‘anti-Bayesian’ effects (Wei & Stocker, 2015). This model illustrates how 
apparently suboptimal behaviour can arise from constraints on the cognitive 
system – here, the requirement of data compression.  
The notion that probabilistic information shapes perception is not in doubt 
(Firestone & Scholl, 2015), however it remains unclear how this occurs. For 
example, how are expectations encoded? How are expectations compared to 
sensory signals, and at what stage in the decision-making stream do they act? 
A key question addressed in this thesis that also remains unstudied is: to what 
extent do these influences carry over into subjective facets of perception? If 
they do carry over, how does this occur? 
2.3.2.1 NEURAL CORRELATES OF PREDICTION 
A key region implicated in predicting the sensory consequences of an action is 
cerebellum (Blackwood et al., 2004; Paulin, 2005). Cerebellar activity correlates 
with the discrepancy between predicted and actual sensory consequences of 
action (Blakemore, Frith, & Wolpert, 2001). Accordingly, monkeys with 
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cerebellar legions show impairments in predicting future states on the basis of 
current motor states (Ebner & Pasalar, 2008), and human patients with 
cerebellar legions are impaired in their ability to update predictive models about 
sensory consequences of action (Roth, Synofzik, & Lindner, 2013; Synofzik, 
Lindner, & Thier, 2008).  
With regard to how these priors shape sensory processing, it has been 
hypothesised that priors are communicated across cortical areas via oscillatory 
activity in either the alpha or beta bands (Arnal & Giraud, 2012; Andre M Bastos 
et al., 2012; Engel, Fries, & Singer, 2001; Engel & Fries, 2010). Alpha-band 
oscillations tend to be associated with top-down influences in the perceptual 
domain (Klimesch, Sauseng, & Hanslmayr, 2007; Mayer, Schwiedrzik, Wibral, 
Singer, & Melloni, 2015; Zumer, Scheeringa, Schoffelen, Norris, & Jensen, 
2014), whereas these effects move to the beta-band in motor tasks (de Lange, 
Rahnev, Donner, & Lau, 2013; Engel & Fries, 2010; van Ede, Jensen, & Maris, 
2010). In accordance with predictive frameworks, there is accumulating 
evidence for a crucial role of anticipatory (i.e. prestimulus) activity in these 
frequency bands associated with feedback signalling (van Kerkoerle et al., 
2014), in representing expectations of both ‘what’ (Mayer et al., 2015) and 
‘when’ (Samaha, Bauer, Cimaroli, & Postle, 2015), as well as in updating rules 
in accordance with cues (Cooper, Darriba, Karayanidis, & Barceló, 2016). Thus, 
8-20Hz neural oscillations are a strong candidate mechanism for the 
communication of priors.  
It also seems apparent that these priors are communicated to, if not 
represented in, sensory areas. When a portion of the visual field is occluded, 
the content of that occluded portion can be predicted from its surrounding 
context, such that in V1 non-stimulated regions are ‘filled-in’ (Petro, Vizioli, & 
Muckli, 2014; Smith & Muckli, 2010) by feedback signals (Morgan, Petro, & 
Muckli, 2016; Muckli et al., 2015). In V1, predicted stimuli are also more easily 
decoded, suggesting that their representation might be more precise (Kok, 
Jehee, & de Lange, 2012). However, there is relatively little convergent 
evidence for how and where (and whether) priors are encoded, which is 
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unsurprising given that priors will be specific to the task and stimuli at hand. It is 
therefore unclear whether findings from under one design would be 
generalisable to another. To illustrate, in simple low-level perceptual tasks, 
middle occipital gyri and fusiform gyri may represent relevant prior information 
(Summerfield & Koechlin, 2008), whereas priors for visual categorisation might 
be represented in medial frontal gyrus activity (Hansen, Hillenbrand, & 
Ungerleider, 2012). Orbitofrontal cortex may represent delusional perceptual 
beliefs (Schmack et al., 2013) and expected reward, while prior beliefs about 
expected reward may be represented in striatum (d’Acremont, Schultz, & 
Bossaerts, 2013).  
Brain regions that are thought to represent the prior may instead represent the 
posterior, as these two quantities are tightly associated. To address this 
concern, Ting and colleagues (2015) used a value-based learning paradigm, in 
which participants had to estimate the signalled value on each trial by 
integrating information from two cues: one which reflected the prior probability of 
reward and the other, the likelihood. Using model-based fMRI, they found 
posterior probabilities represented in medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC). 
Furthermore, mPFC also represented prior and likelihood. These results render 
mPFC a plausible candidate for computing the posterior belief in this task. On a 
similar vein, Vilares and colleagues (2012) orthogonally manipulated the prior 
and the likelihood, and found representations of prior information in putamen, 
insula and amygdala, of the likelihood in occipital cortex, and of the weighting 
function of prior and likelihood (precision weighting) in superior mPFC. Shifts in 
baseline evidence induced by priors were reflected in a fronto-parietal network, 
including medial frontal gyrus, but also superior and inferior frontal gyri and 
anterior cingulate. Though these findings exhibit variability in where Bayesian 
quantities are represented, they suggest that priors are generally represented in 
frontal regions, particularly mPFC, whereas the likelihood is represented in 
stimulus-specific areas.  
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2.3.2.2 NEURAL CORRELATES OF EXPECTATION VIOLATION (‘PREDICTION ERROR’) 
There are many experimental paradigms that can be used to test how prior 
knowledge or expectations shape perceptual responses, including 
manipulations of context, priming, oddball tasks, and probabilistic learning, yet 
responses to violations of expectation are largely robust across measures and 
tasks.  
First, fMRI has shown that unexpected visual targets are associated with an 
increase in BOLD amplitude over stimulus-specific sensory cortices (den 
Ouden, Friston, Daw, McIntosh, & Stephan, 2009; Eickhoff et al., 2011; Iglesias 
et al., 2013; John-saaltink, Utzerath, Kok, & Lau, 2015; Kok et al., 2011) that 
cannot be explained as repetition suppression (Larsson & Smith, 2012; 
Summerfield, Monti, Trittschuch, Mesulam, & Egner, 2009). For example, 
unexpected presentations of face stimuli are associated with an increased 
BOLD response in fusiform face areas (FFA) but not parahippocampal place 
area (PPA), whereas unexpected presentations of house stimuli are associated 
with increased BOLD in PPA but not FFA (Egner, Monti, & Summerfield, 2010). 
While these responses tend to occur in stimulus-specific regions, they can also 
be observed across cortex (Bubic, von Cramon, Jacobsen, Schröger, & 
Schubotz, 2009) and, remarkably, this pattern is seen in sensory cortices even 
when a target is unexpectedly absent (e.g. Todorovic, van Ede, Maris, & de 
Lange, 2011). Predictive processing or Bayesian brain approaches interpret 
these mismatch, or ‘surprise’ responses as reflecting perceptual ‘prediction 
error’.  
We see the same expectation violation, or mismatch, response in ERP 
research. One particularly relevant example is the mismatch negativity (MMN), 
elicited in oddball tasks when rare, deviant tones are presented within standard 
auditory sequences. Because this evoked response reflects a mismatch 
between expectation (the more frequent tones) and sensation (the deviant), the 
MMN has been interpreted in predictive coding terms as a neural signature of 
prediction error (Stefanics et al., 2014; Wacongne, Changeux, & Dehaene, 
2012). In a variant of the oddball task, individual tones can be local oddballs 
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and standards, but also entire sequences can be global oddballs or standards, 
depending on whether they rarely or commonly occur. For example, suppose 
the experimenter plays two tones: A and B. If they are presented in the 
sequences AAAAB AAAAB AAAAB AAAAA, the final ‘A’ tone is a local standard 
because it is preceded by a series of 'A's, but it is embedded in the sequence 
AAAAA, which is a global deviant. Using this design, Chennu and colleagues 
(2013) lent (indirect) support for another prediction of hierarchical predictive 
coding: that mismatch responses at higher regions of the cortical hierarchy are 
associated with violations of more abstracted or complex rules.  
Violations of expectation are associated with an increased ERP and BOLD 
response, but also an increase in high frequency, gamma-band oscillatory 
activity. Gamma oscillations have long been associated with stimulus-driven 
processing (Börgers & Kopell, 2008; Buzsáki & Wang, 2012; Donner & Siegel, 
2011; Kopell, Kramer, Malerba, & Whittington, 2010), and predictive processing 
frameworks hypothesise this frequency channel to be the mechanism by which 
prediction errors are fed forward up the cortical hierarchy (Bastos et al., 2012). 
Consistent with this view, evoked gamma-band oscillations are predominately 
communicated via feedback connections (Bastos et al., 2015; van Kerkoerle et 
al., 2014; von Stein, Chiang, & König, 2000). Furthermore, convergent evidence 
from both model-based analyses and experimental manipulations of prior 
probability have revealed that increased evoked gamma power is positively 
associated with the violation of expectations (Arnal, Wyart, & Giraud, 2011; 
Brodski, Paasch, Helbling, & Wibral, 2015; Brunet et al., 2014; Pelt et al., 2016; 
Summerfield & Mangels, 2006). Recently, the association between gamma 
oscillations and prediction error has received support from model-based 
electrocorticography, Sedley and colleagues show that local field potentials in 
the gamma band show a robust (albeit small) correlation with prediction error, 
but that gamma oscillations are better explained as precision-weighted 
prediction error (Sedley et al., 2016). 
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2.3.3 THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TOP-DOWN ATTENTION AND PRIOR 
EXPECTATION 
The data reviewed so far suggests that both prior expectations and top-down 
attention shape perception. At the behavioural level, attention primarily seems 
to target sensitivity, while expectations primarily seem to bias judgements 
towards those that are more likely to be correct. There is also converging 
evidence from a range of techniques that suggests attention increases the 
neural response to task-relevant features, whereas expectations suppress 
responses to stimuli that have been predicted. This motivates the important 
question of whether and how they interact.  
Bayesian decision theory proposes that priors should carry greater weight on 
decision under uncertainty (see Chapter 1), but this does not seem to hold 
empirically. At the level of behaviour, expectations decrease reaction times and 
bias responses independently of attention (Kok et al., 2012), though under 
inattention priors are incorporated into decision sub-optimally (Morales et al., 
2015). Evidence from functional neuroimaging and EEG may also lie contrary to 
the hypothesised relationship between priors and attention. Some research 
shows that inattention decreases the effects of expectation. For example, 
perceptual ‘prediction error’ responses to unexpected faces and houses are 
attenuated or absent under inattention (Jiang, Summerfield, & Egner, 2013; 
Larsson & Smith, 2012, but see Kok et al., 2011), and attention is necessary for 
face and house priors to be decoded from category-specific areas (Jiang et al., 
2013).  
By contrast, some research that shows expectations shape neural responses 
independently of attention. For example, priors about stimulus orientation can 
be decoded from V1 independently of attention (Kok et al., 2012), and deviant 
tones are associated with increased amplitude of early components of visual 
evoked potentials (VEPs) independently of attention (Hsu, Hämäläinen, & 
Waszak, 2014b). While further research is needed to understand the 
relationship between attention and expectation, it may be that the interaction 
between attention and expectation is dependent on the stimuli. Surprising 
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gratings and pure tones seem to induce mismatch responses independently of 
attention, whereas these responses seem to require attention when using face 
and house stimuli. Thus, it may be that the dependence of expectation on 
attention is associated with the extent to which stimulus-selective processing 
can be achieved pre-attentively: the detection of low-level features (for which 
there exist specialised neurons) can be achieved without attention, whereas 
more complex perceptual tasks, such object categorisation, cannot (VanRullen 
& Thorpe, 2001). Importantly, if this account can explain why some studies find 
a dependence of expectation and some do not, it cannot explain why results 
consistently deviate from Bayesian principles.  
2.4 SUBJECTIVE PERCEPTUAL CONFIDENCE 
Having seen that top-down attention and top-down expectation have dissociable 
effects on perception, sharpening versus biasing perceptual decisions, we can 
ask how subjective perception may be influenced by these processes. 
Subjective decision confidence is constructed from an introspective process, in 
which the subject estimates the probability that their decision was correct (see 
Chapter 3 for how this can be measured and formal treatments of decision and 
confidence). For example, I may be able to identify a person in front of me in 
daylight easily, but at night their features may be harder to detect, and I become 
unsure of whom I have encountered. In the former case, I will estimate my 
chance of having correctly identified the person at close to 100%, while in the 
latter it will likely reduce substantially in the absence of non-visual cues. 
Confidence (my estimate) differs from uncertainty (daytime or night-time), 
because while confidence is defined with respect to a decision, uncertainty is 
not (Pouget et al., 2016). Rather, uncertainty pertains to variability, and can be 
conceived as a distributional property of a state (the degree of ‘internal noise’ or 
the reliability of the representation), the stimulus (e.g. stimulus noise), the 
environment (volatility, that is, changes in the statistics of the world), or action-
outcome mappings (Bach & Dolan, 2012).  
We know that reports of subjective confidence reflect meaningful estimates of 
decision accuracy, because they strongly correlate with task performance (for a 
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review, see Grimaldi, Lau, & Basso, 2015) and task difficulty (Baranski & 
Petrusic, 1998; Maniscalco & Lau, 2012; Vickers, 1979). However, it is not clear 
how we are able to estimate our decision accuracy well, especially in the 
absence of external feedback. How do we know what we see? 
2.4.1 PERCEPTUAL DECISION AND CONFIDENCE ARE TIGHTLY RELATED BUT 
DISSOCIABLE 
It is clear that confidence is constructed, in part, from the same evidence used 
for the objective decision. First, if a subject is probed for a response during 
evidence accumulation, confidence increases with time, reflecting increased 
accumulation of evidence (Baranski & Petrusic, 1998; Festinger, 1943; Vickers 
& Packer, 1982). However, for un-speeded responses, high confidence is 
associated with faster reaction speeds, possibly reflecting faster evidence 
accumulation (Vickers & Packer, 1982; Douglas Vickers, Smith, Burt, & Brown, 
1985). We are also more confident in decisions when sensory uncertainty is 
low, or when the target is easier to discriminate (Baranski & Petrusic, 1998; 
Maniscalco & Lau, 2012; Peirce & Jastrow, 1884; Spence et al., 2015). Finally, 
confidence and decision evidence share common neural signatures at early 
stages of the decision-making stream, suggesting that they arise from the same 
information source (Fetsch, Kiani, Newsome, & Shadlen, 2014; Gherman & 
Philiastides, 2015; Kiani, Corthell, & Shadlen, 2014; Kiani & Shadlen, 2009).  
While decision and confidence are tightly related, confidence must incorporate 
additional evidence. We know this because decision accuracy and 
metacognitive accuracy (the correspondence between confidence and 
accuracy) can dissociate. For example, we can have above chance 
performance, yet no confidence our decisions (Marcel, 1993; Overgaard & 
Sandberg, 2012), which is best illustrated in blindsight patients (Ko & Lau, 2012; 
Leopold, 2012). These patients can respond to objects in their visual field, yet 
are not conscious of those objects. We can also ‘know that we do not know’, 
that is, be at chance accuracy while constructing confidence judgments that are 
sensitive to that lack of evidence (Scott, Dienes, Barrett, Bor, & Seth, 2014). In 
this latter example, if a subject has insight to their lack of knowledge that is 
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purely based upon objective decision evidence, they ought to have selected the 
alternative response. 
These findings refute models that assume confidence to be a read-out of 
decision evidence (e.g. Ratcliff & Starns, 2013; Vickers, 1979). Adaptations of 
these models allow evidence to accumulate after the objective decision has 
been made (e.g. Pleskac & Busemeyer, 2010). In these models, dissociations 
between decision and metacognitive accuracy are easier to accommodate. 
Furthermore, they are supported by evidence for ERP signatures of the decision 
variable, the error positivity (Pe), that continue to evolve after erroneous 
decisions such that evidence for subjective uncertainty is accumulated (Murphy, 
Robertson, Harty, & O’Connell, 2015).  
Although these models are promising, they are not particularly adept in 
accounting for asymmetries in how evidence is accumulated across objective 
and subjective decisions. For example, confidence is more sensitive to 
uncertainty than the objective judgement (Spence et al., 2015), and while 
uncertainty tends to be optimally weighted in objective judgements, it is 
underestimated in confidence judgements (Zylberberg et al., 2012). In a similar 
vein, nonconscious decision evidence can shape objective decisions but not 
subjective decisions (Vlassova, Donkin, & Pearson, 2014). Speculatively, it may 
be that uncertainty is incorporated into confidence judgements twice: first, 
sensory noise may primarily shape evidence accumulation, and second, 
confidence may additionally incorporate estimates of internal noise. However, 
other findings, such as the invariance of confidence judgements to evidence for 
un-chosen decisions remains problematic (Maniscalco et al., 2016; Zylberberg 
et al., 2012). 
2.4.2 NEURAL CORRELATES OF CONFIDENCE 
In humans, prefrontal and frontal areas seem to play a particularly important 
role in confidence and metacognitive monitoring (Fleming & Dolan, 2012; 
Grimaldi et al., 2015; Yeung & Summerfield, 2012). In particular, dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex (DLPFC, e.g. Lau & Passingham, 2006; Rounis, Maniscalco, 
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Rothwell, Passingham, & Lau, 2010), rostrolateral prefrontal cortex (rlPFC, De 
Martino, Fleming, Garrett, & Dolan, 2013; Fleming, Huijgen, & Dolan, 2012; 
Fleming, Weil, Nagy, Dolan, & Rees, 2010), and orbitofrontal/ventromedial 
prefrontal cortex (OFC/vmPFC, e.g. De Martino et al., 2013; Lebreton, Abitbol, 
Daunizeau, & Pessiglione, 2015; Rolls et al., 2010b; Yokoyama et al., 2010) are 
frequently implicated in metacognitive tasks. The default mode network has also 
been implicated in decision confidence (White, Engen, Sørensen, Overgaard, & 
Shergill, 2014).  
However, distinguishing confidence from its antecedents, such as the decision 
variable, modulators of confidence, such as expected reward, and ensuing 
processes, such as action plans, has proved difficult. Accordingly, many 
prefrontal regions implicated in confidence are also implicated in processes 
such as response preparation and evidence accumulation, particularly DLPFC 
(Mulder, van Maanen, & Forstmann, 2014). Fleming and colleagues isolated the 
process of introspecting on one’s decision accuracy from motor plans, by 
comparing conditions in which participants reported their confidence and 
decisions in which participants gave the confidence report presented on-screen 
(Fleming et al., 2012). This manipulation implicated rostrolateral prefrontal 
cortex (rlPFC) in the construction or communication of confidence, a claim 
further supported by the findings that rlPFC grey matter volume predicts 
metacognitive accuracy (Fleming et al., 2010; McCurdy et al., 2013), and that 
patients with legions in this area exhibit domain-specific metacognitive 
impairments while leaving sensitivity unimpaired (Fleming, Ryu, Golfinos, & 
Blackmon, 2014). These results implicate rlPFC in a role that is distinguished 
from report and the objective choice. However what is unclear is whether 
confidence is ‘computed in’ rlPFC, that is, whether rlPFC integrates all relevant 
sources of information into confidence, or whether rlPFC exists within a post-
decisional stream that iteratively refines the confidence estimate.   
While processes that are distinct from objective decision-making must shape 
confidence, it is not clear what these processes are. One plausible candidate is 
error detection, potentially arising in anterior cingulate cortex and reflected in 
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ERP components ERN and Pe. Error detection may provide information on how 
likely the decision is to have been correct, given experienced response conflict 
or additional evidence accumulation (Boldt & Yeung, 2015; Charles, Van Opstal, 
Marti, & Dehaene, 2013; Steinhauser & Yeung, 2010). This is supported by 
recent evidence that the Pe component, represented in posterior medial frontal 
cortex, evolves after an erroneous decision has been made, reflecting post-
decision evidence accumulation about decisional accuracy (Murphy et al., 
2015). While confidence may be shaped by error detection systems, an 
explanation of confidence in terms of error detection alone does not explain how 
the brain is able to infer the accuracy of its decision, especially in tasks that do 
not induce high response conflict.  
At least in part, this process appears to be domain-specific because 
metacognitive decisions in the memory and perceptual domain are subserved 
by distinct functional networks (Baird, Smallwood, Gorgolewski, & Margulies, 
2013), where perceptual metacognition primarily recruits anterior prefrontal 
cortex, as well as anterior cingulate cortex, putamen, caudate and thalamus. 
This domain-specificity is consistent with evidence that patients with anterior 
prefrontal lesions show selective impairments in perceptual metacognition 
(Fleming et al., 2014).   
Studies, especially those which implement model-based analyses, sometimes 
find representations of confidence in reward-related subcortical regions, 
especially striatum (Braunlich & Seger, 2016; Daniel & Pollmann, 2012; Hebart, 
Schriever, Donner, & Haynes, 2014), even in the absence of external feedback 
(Guggenmos et al., 2016). However activity in these regions might reflect 
implicit reward associated with believing a correct decision has been made, 
their association with surprise (Domenech & Dreher, 2010), task-difficulty 
(Green et al., 2013) or fluctuations in decision thresholds (Mansfield, 
Karayanidis, Jamadar, Heathcote, & Forstmann, 2011) that simply covary with 
changes in confidence.  
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2.4.2 DO TOP-DOWN INFLUENCES SHAPE CONFIDENCE, METACOGNITION AND 
AWARENESS? 
The key question addressed in this thesis asks whether top-down influences of 
expectation can shape subjective confidence. Little work has addressed 
whether top-down attention influences perceptual metacognition. Kanai and 
colleagues have shown that in attentional blink and dual-task paradigms, where 
attention is diverted either by the rapid presentation of distractors (attentional 
blink) or by a concurrent task (dual-task), participants are still able to detect 
attentional failures of awareness (Kanai et al., 2010). However when giving 
prospective confidence ratings, participants overestimate the cost of diverting 
attention from the primary task (Finley, Benjamin, & Mccarley, 2014). 
The role of spatial attention in confidence judgements is also unclear. Work has 
both shown that confidence is invariant to spatial attention (Wilimzig & Fahle, 
2008) and increases with spatial attention (Zizlsperger, Sauvigny, & Haarmeier, 
2012). Surprisingly, Rahnev and colleagues found that subjective visibility 
ratings disproportionately decrease with attention (Rahnev et al., 2011). 
However, their data also revealed an interesting relationship between attention 
and subjective visibility and stimulus contrast: with attention, subjective visibility 
increases with stimulus contrast, as would be expected. However, visibility 
ratings under inattention are relatively invariant to stimulus contrast. This 
suggests that under inattention, the integration of sensory uncertainty into 
subjective judgements is impaired. The authors capture this in a signal detection 
model, where inattention leads to more variable perceptual representations 
(Gaussians with a larger variance). They show that using the same confidence 
thresholds for attended and unattended targets results in fewer attended than 
unattended targets being reported as highly visible. These empirical results are 
difficult to interpret from predictive processing perspectives, as invariance of 
judgements to uncertainty cannot be accommodated by changes in precision-
weighting; rather, it suggests that prediction error arising from these unattended 
targets receives no precision-weighting at all. Alternatively, it may be that only 
goal-relevant targets are subject to context-sensitive gain control.    
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Indirect evidence from studies on visual awareness suggests that expected 
targets would be associated with higher confidence. This follows from work 
showing that expected targets receive preferential access to awareness 
(Chang, Kanai, & Seth, 2015; Pinto, van Gaal, de Lange, Lamme, & Seth, 
2015). We also know that prior exposure to a stimulus increases both 
behavioural reports of subjective visibility, and neural correlates of subjective 
visibility such as ERP component N2 (Melloni et al., 2011). Prior experience 
with a stimulus also seems to have a stronger effect on subjective than 
objective decisions, because training participants on a perceptual task in one 
spatial location leads to increased subjective visibility at untrained locations, 
while leaving sensitivity unaffected (Schwiedrzik, Singer, & Melloni, 2011).  
Interestingly, trial-by-trial confidence judgements seem to be shaped by 
expected confidence as well. Rahnev and colleagues showed that 
independently of spatial attention and stimulus contrast, confidence on one trial 
is positively associated with confidence on previous trials, but decision accuracy 
is not. Moreover, this ‘confidence leak’ persists when the task on previous trials 
differed from that on the current trial (Rahnev, Koizumi, Mccurdy, Esposito, & 
Lau, 2015). Consistent with this, Guggenmos and colleagues showed that 
confidence on a trial can be predicted from confidence on previous trials, and 
that the discrepancy between current and recent confidence may be associated 
with left ventral striatum (Guggenmos et al., 2016). Together, these results 
show that confidence cannot simply be a product of sensory processes, but 
must incorporate additional, confidence-specific influences.  
2.5 OUTSTANDING QUESTIONS 
This chapter has shown that top-down attention and top-down priors robustly 
shape objective perception, and that evidence for the perceptual choice is 
integrated into subjective confidence judgements. However, the relationship 
between top-down attention and expectation on confidence remains 
understudied, and the extant literature suggests that subjective judgements may 
not be affected by attention and expectation in the same way as objective 
judgements. The neural mechanisms underlying top-down influences on 
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subjective judgements also remain largely unknown. This thesis investigates 
whether and how top-down priors and top-down attention shape metacognitive 
confidence judgements, orthogonally manipulating these two key processes in 
order to separate their respective effects.  
In order to examine how perceptual priors influence confidence, this thesis 
implements a novel dual-task paradigm. Here, the critical task involves 
detecting a faint, peripheral Gabor target, and each block of trials is associated 
with a different prior probability of its presentation. Participants are informed of 
this prior probability before trials begin, however because the expectancy cues 
are valid ('true') they will be corroborated by the visual information sampled on 
each trial.  
This manipulation of priors is contextual, in the sense that they do not pertain to 
within-trial probabilities (for example cue-target associations, e.g. Kok et al., 
2011), but across-trial probabilities. This is important because trial-wise 
probabilistic information increases the risk of a trivial confidence attribution, 
especially for explicit cues, such that the participant may consciously derive 
their confidence report from the prior information.  
Recent work has begun to delineate between effects of prior expectations and 
of attention on perceptual decision-making, and for this reason, all empirical 
chapters here manipulated attention and expectation orthogonally, while 
keeping detection sensitivity constant across conditions. The attentional 
manipulation used throughout the thesis was dual-task, where attention was 
either fully allocated to the critical target detection task, or shared with a central 
visual search task. Motivational salience associated with expecting Gabor 
presence should be minimised when attention is diverted. In Chapters 4 and 6, 
the Gabor target has a gradual onset and offset, minimising the chances of 
attentional capture.   
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3 
INFERENCES ABOUT CONSCIOUSNESS 
USING SUBJECTIVE REPORTS OF 
CONFIDENCE 
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3.1 OVERVIEW 
An important aspect of consciousness is the ability to reflect upon one’s own 
thoughts, an insight which can be traced back to John Locke, who stated that 
“consciousness is the perception of what passes in a man’s own mind” (Locke, 
1700). This definition of consciousness forms the basis of Higher Order Thought 
(HOT) theories of phenomenal consciousness (Gennaro 2004; Lau & Rosenthal 
2011; Rosenthal 1986), which posit that it is those states for which we have 
some representation or conceptualisation that we have phenomenology for. It is 
not necessary to subscribe to this account of consciousness to appreciate that 
our ability to reflect upon our own thoughts and decisions taps into an important 
facet of awareness. We can operationalise the ability to evaluate these 
decisions as metacognitive sensitivity or metacognitive accuracy, terms used 
interchangeably here. These are defined as the ability to judge the correctness 
of one’s own decisions. We say that metacognitive accuracy is high when 
decision confidence exhibits a positive association with decision accuracy. So, a 
subject with high metacognitive accuracy ‘knows when they know’, and will 
largely ascribe high confidence to correct decisions and low confidence to 
incorrect decisions. This Chapter will discuss ways in which confidence reports 
can be collected and ways in which confidence and metacognition can be 
measured. 
First, this Chapter will present a brief overview of type 1 Signal Detection 
Theory (SDT), used throughout this thesis to characterise objective task 
performance and decision biases. A more thorough account is given in 
Macmillan & Creelman (2004) and Green & Sweets (1966). This Chapter will 
also cover ways in which the researcher may want to measure confidence, and 
what we ultimately need from a good metacognitive measure. Next, it will move 
to a discussion of measures of metacognition and confidence. These quantify 
metacognitive accuracy by examining the correspondence between decision 
accuracy and decision confidence. Specifically, it will first cover correlation 
measures Pearson’s r and the phi correlation coefficient, and then move to 
measures type 2 D’, type 2 ROC curves, and finally meta-d’.  
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3.2 CHARACTERISING OBJECTIVE PERFORMANCE 
3.2.1 TYPE 1 SDT 
Signal detection theory (SDT. Green & Swets 1966; Macmillan & Creelman 
2004) models the way in which we make binary choice perceptual decisions. 
Here, the participant has to choose whether they should attribute stimulation to 
just noise, or to a noisy signal. Alternatively, the model can capture the choice 
between a noisy 'type A' signal and a noisy 'type B' signal. In this Chapter, we 
will consider the 'absent' versus 'present' scenario. However, all the methods 
work equally well for `A’ versus `B’: “yes” can simply be replaced by “left 
orientation” or “old word”, and “no” can simply be replaced by “right orientation”, 
“new word”, and so on.  
The signal detection model is illustrated in figure 3.1. SDT assumes that we can 
represent the probability of some decision evidence having been caused by 
target absence as a Gaussian probability density function (depicted in red). We 
can do the same for the target present case (depicted in blue). This evidence, 
represented on the x-axis, corresponds to an internal state induced by the 
signal. In this way, stronger internal representations of the signal, for example of 
stimulus contrast, will be associated with a higher probability of target presence 
and a lower probability of target absence. SDT assumes that the evidence 
required to report either option is determined by the decision threshold, which 
bifurcates the decision axis into evidence that will result in a “yes” versus a “no” 
response.  
This decision threshold, or criterion, is modelled as a horizontal intercept called 
c or θ. An unbiased observer will set their decision threshold at the intersection 
of the ‘target absent’ and ‘target present’ Gaussians, as is the case in figure 3.1. 
If the decision axis is aligned so that the peak of the ‘target absent’ Gaussian is 
at zero and has a standard deviation of 1 we will get c = 0.5. In this Chapter we 
will place the distributions such that an unbiased criterion gives c = 0. 
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Figure 3.1. Type 1 signal detection theory. 
Top panel. Probability of the internal representation having been 
caused by target absence (red Gaussian) or target presence (blue 
Gaussian). Sensitivity d’ is defined as the separation between the 
peak of the two Gaussians. Decision threshold c is represented as a 
black dashed line. If decision evidence exceeds the threshold then the 
participant will make report “yes”, and if it is less then they will report 
“no”. Here c is equally placed between the two Gaussians and 
therefore responses are unbiased. 
Bottom panel. These figures illustrate how we can predict choices 
from this model. On the bottom left the target is absent. ‘No’ 
responses in this case are correct rejections, whereas ‘yes’ responses 
are false alarms. On the bottom right panel the target is present. Here, 
reporting ‘yes’ is a hit and reporting ‘no’ is a miss.  
 
 
 
 
Table 3.1 SDT responses 
 Respond “present” Respond “absent” 
 Signal present Hit Miss 
 Signal absent False Alarm Correct Rejection 
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In this way, positive values of c are conservative, corresponding to a bias 
towards reporting “no”. Negative values are liberal, corresponding to a bias 
towards reporting “yes”.  
Detection sensitivity d’ is defined as the difference between the peaks of the two 
Gaussians, and is given in units of the standard deviation of the target absent 
distribution. Higher values of d’, indicated by a greater separation between the 
two distributions, correspond to higher sensitivity because there is a smaller 
portion of decision evidence that can support both choices. We can also 
compute relative c, denoted c’ and defined as c /d’. Here, c is taken relative to 
the distance between the two Gaussians. This measure quantifies how extreme 
the criterion is, relative to performance. 
If the assumptions of SDT are met, sensitivity d' will be invariant to decision bias 
c. The first assumption is that the two probability density functions are indeed 
Gaussian. In low-level perceptual tasks this assumption holds, because by the 
central limit theorem, the distribution of activity of a large body of sensory 
neurons responding to the target will approach normality. The second 
assumption is that the two Gaussians have equal variances. It is this second 
assumption that tends to be problematic in psychology research; however if an 
unequal variances model fits better, then the corrected d’a (see below) can be 
used instead. For example, yes/no tasks are thought of as being fit best by an 
unequal variances model. 
In order to calculate d’ the researcher collects data in a 2 x 2 design such that a 
signal is present or absent and the participant can be correct or incorrect. This 
leads to a table of response variables as shown in Table 3.1 and the bottom 
panel of figure 3.1. We can then calculate the following:  
𝐻𝑖𝑡 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 =  𝐻𝑖𝑡𝑠(𝐻𝑖𝑡𝑠 +𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑠) 
𝐹𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑒 𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑚 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 =  𝐹𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑒 𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑠(𝐹𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑒 𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑠 + 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑟𝑒𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠) 
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From these, task performance d’ and decision threshold c can then be 
calculated as 𝑑′ = ф!! ℎ𝑖𝑡 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒  −  ф!! 𝑓𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑒 𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑚 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒  
𝑐 =  !ф!! !!" !"#$  ! ф!!(!"#$% !"!#$ !"#$) !  , 
where ф!! is the inverse cumulative probability density function of the standard 
Gaussian distribution (also commonly known as the Z-statistic). These statistics 
are in the units of the standard deviation of the noise distribution when its mean 
is set to zero.  
If the researcher is assuming an unequal variance model, adjusted d’a can be 
calculated as 𝑑′! = 𝑠ф!! ℎ𝑖𝑡 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 − ф!! 𝑓𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑒 𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑚 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 , 
where s is the ratio of the standard deviation of the signal-plus-noise distribution 
to that of the noise distribution.   
By collecting confidence ratings, we can estimate s from data. From these, the 
researcher can obtain hit and false alarm rates for multiple decision thresholds 
(as described below in the section 3.1).  Subsequently, s and d’a can be 
computed from the best-fit values for the above equation for all hit rates and 
false alarm rates. However, if s has not been estimated to a good degree of 
accuracy we cannot assume that d’a and c are (approximately) independent 
(Macmillan & Creelman 2004). Furthermore, it may be problematic to infer s 
from confidence ratings that are subsequently used for further SDT analyses on 
confidence (Maniscalco & Lau, 2014).  
3.2.2 TRANSFORMING DATA WITH ZERO OR UNITY HIT RATE OR FALSE ALARM 
RATE.  
There are occasions when one obtains hit rates or false alarm rates of zero or 
one. In these cases, data have to be transformed to avoid infinities in the 
equation for d’. These arise from the ф!! function going to plus/minus infinity at 
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1/0. For d' to be finite, the hit and false alarm rates always lie strictly between 0 
and 1. For this reason, extreme hit and false alarm rates, that is, hit rate > 0.95 
or false alarm rate < 0.05, may generate unstable estimates of d’ and c’.  
In most cases, these situations can be avoided by ensuring that one collects a 
large number of trials per condition (at least 50) and that manipulations that may 
affect the decision criterion, for example performance-related reward or 
punishment, are not too strong. However, such a manipulation may be the focus 
of the experiment (as is the case in this thesis). In this case, extreme data are 
obtained then the researcher can use one of two main transformations. In one, 
the researcher only adapts problematic data. Here, in an experimental set-up 
with n signal present trials and (N - n) signal absent trials, a zero hit or false 
alarm rate would be replaced with 1/2n or 1/2(N - n) respectively. A hit or false 
alarm rate equal to one would be replaced with 1-(1/2n) or 1-(1/2(N - n)) 
respectively. Thus, each of these variables is transformed proportionately to the 
number of trials across which it is computed. For example, in the case that 25% 
of 100 trials are signal trials, a 0 or 1 hit rate would be shifted by 1/50 and a 0 or 
1 false alarm rate by 1/150. This method is called the 1/2N rule (Macmillan & 
Kaplan 1985).  
An alternative transformation, the log-linear transformation, was proposed by 
Snodgrass & Corwin (1988). Here, all data cells (total hits, false alarms, correct 
rejections and misses), regardless of whether they are problematic or not, have 
0.5 added to them. This is advantageous in that all data are treated equally, and 
in that it impossible to have zero or one hit or false alarm rates. This correction 
can be considered a (Bayesian) prior on a d' and c of zero (Barrett, Dienes, & 
Seth 2013; Mealor & Dienes 2013).  
Hautus (1995) modelled the effects of both of these transformations on d' and 
found that both transformations can bias d' measures. While the log-linear rule 
systematically underestimated d', the 1/2N rule was more biased, and could 
distort d' in either direction. Therefore, although the log-linear rule is 
recommended over its counterpart, minimising the risk of collecting data with 
empty cells is preferable.  
  
	
61 
3.2.3 TYPE 1 ROC CURVES 
If the assumptions of SDT have been violated we can create a model-free 
receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve, which plots hit rate against false 
alarm rate for possible type 1 thresholds. Accordingly, the area under the ROC 
(AUC or AROC) gives us a measure of detection sensitivity that is also invariant 
to response biases. Plotting the ROC curve requires participants to select a 
stimulus class (S1, versus S2), for example from 1 = definitely S1 to 6 = definitely 
S2. Then, the researcher plots hit rate against false alarm rate via hypothetical 
decision criteria based on different thresholds of the responses. If a response 
scale of length n has been used then there are n - 1 ways to partition responses 
into hypothetical levels of decision criterion. Each partition determines the 
boundary between S1 and S2. For example, first we would partition the data such 
that a rating of 1 indicates an S1 response and a rating of 2-6 indicates S2.  
 
 
Figure 3.2. Type 1 ROC curve. 
Each red circle corresponds to a (Hit rate, False alarm rate) pair, 
derived from a different partition of the response scale. These 
pairs shown us how the relationship between hit rate and false 
alarm rate change as decision threshold varies. The black dashed 
line indicates chance performance. The area under the curve 
(AUC) is the area between the chance line and the ROC function. 
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Then, one would partition such that a rating of 1 or 2 indicates an S1 response 
and 3 to 6 indicates S2, continuing until a rating of 1-5 indicates an S1 response 
and a rating of 6 indicates an S2 response. Therefore, for each hypothetical 
decision threshold one obtains different numbers of hits and false alarms. From 
these, hit and false alarm rates can be computed. As shown in figure 3.2, these 
are plotted against each other, producing a curve that characterises sensitivity 
across a range of decision biases without making assumptions about the 
underlying signal and noise distributions. The diagonal on the graph represents 
chance performance. The more than the ROC curve extends above the 
diagonal, the greater the sensitivity, in that for any given false alarm rate the 
corresponding hit rate is higher. Thus, the area under the ROC curve represents 
task performance.  
It should be noted that because it does not rely on the assumptions of SDT, 
ROC curve analysis is not technically SDT. If one does assume that decisions 
are made based on an SDT model (without necessarily assuming an equal 
variance model), then the Z-transform of the ROC curve can be taken. This is a 
straight line, and the area under the (non-transformed) ROC curve can be 
obtained from a simple formula in terms of the slope and intercept of the Z-
transform: 
𝐴! =  Φ 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡1+  𝑠𝑙𝑜𝑝𝑒!  
One potential problem with estimating type 1 ROC curves from confidence 
ratings is that they may conflate type 1 and 2 performance (Galvin, Podd, Drga, 
& Whitmore, 2003; Maniscalco & Lau, 2014). Additionally, if the researcher 
wants to examine changes in decision bias this will not be an appropriate 
analysis. However, a benefit of plotting an ROC curve or using SDT's d', is that 
task performance can be decomposed into possible drivers of the change: hit 
rate and false alarm rate. For example, some empirical questions might 
hypothesise a change in hit rate but not false alarm rate.  Kanai, Muggleton & 
Walsh (2008) found that transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) over 
intraparietal sulcus induces perceptual fading by demonstrating such an 
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asymmetry: Although d’ reduced with TMS, this was driven by a decrease in hit 
rate only. If false alarm rate (reduced sensitivity on target absent trials) had also 
increased with TMS then the d’ effect could not have been driven by perceptual 
fading, which by definition only affects target present trials. Rather, a concurrent 
reduction in false alarm rate would have implicated intraparietal sulcus in 
general perceptual performance.  
3.3 MEASURING METACOGNITION: PRECURSORS  
3.3.1 MEASURING METACOGNITIVE ACCURACY 
In order to investigate metacognitive judgements the researcher needs to collect 
both an objective judgement and a subjective judgement. Typically, 
experimental designs include some objective task, such as target detection or 
word recall, in which objective performance can be measured. To measure 
metacognitive judgements we use what is known as a ‘type 2 task’, a term first 
coined by Clarke, Birdsall & Tanner (1959) and Pollack (1959), and so-called in 
reference to the aforementioned type 1 task of making decisions or judgements 
about the ‘state of the world’. The type 2 task requires the participant to 
evaluate the accuracy of their decision. Galvin, Podd and Whitmore (2003) 
discuss the type 2 task and argue that  
“…The fact that the second decision [confidence that the trial was a signal trial] 
is a rating and follows a binary type 1 decision does not make it a type 2 
decision. If the second decision is a rating of confidence in the signal event 
rather than in the correctness of the first decision then it is a type 1 rating, no 
matter when it occurs.” 
Following this, it is advised that the confidence judgement requested refer to the 
accuracy in the participant’s decision. However from the perspective of 
consciousness science it seems counterintuitive to assume a distinction 
between asking for confidence in the signal and asking for confidence in the 
participant’s judgement; this suggests an asymmetry in the trustworthiness of 
the objective (type 1) and subjective (type 2) responses. If we instead assume 
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type 1 decisions refer to the state of the world (e.g. target presence versus 
absence), we can take type 2 decisions as probing the mental state or 
representation the subject has of the target. In this sense the prompt 
“Confidence” should be equivalent to the prompt “Confidence that you are 
correct”, though this has not been addressed empirically.  
3.3.2 COLLECTING CONFIDENCE RATINGS 
The traditional method of collecting confidence ratings is in two-steps: the 
judgement is made and then confidence is given, either in a binary fashion or on 
a scale. Whether confidence is collected on a scale or in a binary fashion will 
dictate the metacognitive measures available to use. Confidence scales (e.g. 
from 1 to 4) have the advantage of being more sensitive and they can later be 
collapsed into a binary scale, reducing the chance of getting 0 or 100% 
confident responses. However importantly, if conclusions about consciousness 
are to be drawn, we can only infer unconscious knowledge or unconscious 
perception from those trials where participants have reported no confidence. We 
cannot infer this from low confidence. Therefore, a rating scale should only be 
symmetrically collapsed into a binary scale if no conclusions are to be drawn 
about awareness.  
If the question of interest relates only to perceptual awareness and does not 
wish to use SDT methods, the Perceptual Awareness Scale is an alternative 
method of collecting subjective reports. This scale asks participants to rate the 
subjective visibility of their percept on a scale of one (no perceptual content) to 
four (clear perceptual content). Because the conscious content itself is not 
probed, the scale is more effective for simple (e.g. detection) than complex (e.g. 
discrimination) designs (Dienes & Seth 2010; Sandberg et al. 2010). 
These methods of collecting subjective ratings thus far have been ‘two-step’ 
procedures, which first request a type 1 report (e.g. yes/no) and then a type 2 
report (e.g. confident/guess). An alternative method is to use a one-step 
procedure, whereby participants are asked to choose between two responses 
S1 and S2 and high and low confidence at the same time. For example, a rating 
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scale could be used where the lowest value indicates high confidence in S1 and 
the highest value indicates high confidence in S2. This has the benefit of being a 
faster reporting procedure. Furthermore, because both decisions are reported at 
the same time this method may be preferable if the researcher wishes to 
minimise the difference in decision evidence available for the type 1 and 2 
reports. Indeed, in the perceptual domain, reaction times between one-step and 
two-step procedures differ while leaving the confidence-accuracy correlation 
unchanged (Wilimzig & Fahle 2008).  
3.3.3 WHAT MAKES A GOOD MEASURE OF METACOGNITION? 
In order to assess the ability of an individual to monitor the accuracy of their 
decisions we need to be able to separate the information on which their decision 
is based from the insight into that information that they hold. Accordingly, 
Maniscalco and Lau distinguish between absolute and relative metacognitive 
sensitivity (Maniscalco & Lau, 2012). Absolute metacognitive sensitivity refers 
only to the relationship between confidence and accuracy, whereas relative 
sensitivity refers to the efficacy of the metacognitive evaluation, with no 
confound of information quality.  
To illustrate, suppose that a participant shows higher metacognitive accuracy in 
task A than task B. It may be that this occurs because the participant has more 
decision evidence in task A. In this first scenario, both d’ and metacognition will 
change. Alternatively, metacognition may have increased over and above any 
changes in d’. In the former example absolute metacognitive accuracy has 
changed, whereas in the latter relative metacognitive accuracy has changed. If 
one wants to measure relative rather than absolute metacognitive sensitivity, 
objective performance should be equated across conditions. This is also 
important if the researcher wants to measure subjective confidence, because 
confidence will generally increase with increasing task performance (Grimaldi et 
al., 2015). Similarly, if the researcher is interested in metacognitive bias, that is, 
the tendency of the participant to report with high confidence, evidence should 
also stay constant across conditions and participants.  
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Many measures of metacognition are biased by objective performance, decision 
thresholds and/or metacognitive bias (discussed later in this Chapter). We 
therefore need a metacognition measure that is invariant to these factors, or at 
least allows us to separate them. For example, by demonstrating reduced 
perceptual metacognition after theta-burst transcranial magnetic stimulation to 
prefrontal cortex, Rounis et al. (2010) were able to implicate this area in 
metacognitive sensitivity. They used bias-invariant (type 2) meta-d’ (to be 
discussed later) as their measure, which allowed them to rule out the alternative 
interpretation that PFC is involved in determining confidence bias.  
It is important to note that dependence on decisional or confidence biases is not 
problematic if one is aiming more simply to rate the subject’s performance on 
the type 2 task. Viewed this way, metacognition may be facilitated because of 
shifts in metacognitive bias. Signal detection theoretic methods are useful 
because they allow us to consider the above points. By enabling the calculation 
of response and confidence biases as well as type 1 and 2 performance one 
can see how measures of task performance and decision bias interact. Further, 
one can see whether improvements in metacognitive performance can be 
attributed (at least in part) to specific changes in behaviour, for example, 
increased confidence specifically for correct reports. 
One also has to consider whether to obtain a single measure of metacognition 
across all trials, or whether to assess metacognition separately for each 
possible class of type 1 response, i.e. to use a so-called `response-conditional’ 
measure of metacognition. For example, in a target detection experiment, one 
has the classes “respond present” and “respond absent” (see table 3.3). Kanai, 
Walsh & Tseng (2010) defined the Subjective Discriminability Index (SDI) as a 
measure of subjective unawareness of stimuli, based on response-conditional 
metacognitive measures. Specifically, by using only trials where subjects 
reported absence of a target (type 1 correct rejections and misses) in the type 2 
calculation, they obtained a measure of metacognition for perception of 
absence. Their logic was that chance metacognitive accuracy implies blindness 
to the stimulus, whereas above chance metacognitive accuracy implies that, 
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although the subject reported the target as unseen, some perceptual awareness 
must have been present (inattentional blindness). This follows from participants’ 
ability to modulate their post-decisional confidence according to their accuracy.  
3.4 CONFIDENCE-ACCURACY CORRELATIONS 
The most intuitive measure of metacognition would tell us whether accuracy and 
confidence are significantly, and highly, correlated. Two main alternatives are 
available: Pearson’s r and phi. These are equal in the binary case, but distinct 
for the non-binary case (that is, if confidence is reported on a scale, the former 
can be used). 
For paired variables X and Y corresponding to confidence and accuracy values 
for n participants, the correlation r between confidence and accuracy is 
calculated as 
r = !!!! (!!!!!! )(!!!!!! )!!!!  
where 𝑠! and 𝑠! are the sample standard deviations of X and Y respectively. 
Alternatively, the phi correlation coefficient is calculated as 
φ! = 𝒳!𝑛   
where χ2 is the chi-squared statistic and n is the number of participants.  
When X and Y are binary, e.g. X equals 0 for low confidence and 1 for high 
confidence, and Y equals 0 for incorrect and 1 for correct, phi and r are equal to 
each other, and can be calculated from the formula 
φ =  𝑛!,!𝑛!,!! 𝑛!,!𝑛!,!𝑛.,!𝑛.,!𝑛!,.𝑛!,.  
where nx,y is the total number of trials on which X = x and Y = y, and n.,y and nx,. 
are respectively the total number of trials for which Y = y and X = x. Though 
simple, the problem with such a measure (and indeed, with any non-signal 
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detection theoretic measure) is that r and φ can be inflated by bias without there 
being a true improvement in metacognitive accuracy. To illustrate, imagine a 
stimulus detection paradigm in which all participants perform at 70% accuracy. 
If one participant has a bias towards being confident whereas another tends to 
say they are guessing, the first of these participants will have a higher 
correlation between confidence and accuracy than the second without 
necessarily having increased insight into their own decision accuracy.  
3.5 GOODMAN-KRUSKAL GAMMA COEFFICIENT 
The Goodman-Kruskal Gamma coefficient, G (Goodman & Kruskal 1954)  is a 
non-parametric analogue of the signal detection theoretic measure d’.  Its 
appeal lies in its straightforward probabilistic operationalization, which 
overcomes problems surrounding assumptions about equal variance or 
normality. In its original form it is computed via the same 2 x 2 factors as d’ and 
it can be extended to cases in which ratings are given on a response plus 
confidence scale (e.g. 1 = very confident no, 6 = very confident yes). By being 
distribution-free it hoped to also be a flexible measure of metacognitive 
accuracy when applied to type 2 data (Nelson 1984). Task performance V is 
characterised as follows for a 2 x 2 design, the construction aimed at eliminating 
dependence on overall response bias. Suppose there are two trials and one of 
them is `stimulus present’ and one of them is `stimulus absent’, and the subject 
responds `present’ on one trial and `absent’ on the other. Then V is the 
probability that these responses match the stimulus.  The estimate of this 
(obtained from the data from all trials) is given by:  
𝑉 =  Σ ℎ𝑖𝑡𝑠 × Σ 𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑟𝑒𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠Σ ℎ𝑖𝑡𝑠 ×  Σ 𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑟𝑒𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 + (Σ 𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑠 × Σ 𝑓𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑒 𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑠) 
The Gamma coefficient is then given by  
𝐺 = 2𝑉 − 1 =  (Σ ℎ𝑖𝑡𝑠 × Σ 𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑟𝑒𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠)− (Σ 𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑠 ×Σ 𝑓𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑒 𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑠) Σ ℎ𝑖𝑡𝑠 ×  Σ 𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑟𝑒𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 + (Σ 𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑠 ×Σ 𝑓𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑒 𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑠) 
To assess metacognitive performance, pairs of responses (on the confidence 
scale) are combined to produce an analogue of V. There is no simple formula 
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for the general (non 2 x 2) case, so for a thorough explanation we refer the 
reader to Masson & Rotello (Masson & Rotello, 2009). 
In order to verify G’s supposed invariance to bias and distributional 
assumptions, Masson & Rotello (2009) simulated datasets in which 
metacognitive sensitivity was fixed and calculated G. More specifically, a 2AFC 
task was modelled as two probability distributions representing each choice. 
The difference between the means of these distributions was adjusted on 
simulation runs such that “population gamma”, calculated by randomly sampling 
from the distributions in order to approximate the proportion of cases where 
A>B, was fixed. It was then compared to the Gamma obtained when 
considering decision biases. Indeed, they found that G does get distorted by 
decisional biases. Moreover, this distortion increased when data were simulated 
from an unequal variance model, suggesting that the invariance under 
reasonable changes to distributional assumptions may not hold.  
3.6 TYPE 2 D’ 
Type 2 signal detection theory extends the logic of its type 1 counterpart by 
using confidence reports to map onto detection accuracy (Kunimoto et al. 2001; 
Macmillan & Creelman 2004). It assumes that correct and incorrect responses 
can be plotted on a ‘type 2’ decision axis as Gaussian random variables, 
analogously to the signal and noise distributions in type 1 SDT. Under the 
assumption that confidence is based on the same evidence as the type 1 
decision, the type 2 axis is a transformation of the type 1 axis. The distance 
between the peaks of the distributions gives us our measure of metacognitive 
sensitivity, type 2 D’.  
As shown in figure 3.2, type 2 variables are computed analogously to type 1 
variables, but instead of examining the correspondence between signal and 
response, response accuracy and confidence are compared. We define a type 2 
hit as a confident and correct response, a type 2 false alarm as a confident but 
incorrect response, a type 2 miss as a correct but unconfident response and a 
type 2 correct rejection as an appropriately unconfident, incorrect response. 
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Metacognitive accuracy measure type 2 D’ is then calculated analogously to 
type 1 d’. We subtract the normalised type 2 hit rate from the normalised type 2 
false alarm rate. The type 2 criterion, denoted C, represents metacognitive bias. 
This quantity reflects the extent to which the subject is over or under-confident. 
We may wish to quantify metacognitive accuracy or metacognitive bias 
separately for “yes” and “no” decisions (as is done in Chapters 4, 5 and 6). To 
do this trials are further be separated according to whether the participant’s type 
1 decision was “yes” or “no”.  
 
 
Figure 3.2. Type 2 D’. 
These figures depict the probability of the response having been 
correct  (green) or incorrect (purple). The separation between the two 
Gaussians gives us metacognitive sensitivity measure type 2 D’. The 
decision threshold type 2 C is placed somewhere on the decision axis. 
If the evidence strength is greater than this value the subject will 
respond ‘confident’, else the subject will respond ‘guess’. On the 
bottom left the decision was incorrect. ‘Guess’ responses in this case 
are type 2 correct rejections, whereas ‘confident’ responses are type 2 
false alarms. On the bottom right panel the response was correct. 
Here, reporting ‘confident’ is a type 2 hit and reporting ‘guess’ is a type 
2 miss.  
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Then, we can calculate separate measures of type 2 C and D’ using separate 
sets of trials: “yes” trials and “no” trials (see table 3.2).  
When the type 2 D’ measure was proposed by Kunimoto et al. (2001) it 
generated much excitement, because it was thought to be invariant to bias like 
type 1 d’. Unfortunately, this is not the case. Kunimoto tested this measure with 
a wagering paradigm, where confidence was assessed by the magnitude of 
participants’ wager on each trail. Crucially, the total wager they could place was 
fixed for each session meaning that confidence biases were artificially fixed by 
the nature of the authors’ paradigm. Indeed, the claim that D’ is invariant to 
metacognitive bias has been found to neither hold empirically (Evans & 
Azzopardi 2007) nor theoretically (Barrett et al 2013) when type 1 and 2 
decisions are made based on the same evidence.  
Table 3.2. Response-conditional type 2 response types 
 Report “yes” Report “no” 
 Correct Incorrect Correct Incorrect 
 Type 1 hit Type 1 FA Type 1 CR Type 1 miss 
Confident Type 2 Hit Type 2 FA Type 2 Hit Type 2 FA 
Guess Type 2 Miss Type 2 CR Type 2 Miss Type 2 CR 
FA false alarm, CR correct rejection 
Barrett et al. (2013) found that under certain circumstances D' is highly 
unstable. For example, if the type 1 criterion is placed where the noise and 
signal and noise distributions intersect (i.e. c is unbiased) then D' is maximised 
when the observer is maximally unconfident, which would be a nonsensical and 
mal-adaptive strategy. By varying decision and confidence thresholds, Barrett 
and colleagues also found that D’ can range from being negative (which is 
difficult to interpret in a meaningful way) to being greater than type 1 d’. 
Importantly, these analyses demonstrate a high reliance of D' on decision and 
confidence thresholds. The behaviour of type 2 D', then, does not suggest it to 
be a reliable measure of metacognition. 
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As well as being biased by decision and confidence thresholds, the validity of 
the underlying statistical assumptions of type 2 D' is also questionable. 
Specifically, the evidence for correct and incorrect responses cannot be 
represented as Gaussian distributions along a single decision axis (Maniscalco 
& Lau 2012). Galvin and colleagues have shown that no transformation of the 
type 1 decision axis will lead to the probability of correct and incorrect 
responses being normally distributed (Galvin et al., 2003). Therefore, if a single 
pathway underlies both type 1 and 2 decisions then D’ is not a measure of 
metacognition that arises naturally from SDT modelling. 
Despite these problems, in some scenarios type 2 D’ can still be useful as a 
basic measure of type 2 performance, especially if response bias is small. For 
example, if there is an insufficient number of trials to use more robust measures 
then the researcher may wish to use D'. However, strong conclusions from 
analyses under type 2 D’ and type 2 C should not be drawn.  
3.7 TYPE 2 SDT 
Type 2 D’ is not the only way to envisage a type 2 signal detection theoretic 
model of metacognition. An alternative way to capture type 2 decisions is to 
overlay confidence thresholds onto the type 1 decision axis. As shown in figure 
3.3A, confidence thresholds τ+ and τ- flank the type 1 decision threshold such 
that confidence is high when evidence X is less than τ- or greater than τ+ and 
low otherwise. Although this renders type 2 D’ an unprincipled measure, it 
invites certain promising alternatives, namely type 2 ROC curves and meta-d’, 
as described in sections 3.5.2 and 3.5.3 respectively. 
3.7.1 CONFIDENCE THRESHOLDS OVER THE TYPE 1 DECISION AXIS 
As mentioned in section 3.4, type 2 C gives us a measure of confidence as a 
function of decision accuracy. However, the probability of making a correct 
response and the probability of making an incorrect response cannot be 
represented as Gaussians under any transformation of the type 1 SDT decision 
axis (Galvin et al., 2003). An alternative way in which we can model 
metacognitive decisions is to examine the type 1 evidence required for a 
  
	
73 
decision to be reported with confidence. This entails placing two confidence 
thresholds onto the type 1 decision axis: one for “yes” responses, on the 
positive side of the type 1 decision threshold, and one for “no” responses which 
is placed on the negative side (Maniscalco & Lau, 2014). As these flanking 
thresholds approach the type 1 decision threshold θ (or c), that is, are tighter, 
less additional evidence is required for that decision to be reported with high 
confidence. So, tighter thresholds represent a more liberal metacognitive bias. 
This model can easily accommodate confidence scales with more than two 
points. One simply places more thresholds - one for each additional point on the 
scale. These must satisfy the assumption that the threshold for the lowest level 
of confidence extends the furthest out from θ, and increasing levels of 
confidence are associated with thresholds that are closer to θ.  
The confidence threshold on the left of θ, τ-, tells us the type 1 evidence for 
absence needed to report ‘confident’, given that the subject has reported “no”. 
To estimate this we can reclassify trials on which the subject reported “no” with 
high confidence as simply “no” trials and all others as “yes” trials. Then, we 
recompute type 1 d’ and c from these reclassified responses, which we call d’- 
and c - = τ-. Similarly, the threshold τ+ tells us the type 1 evidence needed for a 
“yes” response to be reported with confidence. This is computed analogously to 
τ-, but trials are reclassified as “yes” if the participant has reported target 
presence with confidence and “no” otherwise. 
As shown in figure 3.3B and C, if the subject has responded “yes” or “no” the 
underlying probability distributions may drastically differ, which leads to 
differences in sensitivity for these two decisions. Indeed, we would expect the 
evidence for target presence to be higher if the subject responded “yes” than if 
they responded “no”.  Because these distributions can differ, we cannot 
compare the response-specific confidence thresholds to θ. We need to 
normalise these thresholds by their respective response-specific d’s d’+ and d’-. 
We define the following: 
𝐶!!!  =  𝜏!𝑑!!     𝐶!!!  =  𝜏!𝑑′! 
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where 𝐶!!! is the normalised confidence threshold for negative responses over 
the type 1 axis, and where 𝐶!!! is the normalised confidence threshold for 
positive responses over the type 1 axis. These values 𝐶!!! and 𝐶!!! tell us how 
extreme the confidence threshold is, in turn informing us of how over- or under-
confident decisions are.  
Now suppose the researcher wishes to determine the distance between each of 𝐶!!! and 𝐶!!! and θ (depicted in fig. 3.3A as distance A and B respectively). 
These distances are computed in empirical Chapters 4, 5 and 6 in order to 
measure effects of expectation on confidence after controlling for shifts in the 
type 1 decision threshold. For θ to be comparable to normalised values 𝐶!!!and 𝐶!!! we also need to normalise θ. Thus, we can take c’ = c / d’, and compute the 
absolute difference between c’ and each normalised confidence threshold. 
Taking the absolute difference is important because “no” decisions will have 
less “yes” evidence for than “yes” decisions, and accordingly always be placed 
to the left of θ. We do not want negative distances. 
An important caveat here is that experimental manipulations that change 𝐶!!! 
and 𝐶!!! may be driven by changes in the variance of the type 1 distributions 
rather than by true metacognitive differences. This problem also arises when 
response-condition type 2 ROC curves are calculated (Maniscalco & Lau, 
2014), and so this problem may similarly plague these confidence thresholds. 
Results using this measure should therefore be interpreted with caution. 
3.7.2 TYPE 2 ROC CURVES 
While the type 1 ROC curve plots the probability of type 1 hits against the 
probability of type 1 false alarms for each level of criterion θ, the type 2 ROC 
curve plots the probability, for some fixed type 1 decision criterion c, type 2 hit 
rate against type 2 false alarm rate for all possible confidence thresholds. Just 
as type 1 ROC curves are robust to type 1 thresholds, so type 2 ROC curves 
should be robust to type 2 (and type 1) thresholds. However, because at the 
type 2 level there are two thresholds, τ+ and τ-, two parameters are left to vary 
freely (τ+ and τ- ). This means that the type 2 ROC is not unique.  
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Figure 3.3 Type 2 signal detection theory 
A. As opposed to the model illustrated in figure 3.2, flanking confidence 
thresholds are placed over the type 1 decision axis on either side of decision 
threshold θ. The confidence thresholds for “yes” and “no” responses are 
denoted τ+ and τ- respectively.These need not be symmetric. As is the case 
for θ, the confidence thresholds indicate the type 1 evidence for the decision 
that is needed to report with high confidence. Given that the participant 
reports “no”, the letter A between τ- and θ shows the additional evidence 
required for this judgement to be reported with confidence. The letter B 
shows the same but for “yes judgements.   B. Here, the participant has 
reported “No”. We see that the target present and absent distributions are 
very different to those in the top panel. As a result, even though the 
thresholds occupy the same points on the decision axis they will lead to 
different proportions of correct and incorrect responses. C. As for B, but for 
“Yes” responses. 
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The current literature posits three potential solutions to this. Galvin et al. (2003) 
suggested collapsing the two confidence thresholds into one likelihood function: 
the likelihood ratio of being correct versus incorrect. This enables a unique 
solution for fixed θ and is straightforward to compute. However, the authors still 
found a strong dependence of the area under the curve (AUC) on θ.  
An alternative measure, proposed by Clifford et al. (2008) recommends 
comparing the type 1 ROC curve based on a confidence rating scale with the 
ROC curve obtained by manipulating c experimentally. That is, if we manipulate 
the physical properties of the stimulus such that response threshold changes 
(e.g. threshold contrast) then we can plot the false alarm rate/hit rate trade-off 
across artificially induced criterion shifts. This is the traditional type 1 ROC 
curve. We can compare this with an alternative type 1 ROC in which changes in 
criterion are modelled by differentially bisecting into "signal" and "noise", an n 
point rating scale all n-1 ways. If metacognition is SDT-optimal, these two ROCs 
should be the same. This point follows from the assumption that an optimal 
observer would fully use the same information for the type 1 and the type 2 
decision. Thus, Clifford et al. proposed their divergence as a measure of 
metacognition. Again though, the degree of divergence is generally dependent 
on type 1 response bias. 
Finally, Barrett et al. (2013) constructed the SDT-optimal type 2 ROC curve; the 
type 2 ROC curve that, for fixed θ and fixed type 2 false alarm rate (F), gives us 
the greatest type 2 hit rate (H), Hmax (and therefore type 2 performance).  Like 
the formulation above, this describes the performance of the SDT-optimal 
observer. Unfortunately this curve was also found to be vulnerable to distortions 
from θ however because it describes SDT-expected performance it can be used 
to check whether data conform to SDT. If the researcher wishes to measure 
metacognitive bias (confidence), type 2 ROC curves will not be appropriate 
because they attempt to eliminate bias by design. 
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3.7.3 META-D’ AND META-D’-BALANCE 
Meta-d' measures  (Barrett et al., 2013; Maniscalco & Lau, 2012) are the current 
gold-standard in measures of metacognition. Meta-d' is the type 1 sensitivity 
that would be expected from the SDT-optimal observer, given the type 2 level 
information. In other words, meta-d’ answers the question ‘what level of type 1 
sensitivity would the optimal SDT observer need in order to obtain this 
confidence-accuracy relationship?’ Because meta-d’ is in d’ units, it can be 
compared to empirically observed values of d’ to quantify how suboptimal the 
participant is, or how this sub-optimality is changed by experimental 
manipulations. The difference between meta-d’ and d’ has a clear interpretation 
in units that correspond to the standard deviation of the noise distribution. Type 
2 D’ on the other hand is formulated in different units from type 1 d’, making it 
hard to compare these two measures directly. 
One assumes the participant has optimal metacognitive performance if meta-d' 
is equal to d'. Like the optimal SDT observer, they are using all of the evidence 
available. If meta-d’ is lower than d’, the optimal observer could show the same 
degree of metacognitive accuracy shown empirically, but will use less type 1 
information than the participant had. The ideal observer therefore outperforms 
the subject and the subject’s metacognitive accuracy is suboptimal.  It is 
assumed that meta-d' will never be higher than d', as this would suggest the 
participant performed "super-optimally". In practice, this would support a model 
in which the observer has more information when making the type 2 decision 
than when making the type 1 decision, for example, after having had feedback 
on the type 1 decision, or having had to make a speeded type 1 decision. 
There are several possible operational definitions of meta-d’, all of which rely on 
solving two pairs of equations, one pair obtained by considering type 2 
performance following a positive type 1 response (e.g. “yes”) and the other 
obtained by considering type 2 performance following a negative type 1 
response (e.g. “no”). All existing approaches fix the type 1 response bias (the 
relative type 1 threshold c’) to the empirical value, for the purposes of solving 
the equations for meta-d’. In general, the two pairs of equations cannot be 
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solved simultaneously. Maniscalco & Lau (2012) adopt a data-driven approach, 
by proposing two methods for finding the best fit: minimising the sum of the 
squares of the errors leads to meta-d'SSE, while maximum likelihood estimation 
leads to meta-d’MLE. 
Maniscalco and Lau's meta-d' formulation assumes symmetrical confidence 
thresholds. By contrast, meta-d’ balance (meta-d'b, Barrett et al., 2013) permits 
response-conditional meta-d’ for positive and negative responses to differ.  
They propose this as a theory-driven rather than data-driven approach which 
affords an alternative calculation of meta-d'. They derive formulae for both 
positive and negative response-conditional meta-d', but rather than solving 
these simultaneously, they take their mean solution, weighted according to the 
number of positive versus negative type 1 responses. Barrett et al. (2013) noted 
that the response-conditional meta-d’ measures do not on their own provide 
stable, bias-invariant measures of metacognition; stability only comes when 
they are combined into a single measure.  
Barrett et al. (2013) assessed how both meta-d'b and Maniscalco & Lau's meta-
d'SSE behave under non-traditional SDT models. In practice, empirical data are 
messy and the paradigm may induce certain changes in how we envisage the 
statistical distributions of signal and noise. Importantly, Barrett and colleagues 
found that under an unequal variance model, even when departing from 
standard SDT (i.e. when the signal is enhanced or degraded between the type 1 
and 2 levels, or when type 1 criterion is jittered across trials, representing 
fluctuations in attention) both versions remain relatively robust, especially when 
the type 1 threshold is varied. In these cases, however, meta-d'b seems slightly 
more consistent than meta-d'SSE, which is unsurprising given that meta-d'b 
permits differences between the response-conditional metacognitive measures. 
When variances are equal, both measures are largely invariant to changes in 
type 1 and 2 thresholds under signal-degradation, signal-enhancement and 
criterion jitter.  
Barrett et al. (2013) also looked at the behaviour of both meta-d' measures on 
finite data sets, and found that with small numbers of trials (approximately 50 
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trials per subject) both showed statistical bias and had higher variance than d'. 
However when 300 trials per subject were included in the analysis, bias 
approached zero and variance dropped substantially. Therefore to get the most 
out of these measures high numbers of trials per condition should be obtained. 
The calculation of meta-d' is optimal when no type 1 or 2 hit or false alarm rate 
is too extreme, and not possible when any of these take the value zero or one. 
This leaves one with two possible sets of data exclusion criteria to consider. 
The `narrow exclusion criteria’ only exclude a subject if any of the type 1 or 
response-conditional type 2 hit rates or false alarm rates are zero or one. These 
obviously maximise the number of subjects retained. An alternative choice is to 
use `wide exclusion criteria’ which exclude subjects if any of the type 1 or 
response-conditional type 2 hit or false alarm rates lie at the extremities (<.05 or 
>.95).  Simulations found narrow exclusion criteria to lead to greater variance of 
meta-d’ but smaller bias than wide exclusion criteria.  
In summary, both versions of meta-d' invert the calculation of type 2 
performance from type 1 performance into a calculation of estimated type 1 
performance given type 2 performance. Therefore, this method avoids many 
conceptual and theoretical problems related to computing an overall measure of 
metacognition. Moreover, these problems also seem to be avoided in practice. 
Although there is, as yet, no single, optimal computation for meta-d' it looks like 
meta-d'b is more robust to non-traditional SDT models whereas meta-d'SSE is 
less biased in small samples.  
The main drawbacks of the meta-d’ measures are that they are noisier than the 
alternative measures discussed above, and that response-conditional versions 
may be unstable. Nevertheless, these measures are most promising for 
capturing metacognition independently of response biases. In summary, these 
measures will give stable and meaningful results when sufficient trials are 
obtained and the standard assumptions of SDT hold to reasonable 
approximation.  
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3.8 MEASURING CONSCIOUSNESS USING TYPE 2 SIGNAL DETECTION 
THEORY 
The literature now offers robust measures of metacognition. So, how can we 
use measures of metacognition to deepen our understanding of consciousness?  
There are arguments in the literature for using metacognition as a robust 
measure of visual awareness (Kunimoto & Miller 2001; Persuade et al 2007). 
These arguments claim that decision confidence taps in to the subjective states 
that underlie awareness. In many cases, it would indeed seem reasonable to 
assume that confidence will correspond with accuracy only when a target has 
been consciously perceived. However, this presumption was violated in 
blindsight patient GY. GY demonstrated above chance metacognition (Evans & 
Azzopardi, 2007), yet is clearly unaware of visual stimuli in the blind field 
(Persaud et al. 2007). Metacognition and awareness can also dissociate, such 
that metacognitive accuracy as measured by meta-d’ is above chance for 
subliminally presented stimuli (Jachs, Blanco, Grantham-Hill, & Soto, 2015). 
Together, these results suggest that under certain circumstances we might 
(carefully) be able to use metacognition as a proxy measure of visual 
awareness or conscious knowledge. However, for a more rigorous assessment 
of unawareness we would hope to see a convergence with other measures that 
indicate unawareness – absence of EEG correlates such as the P300, for 
example.  
There is a debate to be had about how we should interpret a metacognitive 
measure with relation to awareness. Imagine participants A and B take part in a 
psychophysical detection task. If A's meta-d' is twice that of B, are they "twice 
as aware" of the stimulus? Are they twice as often aware or twice as likely to be 
aware of the stimulus? When metacognition is at chance it is much easier to 
interpret the results in relation to awareness than when making relative 
judgements between above-chance values. By contrast, subjective confidence 
may tell us more about the subject’s experience of the stimulus. High 
confidence in a perceptual task corresponds to a high subjective probability of 
having correctly reported the target, whereas low confidence corresponds to 
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uncertainty about the subject’s (task-relevant) perceptual content. Thus, these 
reports inform us about how the subject experiences the stimulus, rather than 
comparing this experience against the objective state of the world. 
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4 
PRIOR EXPECTATIONS FACILITATE 
METACOGNITION FOR PERCEPTUAL 
DECISION 
The influential framework of ‘predictive processing’ suggests that prior 
probabilistic expectations influence, or even constitute, perceptual contents. 
This notion is evidenced by the facilitation of low-level perceptual processing by 
expectations. However, whether expectations can facilitate high-level 
components of perception remains unclear. We addressed this question by 
considering the influence of expectations on perceptual metacognition. To 
isolate the effects of expectation from those of attention we used a novel 
factorial design: expectation was manipulated by changing the probability that a 
Gabor target would be presented; attention was manipulated by instructing 
participants to perform or ignore a concurrent visual search task. We found that, 
independently of attention, metacognition improved when yes/no responses 
were congruent with expectations of target presence/absence. Results were 
modelled under a novel Bayesian signal detection theoretic framework that 
integrates bottom-up signal propagation with top-down influences, to provide a 
unified description of the mechanisms underlying perceptual decision and 
metacognition. 
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4.1 INTRODUCTION 
Metacognition, or ‘cognition about cognition’, reflects the knowledge we have of 
our own decision accuracy and comprises an important, high-level component 
of decision making in both perceptual and cognitive settings. In perceptual 
decision, metacognition is often operationalised as the trial-by-trial 
correspondence between (objective) decision accuracy and (subjective) 
confidence. A key question in perceptual metacognition is how, and indeed 
whether, metacognition is affected by top-down influences such as attention and 
expectation. In the case of attention, it has long been known that it can improve 
visual target detection (Posner, 1980). However, the relationship between 
attention, confidence, and metacognition remains unclear. While Kanai and 
colleagues found that perceptual metacognition persists when attention is 
diverted (Kanai et al., 2010), other studies suggest that the absence of attention 
can lead to overconfidence (Rahnev et al., 2011; Wilimzig & Fahle, 2008).  
Inspired by the growing influence of ‘predictive processing’ or ‘Bayesian brain’ 
approaches to perception and cognition (Clark, 2013; Gilbert & Li, 2013; Gilbert 
& Sigman, 2007; Summerfield & de Lange, 2014; Summerfield & Egner, 2009), 
empirical work on top-down attention is now complemented by a growing focus 
on the role of top-down expectations in decision making. In Bayesian terms, 
expectations can be conceived as prior beliefs that constrain the interpretation 
of sensory evidence.  It has been shown that prior knowledge, either of stimulus 
timing ('when') or of stimulus features ('what'), facilitates low-level processing, 
as reflected in measures such as reaction time (Stefanics et al., 2010) and 
contrast sensitivity (Wyart et al., 2012). Such improvements are often 
accompanied by the attenuation of both the BOLD responses and ERP 
amplitude following expected relative to unexpected perceptual events (Egner et 
al., 2010; Melloni et al., 2011; Wacongne et al., 2011). As well as facilitating 
low-level perception, expectations may influence conscious content. This idea is 
supported by evidence for expectations inducing subjective directionality in 
ambiguous motion (Sterzer, Frith, & Petrovic, 2008) and lowering the threshold 
of subjective visibility for previously seen versus novel visual stimuli (Melloni et 
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al., 2011). These effects are similar to those exerted by top-down attention. 
However, while it has been argued that attention and expectation reflect similar 
processes (Desimone & Duncan, 1995; Duncan, 2006), orthogonal 
manipulations of attention and expectation have demonstrated that, although 
they are tightly intertwined, they can have separable effects on neural activity 
(Hsu, Hämäläinen, & Waszak, 2014a; Jiang et al., 2013; Kok et al., 2011; Wyart 
et al., 2012).  
One influential process theory within the Bayesian Brain framework is predictive 
coding (Beck, Ma, Kiani, & Hanks, 2008; Clark, 2013; Desimone & Duncan, 
1995; Friston, 2009;  Hohwy, 2013; Lee & Mumford, 2003). Predictive coding 
also posits that efficient processing is achieved by constraining perceptual 
inference according to the prior likelihood of that inference (‘expectations’). 
Here, the predictive models underlying perception are generally assumed to be 
multilevel and hierarchical in nature (Clark, 2013; Friston et al., 2012), 
incorporating priors related both to low-level stimulus features, and to high-level 
features representing object-level invariances. Plausibly, priors concerning 
subjective confidence for perceptual decisions may be implemented at high 
levels of the hierarchy. Based on this possibility, we set out to investigate 
whether the top-down influences of attention and prior expectation modulate 
perceptual metacognition.  
To address whether expectation can improve metacognition we orthogonally 
manipulated both attention and expectation. This separated their effects, and 
was achieved by adopting a dual-task design. In a Gabor detection task, 
expectation was manipulated by informing participants of the probability of 
Gabor presence or absence as it changed over blocks. In this way, certain 
blocks induced an expectation of Gabor presence and others, of absence. In 
half of the blocks, participants were instructed to additionally perform a 
concurrent visual search task that diverted attention away from the detection 
task.  
Objective performance can be assessed by using type 1 signal detection theory 
(SDT). By comparing signal type (e.g. present, absent) and response (present, 
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absent), type 1 SDT enables a computation of independent measures of 
objective sensitivity and decision threshold (d’ and c, respectively). We used 
type 2 SDT to assess metacognitive sensitivity (see Chapter 3). By obtaining 
trial-by-trial retrospective confidence ratings, metacognitive sensitivity and 
confidence thresholds can be computed from response accuracy and decision 
confidence. We used two such methods – type 2 D’, which is a direct analogue 
of type 1 d’ (Kunimoto et al., 2001), and meta-d’ (see Section 4.3.5.2 or Barrett, 
Dienes, & Seth, 2013; Maniscalco & Lau, 2012; Rounis, Maniscalco, Rothwell, 
Passingham, & Lau, 2010). Given that prior expectations have been shown to 
facilitate low-level processing, we hypothesise that expectations would also 
improve metacognitive sensitivity. We tested this hypothesis by considering the 
congruency between participants’ yes/no decision and the block-wise 
expectation of Gabor presence or absence. Specifically, we hypothesised that 
metacognitive sensitivity would be greater following expectation-congruent type 
1 decisions (e.g. reporting target presence when expecting target presence), 
than following expectation-incongruent decisions (e.g. reporting presence when 
expecting absence).   
4.2 METHODS 
4.2.1 PARTICIPANTS 
Twenty-one participants (14 female) completed the experiment. All were healthy 
students from the University of Sussex, aged 18 to 31 (M = 20.4, SD = 3.2) and 
had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. The sample size for adequate power 
was computed using GPower 3.1 (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007), with 
estimated effect sizes derived from pilot studies. Data from one participant were 
excluded because their visual search task performance deviated by more than 
1.5 SD from the mean (98.6% correct) and another, for having no variability in 
their confidence reports (100% confident). This left data from 19 participants for 
analysis, all of whom demonstrated, averaging over conditions, a Gabor 
detection d’ and visual search accuracy that was within 1.5 SD from the mean. 
Participants were offered course credits for participating and informed, written 
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consent was obtained. The experiment was approved by the University of 
Sussex ethics committee (C-REC).  
4.2.2 STIMULI AND SETUP 
Stimuli were generated using the Psychophysics toolbox for Matlab (Brainard, 
1997; Kleiner, D., & Pelli, 2007) and presented on a 20 inch Dell Trinitron CRT 
display (resolution 1048x768; refresh rate 85 Hz). Participants were tested 
individually in darkened rooms and were seated 60cm away from the screen. 
Both stimuli and background were linearised using a Minolta LS-100 photometer 
(γ = 2.23607, Weibull fit). The background was greyscale and uniform.  
4.2.3 DESIGN AND PROCEDURE. 
This experiment implemented a novel dual-task design, which is depicted in 
figure 4.1. The critical task was to report the presence or absence of a near-
threshold Gabor patch (which indeed, was either present or absent). The 
second task was a visual search task, in which it had to be determined whether 
a target (the letter ‘T’), had been present or absent amongst distracters (letter 
‘L’s).  
 
Figure 4.1. Trial sequence. 
Across both staircases and experimental trials. In this trial, both the visual search 
and detection targets (T and Gabor, respectively) are present. Participants are 
prompted to respond to the visual search display in diverted attention trials (final, 
bottom) but not full attention trials (final, top). δ  signifies the time that the visual 
search Ls and Ts were presented for. This time was titrated for each participant 
individually. 
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Trials began with the presentation of a white central fixation cross (0.38°x 0.38°, 
random duration between 500 and 1,500 ms). This was followed, on Gabor 
present trials only, by the appearance of the peripheral Gabor patch (spatial 
frequency 2c/°, Gaussian SD = 2°) in the lower-right quadrant of the screen. On 
each presentation, the phase was either 45° or 225° (50% chance of each). To 
reduce sensory adaptation effects, the precise location in which it was 
presented was jittered in both the horizontal and vertical direction from a 
baseline position of 25.2° x 21.08°. On each trial the jitter for each direction was 
randomly sampled from the interval [0.66°, 1.24°]. The contrast of the Gabor 
was titrated for each participant so that hit rate was 79.4% (see section 4.3.4, 
Staircases). In total it was presented for 388ms and had a gradual onset and 
offset. Immediately following the offset of the fixation cross, the central visual 
search array also appeared. On Gabor present trials, the Gabor and the array 
were therefore presented simultaneously. The array consisted of four white 
letters (1.43° x 1.43°) – either 3 ‘L’s and a ‘T’ (visual search target present, 50% 
chance) or 4 ‘L’s (visual search target absent, 50% chance) - arranged around 
fixation at 0°, 90°, 180° and 270°. 
Trial-by-trial, the orientation of each letter took a random value between 0° and 
359°. The time for which the letters remained on-screen was adjusted for each 
participant so that visual search percent correct was 79.4% (M = 254 ms, SD = 
75 ms. See section 4.3.4, Staircases). To ensure that the task was difficult 
enough to divert attention, the array of letters was backwards-masked by an 
array of ‘F’s that remained on screen for 300ms. This masking array was 
followed by a series of on-screen response prompts, requesting un-speeded, 
key-press responses to: first, the Gabor task (Gabor present or absent); 
second, binary confidence in the accuracy of that report (confident or guess); 
finally, and in diverted attention conditions only (see next paragraph), the visual 
search task (T present or absent).  
Expectation was manipulated in the Gabor task by changing the probability that 
it would be present versus absent over blocks of trials (25%, 50% or 75% 
probability of target presence). In the 25% condition, where Gabor presence 
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was unlikely, an expectation of absence was induced. The 50% condition was a 
control, and in the 75% condition an expectation of presence was induced. 
Orthogonally to this expectation manipulation, attention was manipulated over 
blocks of trials by instructing participants to either perform or ignore the 
concurrent visual search task. When participants were in a ‘perform visual 
search’ block, their attention was diverted from the critical Gabor detection task, 
whereas when they were instructed to ignore the visual search array, their 
attention was fully focused on Gabor detection. In the diverted attention 
condition, participants were instructed to prioritise the visual search task. Thus, 
each block was associated with an expectation of Gabor presence or absence 
and a degree of attentional resource for the Gabor task (full/diverted). Before 
each block began, both the probability of Gabor presentation and instructions to 
either perform both tasks or ignore the Gabor were presented on-screen. At the 
end of each block, if visual search accuracy had dropped below 60% on-screen 
feedback reminded participants to maintain their concentration on the visual 
search task. Participants completed 36 blocks in total (6 of each of the 6 
conditions, counterbalanced) and each block had 12 trials. This gave a total of 
432 trials.  
Before data collection began, instructions for the tasks were presented on-
screen. The on-screen instructions were additionally read to the participant to 
ensure that they were fully understood. These explained that the probability of 
target presentation in the upcoming block would be given (25%, 50% or 75%) 
and that the information was correct and would help them complete the difficult 
task. Participants were instructed to fixate centrally throughout and to be as 
accurate as possible in all of their (un-speeded) responses. Next, participants 
completed a set of practice trials for each type of task (staircases and 
experimental conditions). Next, three psychophysical staircase procedures were 
completed (see section 4.2.4) and finally, the experimental trials. Once all 
experimental trials had been completed, participants were debriefed. 
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4.2.4 STAIRCASES.  
We required performance in the Gabor detection task to be equated across 
levels of attention and across participants. Furthermore, the difficulty of the 
visual search task also had to be controlled across participants. To this end, 
three adaptive staircase procedures were completed prior to the experimental 
trials. The first staircase adjusted Gabor contrast under full attention, the 
second, the time for which visual search ‘L’s and ‘T’s were presented and the 
third, Gabor contrast under diverted attention. The staircases set performance 
(percentage correct for the visual search task and hit rate for the Gabor task) in 
each task at 79.4%. Each of the three procedures consisted of two interleaved, 
identical staircases, which terminated after 8 reversals. The visual display was 
identical to that in experimental trials (see section 4.2.3 and figure 4.1), however 
the reports requested from participants varied across procedures. During these 
procedures, confidence judgments were not requested and there was a 50% 
chance of Gabor presentation. 
In staircase 1, Gabor detection was performed under full attention (i.e. ignore 
visual search). Participants were instructed to fixate centrally, ignore the visual 
search display and report peripheral Gabor presence or absence. The initial 
contrast of the attended target Gabor was 5% and this was titrated by the 
staircases. The (ignored) visual search ‘L’s and ‘T’s were presented for 300 ms 
before they were masked.  
In staircase 2, the visual search task was performed but the Gabor task was 
not. Participants were instructed to ignore the Gabor and only perform the visual 
search task. Here, they reported whether a target ‘T’ was present or absent in 
an array of distracter ‘L’s. The visual search array of ‘L’s and ‘T’s were initially 
presented for 300 ms before being masked, and this duration was titrated by the 
staircases. The (ignored) Gabor, if present, had the contrast determined in 
staircase 1.  
In staircase 3, both tasks were performed. Participants were instructed to 
prioritise the visual search task while concurrently performing the Gabor 
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detection task. Visual search letters were presented for the duration determined 
in staircase 2. The Gabor was initially presented at 1.05 times the contrast level 
acquired in staircase 1. The contrast of the unattended Gabor was titrated over 
the course of the procedure. Participants responded to the Gabor task first and 
the visual search task second (as in the experimental trials). If participants’ 
mean visual search accuracy across the staircase dropped below 60% they 
received on-screen instructions to maintain concentration on the visual search 
task.  
4.2.5 ANALYSIS 
4.2.5.1 STATISTICAL ANALYSES.  
Objective detection performance for the Gabor detection task was assessed 
using type 1 signal detection theory (SDT; Green & Swets, 1966) measures d’ 
(detection sensitivity) and c (decision threshold). A negative/positive c reflects a 
bias towards reporting target presence/absence. Visual search performance 
was also assessed using d’ and c. Because we required d’ and c values to 
remain independent of each other, adjusted type 1 d’ was not used. Unless 
otherwise stated, alpha is set at 5%, the assumption of sphericity has been met 
and post-hoc tests are FDR corrected (Banjamini & Hochberg, 1995) 
throughout. 
 4.2.5.2 TYPE 2 SIGNAL DETECTION THEORY. 
 Metacognitive sensitivity was measured by obtaining trial-by-trial confidence 
ratings and using type 2 SDT to assess the relationship between confidence 
and accuracy (Barrett, Dienes, & Seth, 2013; Galvin, Podd, Drga, & Whitmore, 
2003; Kunimoto et al., 2001; Macmillan & Creelman, 2004). Type 2 measures 
are calculated analogously to the type 1 case: type 2 hits (correct and confident) 
and correct rejections (incorrect and guess) are compared with type 2 misses 
(correct and guess) and false alarms (incorrect and confident). From these, type 
2 D’ (metacognitive sensitivity) and type 2 C (confidence threshold) can be 
computed (Kunimoto et al., 2001). Type 2 hit rate (HR) and type 2 false alarm 
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rate (FAR) are calculated as follows (where the subscript ‘2’ indicates type 2 
SDT outcomes):  
𝐻𝑅 =  𝐻!𝐻! +  𝑀!  , 𝐹𝐴𝑅 =  𝐹𝐴!𝐹𝐴! +  𝐶𝑅! 
Thus, HR reflects confidence for correct responses and FAR reflects confidence 
for incorrect responses. 
 Type 2 D’ and type 2 C are defined as: 
𝐷! = 𝑍 𝐻𝑅 − 𝑍 𝐹𝐴𝑅 , 𝐶 = −(𝑍 𝐻𝑅 + 𝑍 𝐹𝐴𝑅 )2  
where Z is the standard Z-score, i.e. the inverse cumulative density function of 
the standard normal distribution. To distinguish type 2 variables from their type 
1 counterparts we denote type 1 variables in lower-case (e.g. type 1 d’) and 
type 2 in upper case (e.g. type 2 D’).   
It is known that type 2 D’ is highly biased by both type 1 and 2 thresholds 
(Barrett et al., 2013; Evans & Azzopardi, 2007; Galvin et al., 2003). An 
alternative measure is the ‘bias-free’ meta-d’. This is an estimate of the type 1 d’ 
an SDT-optimal observer would need to have to generate the type 2 
performance shown (for an in-depth explanation see Barrett et al., 2013 or 
Maniscalco & Lau, 2012). Importantly, meta-d’ is measured in the same units as 
d’. This permits a direct comparison between objective and subjective 
sensitivity. Considering meta-d’ as a proportion of d’ gives us metacognitive 
efficiency, or the amount of type 1 information that is carried forward to the type 
2 level. To take advantage of this feature we additionally analysed our results 
using meta-d’/d'. We calculated meta-d’-balance from freely available online 
code (Barrett et al., 2013). This calculation was supplemented by a maximum 
likelihood estimation of SDnoise:SDsignal+noise from the group-level data, also using 
freely available online code (columbia.edu/~bsm2015/type2sdt; Maniscalco & 
Lau, 2012). 
As described in the introduction, we hypothesised that metacognitive 
performance would be improved when type 1 decisions are based on prior 
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expectations. Testing this hypothesis requires comparing decisions that were 
based on (i.e. congruent with) prior expectations with those that were not. In the 
25% condition, target absence is most probable meaning that an ‘absent’ report 
would be expectation-congruent and a ‘present’ report would be incongruent. 
The opposite would be true for the 75% condition. We therefore computed, for 
each condition, type 2 D’ following ‘present’ responses (hits and false alarms) 
and type 2 D’ following ‘absent’ responses (misses and correct rejections). 
Analogous response-conditional meta-d’ estimates were obtained from freely 
available online code (see Barrett et al., 2013, supplementary materials). 
Unfortunately, response-conditional meta-d' is unlikely to be robust to criterion 
shifts like its response-unconditional counterpart (Barrett et al., 2013). 
For all type 2 measures, a significant response by expectation interaction would 
demonstrate an effect of congruency. Note that we could not use a standard 
(i.e. response-unconditional) D' or meta-d' measure, because in this case 
degraded metacognition following one response could cancel out the improved 
metacognition following the alternative response. 
4.3 RESULTS 
4.3.1 EXPECTATION CAN BE SEPARATED FROM ATTENTION 
To verify that the concurrent visual search task successfully manipulated 
attention we compared the contrast thresholds obtained in the full and diverted 
attention staircases. As expected, a one-tailed paired t-test revealed a 
significant increase in contrast in the dual-task (M = 0.080, SE = 0.011) relative 
to the single-task (M = 0.032, SE = 0.002) conditions, bootstrapped t(18) = 4.64, 
p = .001, 95% CI = [-0.06, -0.03], dz = 1.06. Thus, the paradigm successfully 
manipulated attention.  
Next, the effects of expectation and attention on each of (Gabor) detection 
sensitivity d' and (Gabor) decision threshold c were examined. These analyses 
addressed three questions: first, whether d' had been successfully equated 
across levels of attention and expectation; second, whether the expectation 
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manipulation successfully biased c; third, whether expectation and attention 
were successfully separated at the type 1 level (i.e. did not interact under d' or 
c).  
First, we performed a repeated-measures Expectation (0.25, 0.5, 0.75) x 
Attention (full, diverted) analysis of variance (ANOVA) on type 1 d'. This 
revealed that sensitivity did not significantly differ across the full (M = 2.39, SE = 
0.16) and diverted (M = 2.00 SE = 0.18) attention conditions, F(1, 18) = 3.03, p 
= .099, ηp2 = .144, or across Expectation conditions (M.25 = 2.15, SE0.25 = 0.11, 
M.50 = 2.28, SE.50  = 0.15, M.75 = 2.14, M.75  0.13), F(2, 36) = 2.12, p = .124, ηp2E 
= .101 (Figure 4.2 A). Type 1 sensitivity was therefore successfully equated 
across all six conditions. This means that any changes in type 2 sensitivity 
cannot be attributed to changes in the amount of type 1 information. There was 
no significant interaction between Attention and Expectation under d', F(2, 36) = 
1.12, p = .34, ηp2 = .059, suggesting that the two factors were successfully 
separated with respect to type 1 detection performance.  
A repeated-measures Expectation (0.25, 0.5, 0.75) x Attention (full, diverted) 
analysis of variance (ANOVA) under decision threshold c revealed a significant 
main effect of Expectation, F(2, 36) = 9.18, p = .001, ηp2 = .338. A trend analysis 
demonstrated that decision threshold linearly liberalised (more likely to report 
target present) as the probability of target presence increased, F(1, 18) = 15.72, 
p =.001, ηp2 = .466. The paradigm therefore successfully manipulated 
expectation. Attention had no significant main effect on decision threshold, 
F(1,18) = 3.14, p =.093, ηp2 = .148 and did not significantly interact with 
Expectation, F(2,36) = 0.85, p = .434, ηp2 = .045 (Figure 4.2B). Therefore, 
attention and expectation were separated with respect to type 1 decision 
threshold, as well as type 1 sensitivity. 
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Figure 4.2. Effects of expectation and attention on sensitivity and bias  
A. Type 1 d’ as a function of expectation and attention. B. Type 1 criterion c as a 
function of expectation and attention. Error bars represent within-subjects SEM. 
 *** p < .001,  ** p < .01, * p < .05, n.s. non-significant. 
In the diverted attention condition, participants were instructed to perform the 
detection and the visual search task simultaneously, prioritising visual search. 
However, if participants were unable to divide their attention across the two 
tasks then we would expect a significant negative correlation between trial-by-
trial Gabor detection and visual search accuracy. To address this question we 
computed the Spearman's correlation coefficient between trial-by-trial detection 
accuracy scores on the two tasks for each participant. A one-sample 
bootstrapped t-test against zero revealed that at the group-level there was no 
significant trade-off in performance between the two tasks, M = 0.02, SD = 0.09, 
t(18) = 0.94, p = .361, 95% CI [-.023, .059]. Thus, participants were able to 
perform the two perceptual tasks simultaneously. 
Participants were able to perform the tasks simultaneously, but if the visual 
search task interfered with Gabor detection sensitivity, we might expect a 
significant negative correlation between experiment-wise performance in the 
two tasks. To address this concern we calculated d’ and c for the visual search 
responses and correlated them with their Gabor detection counterparts. Across 
participants there was no significant (Pearson's) correlation between visual 
search d’ and (diverted attention) Gabor d’, r(19) = .250, p = .302, bootstrapped 
95% CI [-.326, .623]. Similarly, there was no significant (Pearson's) correlation 
between type 1 decision thresholds for the two tasks, r(19) = .359, p = .131, 
bootstrapped 95% CI [-.043, .723]. These results suggest that performing the 
visual search task did not significantly interfere with performing the Gabor 
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detection task. This, combined with the absence of a negative correlation 
between trial-by-trial accuracy on the two tasks and with the absence of 
attention by expectation interactions under d' and c, demonstrates that attention 
and expectation were sufficiently separated at the type 1 level. 
The results so far indicate that the paradigm successfully influenced both 
expectation (participants were more likely to report target absence when the 
probability of target presentation was low than when it was high) and attention 
(contrast sensitivity was reduced when attention was diverted). Furthermore, 
they indicate that expectation and attention did not significantly interact. Given 
this, we were able to examine how metacognitive sensitivity is specifically 
affected by expectation and attention, without confounds of task difficulty. 
4.3.2 EXPECTATION IMPROVES METACOGNITIVE PERFORMANCE 
Our main hypothesis was that metacognition would be improved following an 
expectation-congruent response. In the 25% condition, where target absence is 
expected, misses and correct rejections ('no') would be expectation-congruent 
responses and false alarms and hits ('yes') would be incongruent. The reverse 
is true for the 75% condition, where target presence is expected.  
To test our hypothesis, response-conditional type 2 D’s (see Methods) were 
subjected to a repeated-measures Expectation (0.25, 0.5, 0.75) x Attention (full, 
diverted) x Report (present, absent) analysis of variance (ANOVA).  
Critically, the ANOVA revealed a significant two-way interaction between 
Expectation and Report, F(2,36) = 5.60, p =.008, ηp2 = .238. To further probe 
this effect we collapsed across attention conditions and performed a priori trend 
analyses. D’ for target present reports exhibited a significant linear trend with 
Expectation, F(1,18) = 13.85, p = .001 (1-tailed), η2 = .435 such that as the 
probability of target presentation increased from 25% (target presence 
improbable) to 75% (target presence probable), type 2 D’ increased (Figure 
4.3A). Similarly, when participants reported the Gabor as absent there was a 
significant linear trend with Expectation in the opposite direction, F(1,18) = 3.83, 
p = .033 (1-tailed),  η2 = .175: as the probability of target presentation  
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Figure 4.3. Response-conditional type 2 D’ as function of expectation and attention.  
Black lines indicate linear changes in D’ with expectation, independently of attention. 
A. Type 2 D’ for reports of target presence increases with expectation of presence B. 
Type 2 D’ for reports of target absence increases with expectation of absence. Error 
bars are with-subjects SEM. * p < .05 ** p < .01, *** p < .001. 
decreased from 75% (target absence improbable) to 25% (target absence 
probable), type 2 D’ increased (Figure 4.3B). This congruency effect supports 
our hypothesis that expectation improves metacognition. 
As well as a significant Report x Expectation interaction, there was a significant 
interaction between Report and Attention, F(1,18) = 5.61, p = .029, ηp2 = .238. 
This interaction was driven by the presence of a significant difference between 
D' for absent and present reports under diverted attention (M = 0.49, SE =  0.13 
and M = 1.20, SE =  0.19, respectively) , F(1,18) = 6.32, p = .022, η2= .260, but 
not under full attention (M = 0.75, SE =  0.11 and M = 0.92, SE = 0.16, 
respectively), F(1,18) = 0.84, p = .372, η2= .045. This unexpected result 
suggests that inattention impairs metacognition for unseen but not seen targets. 
The ANOVA did not reveal a significant main effect of Expectation on D’, 
F(2,36) = 0.64, p = .533, ηp2 = .034. This is unsurprising, because the influence 
of expectation is seen by comparing expectation-congruence relative to 
incongruence. There was also no significant main effect of Attention on type 2 
D’, F(1,18) = 0.01, p = .953, ηp2 = .001, and no significant  Report by Attention 
by Expectation interaction, F(1.60,28.81) = 0.11, p = .858, ηp2 = .006 (ԑ = .748, 
Huynh-Feldt corrected). 
In summary, these data under type 2 D' indicate that metacognitive 
performance improved when reports of target absence or presence were 
congruent with participants’ expectation (25% or 75% condition, respectively), 
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as compared to when they were incongruent (75% or 25% condition 
respectively).  
4.3.3 EXPECTATION LIBERALISES CONFIDENCE JUDGMENTS 
Given that expectation improved metacognitive performance, did expectations 
also increase subjective confidence? Type 2 confidence threshold can be 
interpreted as a proxy measure of the strength of the perceptual experience 
(Fleming & Lau, 2014). We therefore asked whether expectation-congruent 
reports were associated with higher confidence ratings than their incongruent 
counterparts. Such a result could be interpreted as expectations strengthening 
the associated perceptual experience. 
We tested this possibility by asking whether expectation and report interacted 
under confidence threshold C. Confidence threshold is analogous to type1 
decision threshold, signalling over-confidence when it is negative and under-
confidence when it is positive. Therefore, if expectation liberalises confidence 
judgments we would expect confidence thresholds for 'present' responses to 
liberalise with increased expectation of presence. Following an 'absent' 
response, we would expect confidence to liberalise with increasing expectation 
of target absence (i.e. decreasing expectation of target presence). 
To test this possibility we ran a repeated-measures Expectation (0.25, 0.5, 0.75) 
x Attention (full, diverted) x Report (present, absent) analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) on C. This revealed a significant three-way interaction, F(2,36) = 4.69, 
p = .015, ηp2 = .207, which was not found in the ANOVA on type 2 D’. We 
analysed this interaction by performing simple effects analyses separately for 
the full and diverted attention conditions. Under full attention, Report and 
Expectation significantly interacted, F(2,36) = 15.95, p < .001, ηp2 = .470. The 
pattern was the same as that found under type 2 D’. With increasing probability 
of target presence, there was a linear decrease in type 2 C (more likely to report 
high confidence) when the target was reported as present, F(1,18) = 11.48, p = 
.002, (one-tailed) η2 = .272. However there was a linear increase in type 2 C 
(more likely to report low confidence) when the target was reported as absent, 
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F(1,18) = 25.29, p < .001 (one-tailed), η2= .584. Thus, expectations liberalise 
subjective confidence judgments under full attention.  
By contrast, under diverted attention there was neither a significant main effect 
of Expectation, F(1,18) = .339, ηp2 = .051, nor a significant interaction between 
Expectation and Report, F(2,36) = 2.84, p = .082, ηp2 = .136.  
The ANOVA under C, revealed no significant main effect of Attention, F(1,18) = 
0.83, p = .374, ηp2 = .044, and no significant interactions between Attention and 
Report, F(1,18) = 4.09, p = .058, ηp2 = .185, or Attention and Expectation 
F(1,18) = 0.83, p = .444,  ηp2 = .044. 
While type 2 C quantifies confidence relative to accuracy, the probability of 
correct and incorrect responses cannot be represented as Gaussian 
distributions over any transformation of the type 1 axis (Galvin et al., 2003). This 
means that we cannot determine whether expectations change the evidence 
needed to report decisions with high confidence, or whether confidence 
changes because of bias at the level of objective report. To address this point, 
confidence thresholds for ‘yes’ and ‘no’ reports over the type 1 axis were 
computed (see Chapter 3). These thresholds are placed over the type 1 
decision axis and reflect the evidence required to report decisions with high 
confidence. We divided each threshold by its respective d’ to account for 
differences in sensitivity when making confident versus guess decisions. We 
denote these normalised confidence thresholds for yes and no responses C1’+ 
and C1’- respectively. To determine the separation of each threshold from the 
type 1 decision threshold we took the log absolute distance between each of 
C1’+ and C1’- and c’ = c/d’. These values quantify the separation, in type 1 
evidence units, between the confidence threshold and decision threshold, and in 
turn reflect metacognitive bias.  
Metacognitive bias was subjected to an Expectation (0.25, 0.5, 0.75) x Attention 
(full, diverted) x Report (present, absent) analysis of variance which revealed a 
significant Expectation by Report interaction, F(2,36) = 4.93, p = .013, ηp2 = 
.215. As shown in figure 4.4, metacognitive bias for ‘yes’ responses linearly  
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Figure 4.4. Response-specific confidence thresholds C1’+ 
(red) and C1’- (blue) as a function of attention and 
expectation.  
Under full attention (left), the normalised log distance 
between the type 1 decision threshold and the confidence 
threshold for ‘yes’ responses (red) becomes smaller as target 
presence is increasingly probable. Simiarly, this distance 
becomes smaller for ‘no’ responses (blue) as target absence 
is increasingly probable. This effect of expectation is 
lessened under diverted attention.    
liberalised with expectation of presence, F(2,36) = 5.21, p = .010, ηp2 = .224, 
and for ‘no’ reports, marginally liberalised with increasing expectation of 
absence, F(2,36) = 2.84, p = .082, ηp2 = .136. There was a marginal three-way 
interaction (p = .079) such that, consistent with results under type 2 C, 
congruence shaped confidence under full attention (p = .010) but only 
marginally so under diverted attention (p = .063). Together, these results 
indicate that expectations biased confidence over and above effects on type 1 
decision, such that expected percepts may have required less evidence to be 
reported with high confidence.  
Summarising so far, metacognition improved for expectation-congruent 
perceptual decisions, independently of whether attention was focused on or 
diverted from the task. This effect was mirrored under confidence thresholds, 
but primarily under full attention. Under these conditions, the perceptual 
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experience associated with expectation-congruent decisions may be stronger 
than that for expectation-incongruent decisions.    
4.3.4 REPORT-EXPECTATION CONGRUENCY INCREASES META-D’. 
To assure the robustness of our findings under type 2 D’, we re-analysed the 
data using response-conditional meta-d’. As mentioned in section 2.5.2, given 
the type 2 performance observed, meta-d’ is the type 1 d’ that would be 
expected from the SDT-optimal observer who used all of the available type 1 
information. Meta-d’/d’ is therefore the proportion of type 1 information used in 
the type 2 decision. We expected to find the same pattern of results as those 
obtained under D’ – a Report by Expectation interaction whereby meta-d’/d’ 
increases with response-expectation congruency.  Only 1/19 of our participants 
fully met the criteria for assuring reliable meta-d’ estimates (for all 6 conditions, 
0.05 ≤ hr, far, HR+, FAR+, HR-, FAR- ≤ 0.95; see Barrett et al., 2013). We 
therefore retained participants who met these criteria in at least 3/6 conditions. 
This left us with 12 participants for the analysis. 
 
Figure 4.5. Meta-d’/d’ as function of expectation and type 1 
report.  
Significant interaction between expectation and report, where 
meta-d’/d’ increases with expectation-response congruence. 
Error bars are with-subjects SEM. * p < .05, ** p <  .01, *** p < 
.001. 
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As for the previous analyses, a repeated-measures Expectation (0.25, 0.5, 
0.75) x Attention (full, diverted) x Report (present, absent) analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) was conducted, but this time using meta-d’/d as the dependent 
variable.  
Consistent with our previous result, the analysis revealed a significant 
Expectation x Report interaction, F(2,22) = 8.75, p = .002, ηp2 = .443. A priori 
trend analyses revealed that following a ‘present’ response, meta-d’/d’ linearly 
increased with expectation of target presence, F(1,11) = 5.12, p = .022 (one-
tailed), η2 =.318. Following an ‘absent’ response there was a significant 
decrease in meta-d’/d’ as the probability of target presence increased, F(1,11) = 
4.22, p = .032 (one-tailed), η2 =.277. These patterns are illustrated in figure 4.5. 
We found no other significant main (all F < 2.37, all p > .15, all ηp2 < .29) or 
interaction (all F < 0.99, all p > .32, all ηp2 < .09) effects. This pattern of results 
held under slightly narrower and broader exclusion criteria (i.e. proportion of 
stable conditions).  
Summarising, report-expectation congruency improves metacognitive 
performance when measured by response-conditional meta-d’, as well as when 
measured by response-conditional D’.  
4.3.5 A TYPE 2, BAYESIAN SIGNAL DETECTION THEORETIC MODEL OF 
EXPECTATION AND TOP-DOWN ATTENTION 
To model the influence of top-down expectation on metacognitive sensitivity we 
extended standard signal detection theory (SDT) to incorporate prior 
expectations (Figure 4.6). In our model, the evidence is the internal variable X in 
SDT (the internal representation of Gabor contrast) and the expectation is the 
probability of Gabor patch presentation. The ‘signal’ and ‘noise’ distributions 
were reformulated as posterior distributions of the cases of target present and 
absent, given both the evidence X and the expectation. Therefore the primary 
effect of expectations is to change the internal representation of the stimulus 
(the probability distributions), which in turn will induce apparent shifts in type 1 
and 2 criteria.  
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Type 1 and 2 decision criteria (c and C) were formulated as distinct thresholds 
for the posterior ratio of probabilities of present (S=1) to absent (S=0). For 
probability p of stimulus present and evidence x, this ratio, which we denote by 
R, is given by 
𝑅 = 𝑃(𝑆 = 1|𝑥)𝑃(𝑆 = 0|𝑥) = 𝑃 𝑥 𝑆 = 1 𝑃(𝑆 = 1)𝑃 𝑥 𝑆 = 0 𝑃(𝑆 = 0) = 𝜑!!,!(𝑥)×𝑝𝜑!,!(𝑥)×(1− 𝑝) 
where 𝜑!,! is the probability density function of a normal distribution with mean µ 
and standard deviation s. Assuming the SDT model, this ratio monotonically 
increases with the evidence x.  
To model the effect of diverted attention we implemented the solution proposed 
by Rahnev et al. (2011), in which inattention increases the trial-by-trial internal 
noise. To assess whether this model could account for our data we computed 
the response-conditional type 2 D’s predicted by the model at varying, 
continuous levels of prior expectation of patch present. This was done 
separately for the full and diverted attention cases. 
Parameters were determined in the following way: Type 1 d’ was set to 2.39 and 
2.00 for the full and diverted attention conditions respectively, reflecting the 
mean empirical values we obtained.  
For each level of attention, the type 1 and 2 thresholds for R were based on the 
mean empirical type 1 and 2 hit and false alarm rates in the respective 50% 
expectation condition. For the full attention case, the obtained type 1 threshold 
was R =1.88, and the upper and lower type 2 thresholds were R = 4.27 and R = 
0.68 respectively.  
For the diverted attention case, these were respectively R = 2.52, R = 4.06 and 
R=0.86. For full details on obtaining type 1 and 2 decision thresholds from type 
1 and 2 hit and false alarm rates, see Barrett et al. (2013). Notice that, since 
contrast was increased in the experiment for diverted attention, the models for 
full and diverted attention were approximately the same; only the threshold 
values (R) differed slightly.  
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Figure 4.6. A Bayesian signal detection theoretic model of prior 
expectation.  
Each panel plots the posterior likelihood of a perceptual event against 
the evidence given distinct prior probabilities (P) of stimulus present. 
The blue curve represents the event of stimulus absence and the red 
curve, stimulus presence. Type 1 d' (the distance between the blue 
and red Gaussians) is held at 1. The curves are aligned so that 
criterion is unbiased when p = .50. The dashed lines show the 
decision (c) and confidence (τ+, τ -) thresholds. These are each 
determined by a fixed posterior likelihood ratio R for stimulus present 
to stimulus absent. These plots illustrate that detection, as well as 
confidence about detection, liberalises with increased prior 
expectation on Bayesian SDT. 
Figures 4.7A-D compare the predicted and empirical D’s across levels of report 
and attention. In agreement with the empirical data, predicted D’ for positive 
responses increased with prior expectation for target present (Figures 4.6A and 
4.6B), while D’ for negative responses, it decreased (Figures 4.6C and 4.6D). 
As was the case for the empirical results, this decrease demonstrates an 
increase in D’ with increased prior expectation for target absent. The model 
predicted slight attentional modulations of D’, which reflect numerical 
differences in empirical type 1 d’.  
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Figure 4.7. Modelling of empirical results.  
Solid lines represent stimulated results over continuous probabilities of 
target present. Dashed lines are the corresponding empirical results 
collected over 25, 50 and 75% of target presence. The top and bottom 
rows show results for reported present and absent trials, respectively. The 
leftward and rightward columns show results for full and diverted attention  
Simulated D’ values for ‘absent’ responses also took substantially higher values 
than those collected empirically. Moreover, simulated D’ was higher for absent 
than for present responses, whereas the reverse trend was found empirically. 
These two features persisted for variant models on which signal and noise 
distribution variances were unequal. They are likely attributable to asymmetries 
in the degradation of type 1 evidence available for metacognition, an 
investigation of which is beyond the scope of this chapter. In summary, our 
modelling analyses demonstrate that the observed dependencies of 
metacognitive performance on prior expectation are consistent with a signal-
detection theory model extended according to Bayesian principles to 
incorporate expectations as priors. 
4.3.6 EFFECT OF EXPECTATION ON A CONCURRENT VISUAL SEARCH TASK  
So far we have shown that expectations of Gabor presence or absence improve 
metacognition for the Gabor detection task. Given this, could expectations of 
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Gabor target presence or absence also facilitate perceptual decisions for the 
visual search task? The expectations induced by the paradigm pertained to the 
Gabor target, however the influence of these expectations may free perceptual 
and cognitive resources for other tasks. 
To address this question, we first asked whether expectation affects decisions 
made on the visual search task (i.e. T presence or absence). This was achieved 
by computing type 1 c for the visual search task as a function of expectation. 
Visual search data from the full attention condition could not be analysed 
because the required responses were not collected. 
A one-way Expectation (.25, .50, .75) repeated measures ANOVA under visual 
search criterion cvs revealed a significant effect of Expectation, F(2,36) = 6.17, p 
= .005, η2 = .255. However, rather than expectation of Gabor presence inducing 
a liberal criterion shift under the visual search task, as it did under the Gabor 
task, there was a significant quadratic trend, F(1,18) = 11.74, p = .003, η2 = 
.395. This trend was such that participants were more likely to report that a T 
was present (liberal shift) in the 50% condition (M = 0.19, SE = 0.09) than when 
they had a task-irrelevant prior expectation of Gabor presence or absence (25% 
and 75% conditions, M = 0.35, SE = 0.09, M  = 0.32, SE =  0.08, respectively). 
Therefore the task-irrelevant expectation of Gabor presence or absence did not 
bias participants towards reporting presence or absence on the visual search 
task. Rather, expectations induced a conservative shift in c relative to the 
neutral (50%) condition. 
Given that expectation of Gabor presence or absence biased decisions made in 
the visual search task, they may also have affected sensitivity. To test this, we 
calculated visual search d’ as a function of Gabor detection accuracy and 
expectation-Gabor response congruence. The factor Congruence was formed 
by grouping trials according to whether the response to the Gabor task (present 
or absent) was congruent or incongruent with the prior expectation (75%, where 
they expect presence, 50%, which is neutral, 25%, where they expect absence). 
This factor represents the influence of expectation on Gabor decision. If visual 
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search performance is modulated by the effect of expectation on the Gabor task 
then there should be an effect of this factor.  
A repeated-measures Gabor accuracy (correct, incorrect) x Gabor congruence 
(incongruent, neutral, congruent) ANOVA on visual search d’vs revealed a 
significant main effect of Gabor accuracy, F(1,18) = 4.80, p = .015, ηp2 =.288, 
whereby d’vs was higher following a correct (M = 1.72, SE =  0.16) than an 
incorrect (M = 1.31, SE =  0.18) response on the Gabor detection task. 
Therefore high perceptual sensitivity for the Gabor was associated with high 
perceptual sensitivity for the visual search task as well. The ANOVA also 
revealed a marginally significant interaction between accuracy and congruence, 
F(2,36) = 2.95, p = .065, ηp2 =.141. Post-hoc trend analyses revealed that d’vs 
linearly increased with expectation-Gabor response congruence following a 
correct response on the Gabor task, F(1,18) = 4.49, p = .048, η2 =.200 and 
linearly decreased with congruency following an incorrect Gabor response, 
F(1,18) = 5.27, p = .034, η2 =.226. This result suggests that visual search 
sensitivity improved when the (Gabor) expectation had been valid (i.e. met in 
the stimulus-conditional sense). This follows from the observation that the 
expectation was only valid in trials where correct and congruent or incorrect and 
incongruent responses were made. To illustrate, in the 25% condition, correct 
responses were correct rejections (congruent, valid expectation) or hits 
(incongruent, invalid expectation). The former was associated with a higher d’vs 
than the latter. Incorrect responses were misses (congruent, invalid expectation) 
or false alarms (incongruent, valid expectation). Here, the latter was associated 
with a higher d’vs than the former. Thus perceptual sensitivity for the attended 
task was facilitated by valid (task-irrelevant) expectations for the unattended 
task.  
4.4 DISCUSSION 
In this paper we have shown that the facilitatory effects of prior expectation on 
perceptual decision also manifest their influence in metacognitive judgments. 
We developed a target detection paradigm in which the probability of target 
presence was manipulated block-wise. This probability, of which participants 
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were informed, significantly biased decision thresholds in the expectation-
congruent direction, while leaving sensitivity d’ unaffected (as ensured by our 
staircase procedure). In this way we avoided confounding increased type 2 
sensitivity with increased type 1 sensitivity (Lau & Passingham, 2006), and were 
able to assess metacognition, indexed by both type 2 D’ and meta-d’, as a 
function of perceptual decision and prior expectation. Our main finding was that 
metacognitive sensitivity increased for expectation-congruent as compared to 
expectation-incongruent perceptual decisions. Metacognitive sensitivity is 
determined according to the trial-by-trial correspondence between confidence 
and accuracy. Importantly, because we offered no trial-by-trial information about 
the probability of target occurrence, our results cannot be attributed to a trivial 
relationship between an expectancy cue and the subsequent report. Rather, we 
found a shift in type 1 threshold with expectation, and a liberalisation of type 2 
threshold following an expectation-congruent response to an attended target. 
This suggests that basing decisions on prior expectations induced a superior 
placement of type 1 and 2 thresholds for metacognition.  
Our effect of expectation on confidence required attention, consistent with some 
previous work in type 1 tasks (Chennu et al., 2013; Hsu et al., 2014; Jiang et al., 
2013; but also see. Kok, Jehee, & de Lange, 2012). However, attention was not 
required for expectations to shape metacognitive accuracy, and showed no 
main effect on metacognition either (though under diverted attention, 
metacognition differed as a function of report). Though perhaps counter-
intuitive, this invariance of metacognition to attention is broadly consistent with 
recent work showing that metacognition is preserved for visual sensory 
memory, which does not require attention (Vandenbroucke et al., 2014). It is 
also consistent with research demonstrating above-chance metacognitive 
accuracy for unattended and unseen target stimuli (Kanai et al., 2010). 
4.4.1 MEASURING METACOGNITION 
To assess how metacognition is affected by expectation we used the type 2 
signal detection theory (SDT) measure D'. However, the type 2 SDT model 
underlying D’ assumes that the probability of making a correct or an incorrect 
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response can be modelled as Gaussian distributions over a type 2 decision 
axis. This formulation is problematic because such distributions are usually 
impossible to achieve (Evans & Azzopardi, 2007; Galvin et al., 2003). This issue 
means that D' will not be invariant to type 1 or type 2 criterion shifts (Barrett et 
al., 2013; Evans & Azzopardi, 2007).  In the present study, expectation induced 
both type 1 and type 2 criterion shifts. As a result, we cannot distinguish 
between two possible reasons for why D' may have increased for expectation-
congruent responses. One possibility is that expectation increased the quantity 
of information available for the type 2 judgment (metacognitive efficacy, Fleming 
& Lau, 2014). Alternatively, the increase in D' could have been driven by a 
change in criteria placement that indirectly optimised metacognitive sensitivity.  
We have modelled and interpreted the results in terms of the latter. Specifically, 
our model predicts that expectations change the evidence distributions and the 
criteria shift along the decision axis accordingly. The liberalisation of confidence 
threshold by expectation, though a source of bias in the numerical value D' will 
take, can be interpreted as reflecting the strength of the perceptual experience 
(Fleming & Lau, 2014). Therefore rather than being unequivocally problematic, 
type 2 criteria shifts speak to subjective components of perception. 
Our finding that expectation increased D' was replicated using the measure 
meta-d' (see section 4.3.5.2. Barrett et al., 2013; Maniscalco & Lau, 2012). 
Meta-d’ is robust to changes in type 1 and 2 criteria, however response-
conditional meta-d’ – as required by the analyses presented in this paper - is 
not (Barrett et al., 2013). The invariance is lost because meta-d’ measures 
remove bias by taking a weighted average of the (biased) response-conditional 
measures. Therefore while we replicated our effect using meta-d', we remain 
unable to ascertain whether expectation improves metacognitive efficacy or not. 
Nevertheless, our results under type 2 D’ and meta-d’ together provide 
converging evidence for the facilitatory effect of expectation on metacognition.  
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4.4.2 MODELLING METACOGNITION 
 The framework of SDT applied to visual perception emphasises the importance 
of ‘bottom-up’ processing, whereby afferent sensory signals are repeatedly 
transformed to generate perceptual decisions at both objective (type 1) and 
subjective (type 2) levels. However, our data add to an increasing body of work 
which has demonstrated the importance of top-down processes in shaping 
perceptual decisions (Bar et al., 2006; Gilbert & Li, 2013; Wacongne et al., 
2011). Together, these data pose a challenge to bottom-up models of 
perception and are difficult to reconcile with standard expressions of SDT.  
To formally account for these top-down effects within SDT, we developed a type 
2 Bayesian signal detection model which models prior expectations by defining 
decision threshold as the posterior odds of a target being present. This model 
successfully predicted an increase in type 2 D’ following expectation-congruent 
responses. Diverted attention was modelled by increasing internal noise - as 
recently proposed by Rahnev et al. (2011). This successfully predicted that the 
influence of expectation on D' would be independent of attention. 
We recognise that our model did not capture all aspects of the observed data. In 
particular, the model predicted an improvement in metacognition following a 
“no” response, but this was not found empirically. This discrepancy is likely to 
have arisen from influences on metacognition that were not included in our 
model, such as the incorporation of additional sources of information relevant to 
perceptual decision. Nonetheless, by accounting for the main effects of (top-
down) prior expectations on D’, we have demonstrated the scope for formal 
synthesis between the traditionally ‘bottom-up’ signal detection theory and ‘top-
down’ influences characteristic of alternative frameworks like ‘predictive coding’ 
or the Bayesian brain (Beck et al., 2009; Clark, 2013; Friston, 2009; Hohwy, 
2013; Lee & Mumford, 2003). 
4.4.3 FROM SDT TO THE BAYESIAN BRAIN 
The increasingly influential predictive coding framework views the brain as a 
Bayesian hypothesis-tester, and explains perceptual decision as an inference 
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about the most likely cause of incoming sensory input (Clark, 2013; Rao & 
Ballard, 1999; Seth, 2014a). In this view, top-down expectations constrain 
perceptual decision according to the prior likelihood of that decision. The 
sensory input remaining unexplained is termed prediction error, and only this 
percolates upwards in the sensory hierarchy (Friston, 2010; Rao & Ballard, 
2004; Spratling, 2008). The eventual perceptual choice will be the perceptual 
hypothesis with the highest posterior probability. This framework fits comfortably 
with our novel finding that under dual-task conditions, sensitivity for the attended 
(visual search) task was increased when participants held valid expectations 
pertaining to the unattended (Gabor) task: when prior expectations facilitate 
decision for the unattended Gabor task, additional processing resources should 
be available for the attended visual search task (Hohwy, 2012).  
Certain predictive coding formulations also explicitly model the importance of 
the reliability (or 'precision') of the bottom-up signal to perception (e.g. Feldman 
& Friston, 2010). In this paper we have shown that expectations liberalised 
subjective confidence judgments for attended (i.e. high precision) targets. 
Previous work has shown that confidence judgments are a function of both 
sensory evidence and internal noise (Kepecs, Uchida, Zariwala, & Mainen, 
2008; Yeung & Summerfield, 2012; Zylberberg et al., 2012, 2014). This 
relationship has been likened to a p-value, which quantifies the evidence for a 
hypothesis (mean) and scales with the reliability of that evidence (standard 
error; Kepecs & Mainen, 2012). In fact, such a formulation of confidence is 
highly compatible with predictive coding. Bringing these together, decisional 
confidence could be explained in predictive coding terms, where the mean is the 
posterior probability of a perceptual hypothesis, and the standard error is the 
precision of the evidence (Feldman & Friston, 2010). Such a conceptualisation 
of confidence would explain the congruency-attention interaction found in this 
paper. It is also consistent with work demonstrating that confidence evolves 
together with the decision variable (De Martino et al., 2013; Fetsch et al., 2014; 
Kepecs et al., 2008).  
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The above account may explain the construction of confidence judgments within 
a single level of the perceptual hierarchy. However, successful metacognitive 
evaluations and the subjective aspect of decisional confidence may be a 
function of uncertainty estimates over multiple hierarchical levels. We leave the 
theoretical and neural underpinnings of how expectation modulates 
metacognition open to future research.    
4.5 CONCLUSIONS 
In summary, we show for the first time that top-down prior expectations can 
influence metacognition for perceptual decision, illustrating the action of priors 
on complex cognitive functions. Specifically, we found that perceptual decisions 
which are congruent with valid perceptual expectations lead to increased 
metacognitive sensitivity, independently of attentional allocation. This finding 
motivated the development of an extended Bayesian signal detection theoretic 
model that incorporates top-down prior expectations, and moreover, formally 
integrates two previously distinct frameworks for perceptual decision: (top-
down) predictive coding and (bottom-up) signal detection theory. Finally, 
measures of metacognition are often used as an indirect measure of awareness 
(Kanai et al., 2010; Kunimoto et al., 2001; Seth et al., 2008). Therefore, by 
demonstrating increased metacognitive sensitivity for expected perceptual 
events, we provide evidence for the existence of a mechanism, based on prior 
expectations, that underpins metacognitive sensitivity and contributes to our 
understanding of the brain basis of visual awareness.  
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5 
RHYTHMIC INFLUENCE OF PRIORS IN THE 
PHASE OF ONGOING OCCIPITAL ALPHA 
OSCILLATIONS 
 
Prior expectations have a powerful influence on perception, biasing both 
decision and confidence. However, how this occurs at the neural level remains 
unclear. It has been suggested that spontaneous alpha-band neural oscillations 
represent rhythms of the perceptual system that periodically modulate 
perceptual judgements. We hypothesised that these oscillations instantiate the 
effects of expectations. While collecting scalp EEG, participants performed a 
detection task that orthogonally manipulated perceptual expectations and 
attention. Trial-by-trial retrospective confidence judgements were also collected. 
Results showed that independently of attention, pre-stimulus occipital alpha 
phase predicted the weighting of expectations on yes/no decisions. Moreover, 
phase predicted the influence of expectations on confidence. Thus, 
expectations periodically bias objective and subjective perceptual decision-
making together, prior to stimulus onset. Our results suggest that alpha-band 
neural oscillations periodically transmit prior evidence to visual cortex, changing 
the baseline from which evidence accumulation begins. In turn, our results 
inform accounts of how expectations shape early visual processing. 
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5.1 INTRODUCTION 
Perception is subject to powerful top-down influences. For example, a highly 
ambiguous figure can be easily identified following brief priming of object 
identity (Porter, 1954). Many believe that the feed-forward sensory input is 
shaped by feedback or recurrent connections from high-level cortical areas to 
lower-level regions (Gilbert & Li, 2013; Gilbert & Sigman, 2007; Lee, 2002) 
following a first pass up the sensory hierarchy (Bar, 2003). However, the 
neuronal mechanisms that integrate top-down and bottom-up signals remain 
largely unknown (Bar, 2003) 
Top-down influences, including priming, context effects and prior exposure, can 
be parsimoniously construed as a process that biases perceptual inference 
towards a plausible solution. In line with this, there has been renewed interest in 
framing top-down influences in terms of probabilistic prior beliefs, or 
'expectations' (Summerfield & de Lange, 2014) which, behaviorally, bias 
perceptual choice (see Chapter 4, or de Lange et al. 2013). It is suggested that 
expectations are represented in high-level cortical regions prior to the 
perceptual event, and entrain task-relevant neurons at lower levels to increase 
sensitivity (Engel et al., 2001). Spontaneous neural oscillations are therefore a 
promising candidate mechanism for how expectations shape perception.   
Oscillations in the alpha range are particularly relevant when considering how 
expectations influence perception. Theoretical models have associated top-
down processes with oscillations in the 8 to 14Hz range (Bastos et al., 2012; 
Friston, Bastos, Pinotsis, & Litvak, 2014) and recent neurophysiological findings 
suggest that occipital alpha oscillations primarily propagate in a top-down 
fashion (van Kerkoerle et al., 2014), supporting the notion that alpha power is 
intimately related to top-down control (Klimesch et al., 2007; Mathewson et al., 
2012; Palva & Palva, 2007). Recent work has revealed that the phase (in 
addition to power) of pre-stimulus alpha oscillations also predicts various 
components of perception. These include spatial attention (Busch & VanRullen, 
2010), saccadic reaction speed (Drewes & VanRullen, 2011), and perceptual 
awareness ratings (Mathewson, Gratton, Fabiani, Beck, & Ro, 2009). This has 
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been interpreted as reflecting cycles in the 'preparedness' of the perceptual 
system (Vanrullen, Busch, Drewes, & Dubois, 2011).  In Bayesian terms, prior 
beliefs (i.e. expectations) are available before stimulus onset. Accordingly, we 
hypothesised that this ‘preparedness’ should be modulated by expectations: 
anticipating a perceptual event should bias perceptual inference towards that 
event. This was tested by asking whether the extent to which decisions are 
biased by expectation oscillates with pre-stimulus occipital alpha phase.  
Perceptual decisions are additionally accompanied by a subjective degree of 
confidence, which represents belief in one’s decision accuracy and may arise 
from uncertainty about external (i.e. sensory) or internal noise. Recent work has 
shown that the decision variable and decision confidence may be encoded 
together (Kiani & Shadlen, 2009), and arise from the same sensory evidence 
(Fetsch, Kiani, Newsome, & Shadlen, 2014). In addition to expectations biasing 
decision, expected perceptual events are associated with greater subjective 
confidence (see Chapter 4). Following these findings, we additionally 
hypothesised that pre-stimulus alpha phase would predict the influence of 
perceptual priors on confidence.  
These two hypotheses were tested by adopting a dual-task Gabor detection 
paradigm which manipulated prior expectations while controlling for the (often 
conflated) influence of attention (Feldman and Friston 2010; Summerfield and 
Egner 2009). Prior expectations of target presence or absence were induced by 
manipulating (block-wise) the probability of Gabor appearance, presented at a 
contrast that yielded 70% accuracy. The probability was either 25%, such that 
absence was expected, or 75%, such that presence was expected. A 
concurrent visual search task diverted attention from the Gabor task in half of 
the blocks. Critically, the visual search array and Gabor were presented 
simultaneously following a jittered inter-stimulus interval (ISI; figure 5.1). This 
allowed us to time-lock our EEG analysis to both Gabor present and Gabor 
absent trials, and compute independent measures of decision threshold (bias) 
and detection sensitivity as a function of condition and pre-stimulus EEG phase.  
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Our first hypothesis was that pre-stimulus alpha phase would predict the extent 
to which decision threshold is biased by expectation. This would be shown if (1) 
decision threshold oscillates with pre-stimulus phase and (2) there is some 
phase angle that predicts ‘yes’ responses when expecting target presence (the 
75% condition) while predicting ‘no’ responses when expecting target absence 
(the 25% condition). 
Our second hypothesis was that pre-stimulus alpha phase would also predict 
expectancy effects on subjective confidence. This would be shown if (1) 
confidence oscillates with pre-stimulus phase and (2) the same phase that 
predicts high confidence when expectations are met will predict low confidence 
when expectations are violated. 
5.2 METHODS 
5.2.1 PARTICIPANTS 
Participants were 20 English-speaking subjects (13 female) aged between 20 
and 32 years (M = 25.6 SD = 3.3) with normal or corrected-to-normal vision. 
One participant’s data were excluded from analysis for being excessively noisy, 
and a second for having too few trials (<500 vs. mean of 1,100). This was due 
to excessively slow responding. This left 18 participants’ data for analysis. All 
participants gave informed, written consent and were reimbursed at 
£10.30/hour. On average, each session lasted 2.5 hours and two sessions were 
completed 24 hours apart. Ethical approval was awarded by the University of 
Sussex ethics committee (C-REC). 
5.2.2 STIMULI AND DESIGN 
The experiment was presented on a 21-inch CRT monitor (100Hz, 1048 x 700 
resolution) using Psychtoolbox for Matlab. The experiment was composed of 
two concurrent tasks: detection of a peripheral Gabor patch and a visual search 
task in the center of the screen (figure 5.1).  
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Figure 5.1. Trial sequence. 
Before the first trial of a block participants are informed of the experimental 
condition they are in. “25%” means that the participant is in the 25% of 
Gabor presence condition and “ignore letters” means that the participant 
should ignore the visual search array (i.e., they are in the full attention 
condition). During the trial, a target Gabor is either present (top) or absent 
(bottom). Similarly, a visual search target T is either present (bottom) or 
absent (top). Response prompt followed the offset of the masking array. 
Trials began with the onset of a white fixation cross. After a jittered inter-
stimulus interval (ISI; 1000 to 1500ms) the visual search array appeared. This 
consisted of four rotated (random orientation of 0° to 359°) white, capitalised 
letters arranged around fixation (1.43° x 1.43°) at 0°, 90°, 180° and 270°. On 
50% of trials the visual search target was absent and all letters were 'L's. On the 
other 50%, a target ‘T’ replaced one randomly designated ‘L’. To ensure that the 
task was sufficiently difficult to divert attention from the Gabor task, this array 
was backwards masked by an array of 'F's. The stimulus onset asynchrony 
(SOA) between the visual search and masking array was titrated for each 
individual to equated detection performance to 78% across participants (see 
Staircases).  
On Gabor ‘target present’ trials, a peripheral (3.85° x 4.10° visual angle) Gabor 
patch (SD 0.89°, sf 0.08c/°, phase 45°) was presented in the lower-right 
quadrant of the screen. On these trials the Gabor and the visual search array 
appeared simultaneously. The Gabor was presented for 10ms at the contrast 
resulting in a 70% hit rate (see Staircases). 
Following the offset of the visual search array a series of response prompts 
appeared. Using a key-press, participants made un-speeded judgments of first, 
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Gabor presence or absence, second, confidence that they were correct on an 
interval scale from 1(no confidence) to 4 (total confidence), and finally, the 
presence or absence of a ‘T’ in the visual search array. 
The experiment had four conditions, constructed in a blocked attention (full, 
diverted) by expectation (expect Gabor presence, expect Gabor absence) 
design. Under full attention participants fixated centrally but did not perform the 
visual search task, thereby allocating full attention to Gabor detection (visual 
search responses were not requested). Under diverted attention participants 
performed both tasks, prioritising visual search. Expectation was manipulated 
by informing participants of the true probability of Gabor presence (as well as 
the attention condition) before each block began. This was either 25% (expect 
absence) or 75% (expect presence). After each experimental trial a condition-
specific 2 down 1 up staircase titrated the contrast of the Gabor to maintain a 
consistent hit rate during the long experimental sessions. Expectation-specific 
staircases controlled for potentially greater levels of sensory adaptation to the 
Gabor in the 75% condition. 
Each block consisted of 12 trials from one of the conditions and blocks were 
completed in sets of 8 (2 of each condition, 96 trials). Blocks were fully 
counterbalanced.  Participants completed as many blocks as possible in each 
testing period (always equal numbers of each condition; 6 to 18 runs of each 
condition per session, M = 11.5). Across participants there was considerable 
variation in total trials completed due to the cumulative effect of reaction time 
differences.  
After explaining the task to participants they completed a set of practice trials. 
Next, they completed three staircase procedures (see Staircases) and finally, 
the experimental trials. Participants were encouraged to take regular breaks and 
were offered to leave the session early if they became too tired to continue. 
5.2.3 STAIRCASES 
Following a set of practice trials, participants completed 3 interleaved 2 down 1 
up psychophysical adaptive staircase procedures with 8 reversals in order to 
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equate task difficulty across conditions and participants. The visual display was 
always the same as that in the experimental trials but the instructions and 
response prompts differed. In the first staircase participants performed Gabor 
detection while ignoring the visual search array (full attention). Only Gabor 
present/absent responses were collected. Gabor contrast was titrated to 
achieve a 70% hit rate (contrast cannot be titrated in target absent trials) under 
full attention. In the second staircase (3 down 1 up) the Gabor was ignored and 
participants performed only visual search. Here, only responses to the visual 
search target were collected (T present/absent). The SOA between the visual 
search array and the masking array was titrated to achieve 78% accuracy in the 
visual search task. In the third staircase participants performed both Gabor 
detection and visual search simultaneously, prioritising visual search and 
reported both Gabor presence/absence and T presence/absence. Here, Gabor 
contrast was titrated to achieve a 70% hit rate under diverted attention. The 
SOA for the visual search display was set to that determined by the second 
staircase. Confidence judgements were not collected during the staircases. 
5.2.4 EEG ACQUISITION 
 EEG data were collected on an ANT system at a sample rate of 2048 Hz with 
no online filtering. Activity was measured continuously from 62 active electrode 
channels arranged according to the 10/20 system over the scalp. The ground 
electrode was placed on the forehead and data were averaged across the 
whole head online. Impedances were kept below 7 kΩ throughout the 
experimental session. Participants sat in an electrically shielded faraday cage 
with an external monitor viewed through shielding glass. Their head was 
stabilised with a chin rest. 
5.2.5 EEG PRE-PROCESSING 
EEG data were pre-processed using the EEGLAB toolbox for Matlab. During 
pre-processing EEG recordings were down-sampled to 256 Hz and high-pass 
(0.1Hz) filtered with a finite impulse response filter (EEGlab function ‘eegfilt’).  
EEG data were visually inspected for excessively noisy channels, which were 
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manually interpolated with their two neighbors on a block-wise basis. No 
participant required more than three channels interpolated (5 participants in 
total). No interpolated channels were included in analyses presented in this 
paper. After interpolation data were referenced to participants' average signal. 
Data were epoched from 1000ms before visual search array (and Gabor target, 
if present) onset to 500 ms after. Manual artifact rejection was performed on 
saccade, eye-blink and excessively noisy trials (5% of trials removed on 
average). For each participant, each electrode and each trial we computed the 
time-frequency wavelet decomposition of the EEG data. Window lengths of 1 
oscillatory cycle at low frequencies (starting at 2Hz) were used. This length 
linearly increased with frequency band to a maximum of 15 cycles at 50Hz. This 
decomposition method generated wavelet coefficients for 49 log-spaced 
frequencies and 242 time points.  
5.2.6 ANALYSIS 
5.2.6.1 EEG: ELECTRODE REGION OF INTEREST. 
We had an a priori hypothesis that top-down influences of prior expectation 
would be observable over occipital regions. Initial analyses were therefore 
restricted to the occipital electrodes O1, Oz and O2.  Because phase at some 
time-frequency point will differ across electrodes, analyses were further 
restricted to one electrode per participant and session. To control for differences 
in electrode placement, electrode ROIs (eROIs) were determined on a 
participant-by-participant and session-by-session basis according to their 
sensitivity to the Gabor detection task. The grand-averaged ERP indicated a 
negative deflection following hits relative to misses in the 75-200ms range. 
Each participant’s session-specific eROI was therefore chosen as the occipital 
electrode (i.e. O1, Oz or O2) that showed the greatest event-related potential 
(ERP) amplitude, as defined below. To compute the ERPs a 200ms pre-
stimulus baseline was subtracted from each epoch. Epochs in which hits 
(respectively, misses) were made were averaged together. For each response 
type (hit or miss) we obtained the maximal local peak amplitude (LPA) in the 
75ms-200ms period. LPA is defined as the greatest amplitude within a range of 
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time points such that this peak is greater than the average amplitude of the 
surrounding 7 time points (Luck, 2005). This method minimises the chance of 
selecting spurious spikes. The eROI for each participant was chosen as the 
occipital electrode that showed the greatest value for LPAhit – LPAmiss. 
Subsequent analyses on phase were restricted to these eROIs. 
5.2.6.2 EEG: PHASE OPPOSITION ANALYSIS.  
Next, we sought to determine if, for our eROI, spontaneous EEG phase differed 
at any time point and in any frequency band between 'reported present' (yes) 
and 'reported absent' (no) trials. This was done in order to isolate candidate 
time-frequency regions in which expectation might interact with the influence of 
EEG phase. The relationship between phase and response was quantified with 
the measure phase opposition (Vanrullen et al., 2011), which is defined as the 
mean of phase locking values (PLV) for yes and for no responses. Phase 
locking value measures the extent to which phase angle at some time-
frequency point over one electrode is predicted by either (A) phase at the same 
time-frequency point over another electrode or (B) a behavioural response (as 
in the present paper). Here, we used PLV as a measure of the relationship 
between ongoing phase and response. Because yes and no responses 
encompass all possible responses and because stimulus onset is unpredictable 
(randomised ISIs), the joint PLV across all trials is expected to be small (no 
different from chance). However, if EEG phases for a given behavioural 
response are clustered about some angle (necessarily different for yes vs. no) 
then the individual PLVs for both yes and no responses, and therefore the 
resulting phase-opposition value, will be high (up to 1 for perfect phase-
opposition; see Vanrullen, Busch, Drewes, & Dubois, 2011 for additional 
details). High (and statistically significant) values indicate that phase predicts a 
yes versus a no response. For a set of n trials where response R is given and 
where C(R) is the complex coefficients of the wavelet transform, PLVR and 
phase opposition PO for responses R1 and R2 are defined as follows: 
𝑃𝐿𝑉! =  1𝑛 𝐶 𝑅𝐶 𝑅!                         𝑃𝑂!!,!! =  𝑃𝐿𝑉!! +  𝑃𝐿𝑉!!  2  
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This measure PO is similar to the phase bifurcation index (PBI; Busch, Dubois, 
& VanRullen, 2009). PBI is defined as (PLVR1 -PLVALL) X (PLVR2 - PLVALL), that 
is, the baseline-corrected product of phase locking values for response 1 and 
for response 2. We preferred the additive measure PO, because PBI can give 
unreliable results when taking the product over very small values. Moreover, 
because PO is additive it is robust to differences in trial counts between 'yes' 
and 'no' trials: any baseline correction applied to empirical PO values would be 
equally applied to bootstrapped PO values and cancel out. 
PO between yes and no responses was separately calculated for each level of 
attention and expectation. Separate calculation of PO for each level of 
expectation was necessary because we hypothesised that the phases 
predicting ‘yes’ (respectively, ‘no’) would differ as a function of expectation. The 
four PO time-frequency maps corresponding to each experimental condition 
were averaged together. 
At each time-frequency point, PO statistical significance was assessed by 
estimating the mean and standard deviation of the null distribution from 8000 
bootstrapped samples per participant. To obtain bootstrapped samples, 
responses were pseudo-randomly assigned to trials such that the number of 
yes and no responses stayed the same. PO was then recalculated. This method 
removed any relationship between the EEG signal and behaviour. Z-scores and 
p values were computed by comparing empirical PO values to the mean and 
standard deviation of the bootstrapped values. P values were false discovery 
rate (FDR) corrected for multiple comparisons over all frequencies and all pre-
stimulus time-points.  
 5.2.6.3 EEG: PHASE MODULATION OF PERCEPTUAL DECISION 
The time-frequency representation of phase opposition values revealed that 
phase is related to the subjects’ response (see above and fig. 5.3B). However, 
we did not know (and aimed to determine) whether the “optimal” phase for a yes 
response is comparable for the different expectation conditions.  To determine 
whether the influence of expectation on decision is predicted by pre-stimulus 
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phase in some frequency band, a follow-up analysis was run in which the data 
were restricted to a time-frequency region of interest. The time-frequency ROI 
was taken as the point of maximal phase opposition (PO) significance. Critically, 
there was no circularity in this analysis because PO values had been collapsed 
across levels of expectation.  
For each participant, each condition and each trial, the phase at the time-
frequency ROI was binned into one of 6 phase bins. For each bin we then 
computed within-subject signal detection theoretic (SDT) outcome variables d' 
(sensitivity), c (decision threshold/bias) confidence (percentage of trials reported 
with high confidence). This provided values of each SDT outcome as a function 
of condition and phase bin. Using 6 bins enabled a sufficient number of trials for 
SDT estimates to be reliable.  
 5.2.6.4 SIGNAL DETECTION THEORETIC (SDT) OUTCOMES.  
To obtain separate measures of detection sensitivity and decision bias, we used 
signal detection theory (SDT, see Chapter 3). For each experimental condition, 
trials were categorised into hits, misses, false alarms and correct rejections. Hit 
rate and false alarm rate are then defined as:  
𝐻𝑖𝑡 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 =  ℎ𝑖𝑡𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑡𝑠 +𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑠 ,𝐹𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑒 𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑚 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 =  𝑓𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑒 𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑠𝑓𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑒 𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑠 + 𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑟𝑒𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 
 From these quantities, detection sensitivity for the Gabor target, d’, and 
decision threshold c are given by: 
𝑑! =  𝑍 𝐻𝑖𝑡 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 − 𝑍 𝑓𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑒 𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑚 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 ,     𝑐 =  −  ! !"# !"#$ !!(!"#$% !"!#$ !"#$)!   
where Z is the inverse normal cumulative distribution function. Note that for 
decision threshold c, positive values represent a conservative bias (more likely 
to report Gabor absence) and negative values represent a liberal bias (more 
likely to report Gabor presence).  
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In computing these measures we used the log-linear rule, which adds 0.5 to the 
total number of hits, misses, false alarms and correct rejections. This ensures 
SDT outcome variables can be computed for all conditions and phase bins, and 
also acts as a Bayesian prior on a d’ of zero. 
5.2.6.5 CONFIDENCE.  
Confidence ratings were collected on a four-point scale. To account for 
individual differences in how the scale was used (mean confidence: 2.92, range: 
2.34 - 3.47) we collapsed ratings onto a binary scale. This was achieved by 
calculating each participant's mean confidence across all conditions then 
categorising each rating as high (greater than the mean) or low (lower than the 
mean). Note that we did not use a median split because here, the median is 
always an integer. 
 5.2.6.6 STATISTICAL ANALYSES 
Data were collected over two experimental sessions and collapsed across them. 
Session number did not significantly interact with any other factors under any 
behavioral dependent variable. For each participant reported confidence was 
collapsed onto a binary scale using a mean split (median split of a four-point 
integer response scale cannot be formed). Analyses were conducted using 
Matlab, CircStat toolbox for Matlab (Berens, 2009) for circular statistics, and 
SPSS. Where appropriate, p values were FDR (false discovery rate) corrected. 
Circular statistics were corrected for the binning of phase angles where 
appropriate. Unless otherwise specified, data subjected to within-subjects 
ANOVAs met the assumption of sphericity. 
5.3 RESULTS 
5.3.1 EXPECTATION AND ATTENTION SEPARATELY INFLUENCE CONTRAST 
SENSITIVITY 
To determine the success of our attention manipulation we asked whether 
diverting attention with the visual search task decreased contrast sensitivity (as 
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determined by the psychophysical staircases). Mean Gabor contrast was 
subjected to an Attention (full, diverted) x Expectation (25%, 75%) repeated-
measures ANOVA. This revealed a significant main effect of Attention, F(1,17) = 
22.60, p < .001, ηp2 = .57, such that contrast sensitivity was significantly greater 
(i.e. contrast threshold decreased) in the full (19.8%±1.2%) than diverted 
(25.7%±1.3%) attention condition. Our manipulation of attention was therefore 
successful. The ANOVA also revealed a significant main effect of Expectation, 
F(1,17) = 8.50, p= .010, ηp2 = .33, whereby contrast sensitivity was significantly 
greater in the 75% (22.3%±1.1%) than the 25% (23.3%±1.1%) condition. This is 
likely to be an outcome of more Gabor exposure in the 75% than the 25% 
condition, which was controlled by implementing running staircases during the 
experimental phase (see Staircases). The interaction between Attention and 
Expectation was not significant F(1,17) = 1.26, p = .278, ηp2 = .07. Results are 
represented in fig. 5.2A. 
5.3.2 EXPECTATIONS BIAS DECISION AND INCREASE SUBJECTIVE CONFIDENCE 
The main behavioral analyses presented here used Signal Detection theory (for 
details, see Methods). To ensure that our expectation manipulation successfully 
biased choice, decision threshold c was calculated as a function of condition. 
Here, c > 0 represents a conservative bias (i.e. towards reporting ‘no’) whereas 
c < 0 represents a liberal bias (i.e. towards reporting ‘yes’). An Attention (full, 
diverted) x Expectation (25%, 75%) repeated-measures ANOVA revealed that c 
was significantly affected by Expectation, F(1,17) = 70.33, p < .001, ηp2 = .80. 
As predicted, c was significantly more conservative in the 25% than the 75% 
condition (Mdiff = 0.21±0.03, figure 5.2B), meaning that decisions were more 
biased towards absence in the ‘expect absent’ (25%) than the ‘expect present’ 
(75%) condition. There was neither a significant main effect of Attention, F(1,17) 
= 0.01, p = .952, ηp2 < .01 nor a significant interaction between factors, F(1,17) 
= 1.45 p = .244, ηp2 = .08. 
To determine whether detection sensitivity had been successfully equated 
across conditions an Attention x Expectation repeated-measures ANOVA under 
detection sensitivity d’ was run. This revealed a significant main effect of  
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Figure 5.2. Behavioural results. 
 A Mean contrast at which the Gabor was presented over the course of the 
experiment in each condition. Significant main effects of both attention and 
expectation. B. Effects of attention and expectation on decision threshold c. 
Independently of attention, decision threshold in the 25% condition is significantly 
more biased towards ‘no’ responses than in the 75% condition. C. Effects of attention 
and expectation-report congruence on confidence. Congruent responses are reports 
of presence/absence in the 75%/25% condition, and vice versa for incongruent 
responses. Confidence is higher for congruent than incongruent reports in both 
attention conditions, but the effect of congruence is greater under full attention.  The 
main effects of both attention and congruence are also significant. D. Effects of 
accuracy and expectation-report congruence on confidence. Confidence is higher for 
congruent than incongruent reports for both correct and incorrect responses, but the 
effect of congruence is greater in the incorrect case.  The main effects of both 
accuracy and congruence are also significant.  Error bars represent within-subject 
SEM. *p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p ≤ .001. 
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Expectation, F(1,17)  = 52.85, p < .001, ηp2 = .76, such that d’ was greater in the 
25% (2.60±0.09) than the 75% (2.23±0.09) condition. This small difference was 
an unavoidable consequence of liberalising decision threshold while ensuring a 
constant hit rate. The main effect of Attention, F(1,17) = 0.46, p = .507, ηp2 = 
.03, and its interaction with Expectation, F(1,17)= 0.23, p = .655, ηp2 = .01, was 
not significant.  
Chapter 4 showed that expectations increase subjective confidence and 
improve metacognitive accuracy. On this basis, we hypothesised that pre-
stimulus phase would modulate the influence of expectations on confidence. To 
address this at the behavioral level, the next analyses determined whether this 
finding was replicated.  
In the 25% condition, where Gabor absence is expected, the expectation-
congruent report is 'no', whereas in the 75% condition, where Gabor presence is 
expected, the expectation-congruent report is 'yes'. The reverse defines 
expectation-incongruent reports. A within-subjects Attention (full, diverted) x 
Accuracy (correct, incorrect) x Congruence (expectation-congruent, 
incongruent) repeated-measures ANOVA under confidence was run. Results 
showed that confidence was higher under full than diverted attention, F(1,17) = 
17.67, p = .001,  ηp2 = .51, for correct than incorrect responses, F(1,17) = 42.22, 
p < .001,  ηp2 = .71, and for congruent than incongruent decisions, F(1,17) = 
19.07, p < .001,  ηp2 = .53.  
As shown in figure 5.2C, a significant attention x congruence interaction, F(1,17) 
= 14,83, p = .001,  ηp2 = .47, revealed that diverting attention reduced the effect 
of congruence on confidence (Mdiff = 4.6% SEdiff = 1.4%) relative to full attention  
(Mdiff = 14.1% SEdiff = 3.2%). Congruence still increased confidence in both 
attention conditions (diverted: t(17) = 3.25, bootstrapped p = .006; full: t(17) = 
4.41, bootstrapped p = .001).  
As shown in figure 5.2D, a significant accuracy x congruence interaction, 
F(1,17) = 8.48, p = .010,  ηp2 = .33, revealed that the influence of congruence on 
confidence was greater for incorrect (Mdiff = 12.0% SEdiff = 2.6%) than correct 
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(Mdiff = 6.7% SEdiff = 2.1%) responses. Crucially, congruence increased 
confidence in both cases (incorrect: t(17) = 4.67, bootstrapped p = .001; correct: 
t(17) = 3.29, bootstrapped p = .014) indicating that the influence of congruence 
on confidence is not confounded by differences in decisional accuracy. 
No other significant effects were found (attention x accuracy, p = .102, ηp2 = .15; 
attention x accuracy x congruence, p = .975, ηp2 < .01). Thus, effects under 
confidence reported in Chapter 4 were replicated: expectations liberalise 
confidence, and the effect was weaker (but present) under diverted than full 
attention. 
Are these changes in confidence associated with changes in metacognitive 
bias? To address this question we estimated each participant’s response-
specific confidence thresholds 𝜏! and 𝜏! for each level of attention and 
expectation (see section 3.6.1). These were scaled by d’ and subtracted from 
type 1 c. That is, we computed the measures 
𝐶!!!  =  𝜏!𝑑!!     𝐶!!!  =  𝜏!𝑑′! 
These tell us how far the confidence thresholds extend from the decision 
threshold. The further away they are, the more evidence the participants needs 
to assign high confidence to their choice (i.e. the more conservative their 
threshold). This measure of metacognitive bias was log-transformed (because 
raw values are bounded by zero) and subjected to an Attention by Expectation 
by Report repeated-measures ANOVA. Independently of attention, report and 
expectation interacted, F(1,17) = 12.17, p = .003,  ηp2 = .417 (figure 5.3).  
Follow-up bootstrapped t-tests revealed that for “no” reports, confidence 
threshold 𝐶!!! was significantly closer to c (i.e. more liberal) in the 25% (expect 
absent) than the 75% (expect present) condition, p = .004. However a 
congruence effect was not found for “yes” reports (p = .237). This may be due to 
a presence of floor effects: confidence for “yes” reports was already very liberal, 
probably because the Gabor target had an abrupt onset, leading to visual pop-
out’.  
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This analysis shows that confidence thresholds for reports of target absence 
were liberalised when absence was expected, such that less evidence was 
required to report the choice with high certainty. In turn, this means that 
expectations don’t only shape confidence indirectly (by shifting decision bias), 
but they also may target metacognitive thresholds. 
Finally, we determined whether expectations improved metacognitive accuracy 
as defined by type 2 D and meta-d’/d’. As in chapter 4, each measure of 
metacognition was subjected to separate Attention x Expectation x Report 
repeated-measures ANOVAs. Under both type 2 D’ and meta-d’/d’ a significant  
 
Figure 5.3 Metacognitive bias as a function of expectation and 
report.  
This panel depicts the log distance between type 1 criterion and 
type 2 confidence thresholds. Larger values mean that more 
evidence is needed to report ‘confident’. When participants 
reported “no” (blue circles), confidence was more liberal, i.e. took a 
lower value, in the 25% than the 75% condition. That is, when 
expecting target absence, perceived absence required less 
evidence to be reported with high confidence. For “yes” responses 
(red diamonds) there is no difference in thresholds between the 
25% and 75% conditions, however this appears to be driven by 
floor effects. Error bars represent within-subjects SEM. 
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3-way interaction was found (type 2 D’: F(1,17) = 2.25, p = .025,  ηp2 = .261. 
Meta-d’/d’: F(1,17) = 6.20, p = .023,  ηp2 = .267).  
Expectation-response congruence influenced metacognition under full attention  
(type 2 D’: F(1,17) = 6.74, p = .019,  ηp2 = .284. Meta-d’/d’: F(1,17) = 9.50, p = 
.007,  ηp2 = .358) but not diverted attention (type 2 D’: F(1,17) = 3.92, p = .540,  
ηp2 = .023. Meta-d’/d’: F(1,17) = 1.54, p = .700,  ηp2 = .009). Thus, we replicated 
the finding of Chapter 4 that expectations improved metacognitive accuracy.  
In summary, our paradigm successfully manipulated attention and expectation: 
contrast sensitivity increased in the presence of full attention, and expectation 
biased perceptual decisions. There was a small difference in d’ across levels of 
expectation but not across levels of attention. Expectation further increased 
confidence, such that participants were more confident in their Gabor detection 
reports when that report had been congruent with their prior expectations. For 
“no” reports, this was driven by changes in the threshold for reporting 
“confident”.  
While these effects of expectation were present at the behavioral level, they are 
not necessarily modulated by pre-stimulus brain oscillations. The next analyses 
first determined whether oscillatory phase predicts perceptual decision 
irrespective of expectation, and then determined whether the predictive value of 
oscillatory phase reflects prior expectations. 
5.3.3 PERCEPTUAL DECISION IS PREDICTED BY OCCIPITAL ALPHA PHASE 
Before addressing the question of whether the effect of expectation on decision 
is modulated by pre-stimulus phase over visual regions, we checked that pre-
stimulus phase predicted perceptual choice, irrespective of expectation.  
Analyses were restricted to the occipital electrode (O1, Oz or O2) that showed 
the greatest post-stimulus response to the Gabor task. This method gave, for 
each participant and for each of the 2 sessions, a single electrode (eROI) that 
was involved in early post-stimulus processing. eROIs were extracted by 
selecting the occipital electrode with the greatest event-related potential (ERP) 
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amplitude for hit relative to miss trials (Mdiff = 0.75µv, SDdiff = 0.64µv, see 
Methods for details).  
The predictive value of phase in perceptual decision was assessed using the 
measure phase opposition (PO). PO is the average of phase-locking values 
(PLV) for two responses – here, yes and no (Vanrullen et al., 2011) - and 
therefore reflects the extent to which pre-stimulus phase predicts subsequent 
choice (see Methods for details). For response R and complex wavelet 
coefficients C, PLV and PO are defined as: 
         𝑃𝐿𝑉! =  !! ! !! !!                         𝑃𝑂!!,!! =  !"#!!! !"#!!  !  
PO values for each time-frequency point were calculated separately for each 
level of attention and expectation and subsequently collapsed across 
expectation conditions. This was done because for this initial analysis we were 
seeking time-frequency regions in which EEG phase predicted decision, but not 
explicitly seeking time-frequency regions in which the influence of phase 
depended on expectation. Averaging over conditions means phase effects are 
still detectable if expectation changes (or even reverses) the preferred phase for 
yes or no responses. Interactions between phase and expectation were run in a 
separate follow-up analysis, thereby avoiding ‘double-dipping’.  
To obtain p-values, PO values were compared to the null distribution by 
pseudo-randomly allocating a behavioral response to each phase angle at each 
time-frequency point. This process was repeated for each session and each 
condition 2000 times (8000 in total), giving 1.8 x 1070 bootstrapped samples 
over all participants. The p-values were FDR-corrected over the entire pre-
stimulus region (-1000ms to stimulus onset) and over all frequencies. 
This analysis revealed a region of significant phase opposition in the pre-
stimulus alpha range over all trials, which reached maximum significance at 
10Hz, 119ms prior to stimulus onset, (p = 10-7, αFDR = 10-2.6, figure 5.4A,left). 
This means that pre-stimulus occipital alpha phase predicts yes versus no 
responses. Given that phase-modulation of perceptual hit rate has been shown 
to be dependent on attention (Busch & VanRullen, 2010), we then split phase 
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opposition values into two separate maps, one for each level of attention. 
Significant phase opposition was present under full attention (p-119ms, 10Hz = 10-4, 
αFDR = 10-2, figure 5.4A, center), and was indeed reduced in extent (but present) 
under diverted attention (p-119ms, 10Hz = 10-5, αFDR = 10-3, figure 5.4A, right), 
consistent with previous work.  
This result shows that pre-stimulus occipital alpha phase predicted decision, but 
we do not yet know whether decision bias or detection sensitivity was 
fluctuating. This question was addressed in the next section.  
5.3.4 PRE-STIMULUS OCCIPITAL ALPHA PHASE PREDICTS DECISION 
THRESHOLDS 
Previous studies on pre-stimulus phase have not been able to separate 
sensitivity from decision bias because phase analyses have only time-locked to 
target-present trials. Whereas target-absent trials usually have no obvious 
reference point for the phase analysis (when using a randomised inter-trial 
interval), here the onset of the search array served as a reference point for both 
Gabor-present and Gabor-absent phase determination. This allowed us to 
calculate the theoretically independent measures c (decision threshold) and d’ 
(detection sensitivity).  
Computing these values required binning phase angles from each trial. We 
needed data from just one time point, because pooling phase angles over time 
points results in associating multiple, systematically rotating phase angles with 
a single behavioral response. Similarly, phase angles from differing frequency 
bands cannot be compared in terms of their position in an oscillation. We 
extracted phase angles from each epoch from the eROIs at the -119ms, 10Hz 
time-frequency point: the point of maximal PO significance. Each phase angle 
was then binned into one of 6 phase bins.  
By considering responses on those trials this gave, for each participant, an 
associated set of hits, misses, false alarms and correct rejections as a function 
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Figure 5.4. EEG results.  
A. Time-frequency representation of phase opposition between yes and no reports over 
the eROI for (left) all trials, (middle) full attention, and (right) diverted attention. The 
vertical dashed line represents stimulus onset. The colour scale represents log-
transformed p-values. Regions that survive FDR correction are outlined in white.  
B. Relationship between decision threshold c and binned occipital 10Hz phase at -
119ms. The blue phase-criterion function represents results from the 25% (expect 
absent) condition and the red phase-criterion function represents results from the 75% 
(expect present) condition. Grey shading indicates the phase values which maximally 
predict the influence of expectation on decision: decisions are maximally biased 
towards reporting ‘no’ in the expect 25% condition, but towards ‘yes’ in the 75% 
condition. Shaded outlines represent within-subjects SEM  
C. Relationship between confidence and pre-stimulus 10Hz phase at -119ms. 
Congruent responses are reports of presence/absence in the 75%/25% conditions and 
vice versa for incongruent responses. Confidence significantly fluctuates with phase for 
both congruent (green) and incongruent (red) reports. Shaded regions represent within-
subjects SEM.  
D. Relationship between detection sensitivity d' and pre-stimulus 10Hz phase at -
119ms for the full (left) and diverted attention (right) conditions. Sensitivity does not 
fluctuate with phase in either condition. Shaded regions represent within-subjects SEM. 
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of phase bin. Trials were further categorised according to experimental 
condition. In turn, for each participant we could calculate d' and c as a function 
of phase bin, attention and expectation. Note that in splitting trials according to 
bin, the resulting six values of c per condition will not average exactly to the 
single value of c per condition when computed irrespective of phase bin. 
First, we asked whether pre-stimulus phase predicts decision threshold by 
running an Attention (full, diverted) x Expectation (25%, 75%) x Phase bin (1 to 
6) repeated-measures ANOVA on decision threshold c. Only interactions with 
phase bin are reported. This analysis revealed no significant main effect of 
Phase, F(5,85) = 0.66, p = .670, ηp2 = .04, no significant Attention by Phase bin 
interaction, F(5,85) = 0.38, p = .862, ηp2 = .02, and no significant three-way 
interaction, F(5,85) = 0.66, p = .650, ηp2 = .04. Critically, there was a significant 
two-way interaction between Expectation and Phase bin, F(5,85) = 2.64, p = 
.029, ηp2 = .13. This interaction is depicted in figure 5.4B, and is such that, as 
hypothesised, (1) c appears to oscillate with phase in both expectation 
conditions and (2) the two phase-criterion functions appear to be in anti-phase.  
These curves being in anti-phase mean that the range of phase values related 
to highest c in the 25% condition (conservative, expectation-congruent) is 
similar to the minimum values for c in the 75% condition (liberal, expectation-
congruent). 
This range is consistent with what we would expect from the optimal phase for 
perceptual priors to influence perceptual decision. At π rad away from this 
range, phase predicted the most liberal responses in the 25% condition 
(incongruent) and the most conservative responses in the 75% condition 
(incongruent). This suggests that in this range of phase the top-down priors 
exert their weakest influence, and that the relative effect of perceptual priors is 
minimal. We assume that here, the influence of bottom-up signals is therefore 
maximal. 
Supporting part of our first hypothesis, this indicates that independently of 
attention, the extent to which pre-stimulus occipital alpha phase predicted 
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decision threshold differed in the 25% (expect absent) and 75% (expect 
present) conditions.  
Figure 5.4B suggests that c oscillates in both conditions (both functions are 
sinusoids), but that the same phases predict opposing responses (the functions 
are in anti-phase). However, we have not yet determined this statistically. This 
was the aim of our next two analyses.  
5.3.5 PRIOR EXPECTATIONS CHANGE THE RESPONSE PREDICTED BY PRE-
STIMULUS ALPHA PHASE 
Does phase predict c in both expectation conditions? To check whether the 
phase-criterion functions were sinusoids we tested whether the distance 
between the peak and trough of each function was π rad. We used a circular v-
test, which tests the hypothesis that a set of angles (here, the peak-to-trough 
distance) is significantly clustered about some specified angle (here, π rad). 
This analysis revealed that indeed, the peak-to-trough distance was 
approximately π rad in both the 25% (v = 43.98, p < .001) and the 75% (v = 
12.56, p = .044) conditions. This means that both functions are sinusoids, and 
therefore that phase predicts criterion in both the 25% and 75% conditions.  
Next we asked whether the two phase-criterion functions were in anti-phase. 
This was the final, key step in testing whether expectations were reflected in 
pre-stimulus phase. A circular v-test, testing whether the peak-to-peak 
difference between the two phase-criterion functions was significantly clustered 
about π rad, revealed this to be the case, v = 43.98, p < .001. Thus, the two 
functions are in anti-phase, and the same phases that predict ‘yes’ when 
expecting target presence predict ‘no’ when expecting target absence. These 
phases are therefore those at which expectations exert their greatest effect on 
decision.  
In summary, we have supported our first hypothesis: that the influence of 
expectations on decision is oscillating with pre-stimulus alpha phase. We do not 
claim that a decision threshold is set at or before stimulus onset, because 
clearly, sensory evidence is not yet available to the visual system. Rather, our 
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data show that prior to stimulus onset, ongoing alpha phase biased the position 
of a decision threshold that is set later in time. 
5.3.6 RHYTHMIC FLUCTUATIONS IN CONFIDENCE  
Our second hypothesis was that pre-stimulus alpha phase would also predict 
the influence of expectations on confidence. Behaviorally, confidence increases 
for expected percepts. Consistent with this, our behavioral analyses showed 
that confidence for expectation-congruent reports (i.e. reporting 'yes' in the 75% 
condition or reporting 'no' in the 25% condition) was higher than for incongruent 
reports (i.e. reporting 'no' in the 75% condition or reporting 'yes' in the 75% 
condition). Therefore, if phase predicts the influence of expectations on 
confidence then there should be a range of phase angles which predict high 
confidence when congruent reports were made, but low confidence when 
incongruent reports were made. This set of phases would be the optimal 
phases for expectations to shape confidence.  
The four-point scale was collapsed into a binary confident/guess reports by 
performing a mean split on individual participants' reports. Next, we computed 
participants’ percentage of decisions reported with high confidence, as a 
function of phase bin, attention, and expectation-response congruence.  
An Attention x Congruence x Phase bin repeated-measures ANOVA under 
confidence revealed a significant main effect of phase bin (p < .001), but the 
phase-confidence function was not sinusoidal and therefore does not reflect the 
existence of an optimal phase for high confidence. The three-way interaction 
was also non-significant (p = .198, ηp2 = .08).  Crucially, the analysis did reveal 
a significant 2-way Congruence x Phase bin interaction, F(5,85) = 4.10, p = 
.002, ηp2 =.19.  
To break down this interaction we tested whether confidence oscillated with 
phase at either level of congruence. As in the analysis under decision threshold, 
circular v-tests tested the peak-to-trough difference of the two phase-confidence 
functions against π. These revealed that subjective confidence oscillated with 
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pre-stimulus alpha phase for both expectation-incongruent, v = 34.56, p < .0001 
and expectation-congruent, v = 25.13, p < .001, responses (figure 5.4C).  
As was the case for the decision threshold analysis, visual inspection of the 
figure suggests that the two functions are in anti-phase: phases associated with 
relatively high confidence for congruent reports are associated with relatively 
low confidence for incongruent reports. This was confirmed statistically with a 
circular v-test that showed the peak-to-peak distance between the two phase-
confidence functions to be significantly clustered about π rad, v = 43.98, p < 
.0001. In turn, this analysis indicates that the two functions are in anti-phase.  
Interestingly, the phase at which congruent yes/no responses are most likely 
appears similar to that at which congruence maximally predicts confidence (see 
figure 5.4C and 5.4B, respectively): the peak of the phase-expectation function 
(the 25% minus the 75% sinusoid) appears associated with high confidence for 
congruent reports, but low confidence for incongruent reports.  
In summary, our results suggest that at phases where prior expectations 
exerted stronger influences on decision; confidence was high for the 
expectation congruent report, but low for expectation-incongruent reports. This 
means that when the influence of priors was strong, confidence increased for 
predicted perceptual events, but decreased when expectations were violated. 
Together with the results under decision threshold, these data suggest a 10Hz 
alternation in the extent to which perceptual priors bias both objective and 
subjective decision-making.  
5.3.7 ALPHA PHASE DOES NOT PREDICT PERCEPTUAL SENSITIVITY 
Confidence is typically correlated with accuracy, such that participants are more 
confident when they are correct than when they are incorrect. Previous work 
has implicated pre-stimulus alpha phase in the detection of perceptual stimuli 
(Dugué, Marque, & VanRullen, 2011; Mathewson et al., 2012; Rohenkohl & 
Nobre, 2011), however previous studies have not been able to time-lock the 
phase analysis to target-absent as well as target-present trials. In turn, it is 
unclear whether these results reflect alternations in decision biases or in 
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perceptual sensitivity. If sensitivity is predicted by pre-stimulus alpha phase, our 
results under confidence may simply reflect fluctuations in d’.  
Our results under c implicate alpha phase in decisional biases, however to 
ascertain whether alpha phase is also implicated in sensitivity we ran an 
Attention x Expectation x Phase bin rmANOVA under d'. This revealed no 
significant main effect of Phase bin, F(5,85) = 1.65, p = .156, ηp2 = .09, nor any 
significant interactions (Attention x Phase: F(5,85) = 0.86, p = .507, ηp2 = .05 
(figure 5.4D); Expectation x Phase F(5,85) = 0.37, p = .868, ηp2 = .02;  Attention 
x Expectation x Phase,  F(5,85) = 0.88, p = .499, ηp2 = .05).  
An analogous Bayesian repeated-measures Attention x Expectation x Phase 
bin ANOVA was run on JASP using a Cauchy prior of 0.8 HWHM. This revealed 
evidence for the null hypothesis of no main predictive effect of phase (BF = 
0.025), as well as no predictive effect of phase that depended on attention (BF 
= 0.003), expectation (BF = 0.001) or both attention and expectation (BF < 
.0001).   
Previous studies have found that it was useful to realign each participant’s 
phase-hit rate function in order to correct for individual differences in optimal 
phases for perceptual sensitivity (Busch & VanRullen, 2010). Even using this 
method, however, we found no evidence for phase predicting d’ under either full 
(p = .787) or diverted (p = .407) attention. 
Together, these data robustly show that pre-stimulus alpha phase does not 
predict detection sensitivity. Rather, the data support the interpretation that 
alpha phase reflects fluctuations in objective and subjective decisional biases. 
5.4 DISCUSSION 
The present experiment implemented a paradigm that both separated the 
influences of expectation from those of attention, and allowed pre-stimulus 
oscillations to be time-locked to both target-absent and -present trials. Critically, 
this design enabled us to compute signal detection theoretic measures as a 
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function of phase and condition, and in turn separate phase-modulation of 
detection sensitivity from phase-modulation of decision threshold.  
Our results show that top-down expectations rhythmically bias perceptual 
decision-making in the pre-stimulus period, such that the extent to which 
expectations biased decision was predicted by the phase of pre-stimulus 
occipital alpha oscillations. The data revealed that decision threshold was 
predicted by phase both when expecting target presence and when expecting 
target absence. However, expectation flipped the relationship between phase 
and criterion (decision threshold), that is, the phase-criterion functions were in 
anti-phase: the same phases that predicted biases towards reporting ‘no’ when 
expecting target absence predicted biases towards reporting ‘yes’ when 
expecting target presence. These phases correspond to the optimal phases for 
expectations to influence perception.  
Importantly, we do not claim that perceptual priors entrained alpha oscillations, 
as is the case for temporal predictions (e.g. Rohenkohl and Nobre 2011; 
Samaha et al. 2015). Rather, priors determined whether a specific phase angle 
facilitated a ‘yes’ or a ‘no’ judgment. This effect of pre-stimulus alpha phase is 
interpreted as evidence for fluctuations in state of the visual system prior to 
stimulus onset affecting the propensity to use prior evidence post-stimulus, at 
the decision stage. Speculatively, this could occur if prior evidence for or against 
target presence is periodically transmitted to visual areas, in turn resulting in 
periodic changes in the baseline from which evidence accumulation begins 
(Christopher Summerfield & Egner, 2009).  
Fluctuations in the influence of expectation on objective decisions were 
accompanied by fluctuations in subjective confidence. For incongruent reports, 
subjective violations of expectation were associated with degrees of confidence 
that tracked the influence of the prior expectation: when perceptual priors 
exerted greater effects on decision, subjective violations of expectation were 
associated with greater subjective uncertainty. Moreover, the phase-confidence 
functions for congruent and incongruent responses were in anti-phase: the 
phase that predicted greatest uncertainty for incongruent reports also predicted 
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highest confidence for congruent reports. Together, these results extend 
previous work demonstrating that confidence evolves with the decision variable 
at early processing stages (Fetsch, Kiani, Newsome, & Shadlen, 2014;  Kiani & 
Shadlen, 2009) by showing that decision and confidence are jointly shaped by 
top-down influences.  As is the case for yes/no decisions, we interpret these 
results as evidence for biases in the early processing of sensory signals (for 
example, changes in starting point of evidence accumulation) modulating 
reported subjective confidence at late stages of the decision-making stream.  
Consistent with previous work, we found that alpha phase-modulation of 
perception is greater with attention than without (Busch & VanRullen, 2010; 
Landau & Fries, 2012), though here, still present under diverted attention. 
Critically, while previous evidence has demonstrated alpha-modulation of 
perceptual hit rate (Busch et al., 2009; Dugué et al., 2011; Landau & Fries, 
2012; Mathewson et al., 2009), it has not been possible to ascertain whether 
changes in hit rate have been driven by changes in sensitivity or bias. Here we 
implicate alpha oscillations in biasing perceptual decisions, but not increasing 
sensitivity. Critically, the influence of alpha phase on decision is modulated by 
expectations. Our data also extend previous research that has revealed that the 
influence of expectation on decision is predicted by pre-stimulus beta-band 
power over both motor (de Lange et al., 2013) and somatosensory (van Ede et 
al., 2010) cortices, as well as by BOLD responses in a range of cortical areas 
(Hesselmann, Kell, & Kleinschmidt, 2008; Hesselmann, Sadaghiani, Friston, & 
Kleinschmidt, 2010; Rahnev, Bahdo, de Lange, & Lau, 2012; Christopher 
Summerfield & Koechlin, 2008). Pre-stimulus signals biasing decision at early 
stages of visual processing (i.e. in sensory cortices) has not, to our knowledge, 
been shown before. Our results therefore support an early, and critically, 
rhythmic, influence of expectations on decision.  
Top-down influences are increasingly modeled within Bayesian frameworks 
(Clark, 2013; Daunizeau et al., 2010; J. Hohwy, 2013; Kersten et al., 2004; Ma, 
Beck, Latham, & Pouget, 2006; Mathys et al., 2014). Here, perception is 
described as a Bayesian inference on sensory causes. A core tenet of these 
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frameworks is that the prior probability of sensory causes will constrain 
inference accordingly, and so probable or ‘expected’ sensory causes are more 
likely to be chosen and thus perceived (Knill & Pouget, 2004; Lee & Mumford, 
2003; Spratling, 2008; Yuille & Kersten, 2006a). A plausible implication of this 
view is that such prior probabilities should be reflected in the state of the brain 
in the pre-stimulus period. Consistent with this, we have shown that the 
influence of priors on decision oscillates with pre-stimulus alpha phase.  
One possible explanation for these findings is that alpha oscillations orchestrate 
the communication of prior expectations to visual cortex. On this view, rhythmic 
influences of expectation on decision threshold would reflect fluctuations in the 
prior probability of the reported perceptual decision. However, an alternative 
view is that our results reflect fluctuations in the weighting of priors on decision, 
rather than the prior probability itself. On this alternative view, alpha phase 
reflects the attentional state of the system, consistent with previous theoretical 
work (Jensen, Bonnefond, & VanRullen, 2012; Palva & Palva, 2007) , so that 
priors are assigned a greater weight on perceptual decision when sensory 
signals are expected to be unreliable. Here, perceptual expectations would 
increase or decrease the excitability of relevant neural populations, or gain, 
according to whether a target is expected to appear or not. In both cases, pre-
stimulus occipital alpha phase modulates the relative weighting of prior 
expectations and sensory data, however our data cannot discriminate between 
these two views, and we leave this question open to future research.  
In summary, we have described evidence indicating a periodic influence of 
perceptual priors on both objective (detection) and subjective (confidence) 
decisions, predicted by the phase of pre-stimulus occipital alpha oscillations. 
This rapid and periodic alternation between top-down and bottom-up influences 
in visual areas extends existing data implicating alpha oscillations in top-down 
processing (von Stein et al., 2000). Together, our data suggest that alpha 
oscillations may periodically transmit perceptual priors, and in turn reveal a 
plausible neural mechanism by which prior information may subserve top-down 
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modulation of early visual processing: alpha oscillations may orchestrate the 
reciprocal exchange of predictions and prediction errors.   
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6 
FUNCTIONAL NETWORK UNDERLYING TOP-
DOWN INFLUENCES ON CONFIDENCE  
It is clear that prior expectations shape perceptual confidence, yet how this 
occurs post-stimulus is unknown. Here we recorded fMRI data while 
participants made perceptual decisions and confidence judgements, controlling 
for potential confounds of attention. Results show that the relationship between 
expectations and subjective confidence increases BOLD activity in right inferior 
frontal gyrus (rIFG). Specifically, rIFG is sensitive to the discrepancy between 
expectation and decision (mismatch), and, crucially, higher mismatch responses 
are associated with lower decision confidence. Connectivity analyses revealed 
the source of top-down influences on confidence to be frontal areas right 
orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) and bilateral frontal pole (FP), and the source of 
sensory signals to be occipital pole. Altogether, our results indicate that 
predictive information is integrated into subjective confidence in rIFG, and 
reveal an occipital-frontal network that constructs confidence from top-down and 
bottom-up signals. This interpretation was further supported by exploratory 
findings that the white matter density of occipital pole and OFC predicted their 
respective contributions to the construction of confidence. These findings 
advance our understanding of the neural basis of subjective perceptual 
processes by revealing a functional network that integrates prior beliefs into the 
construction of confidence.  
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6.1 INTRODUCTION 
Perception is increasingly being seen as an active process, in which current or 
future sensory states are inferred from predictive information (Bar, 2007; Beck & 
Kastner, 2009; Engel et al., 2001; Fiser et al., 2010; Gilbert & Li, 2013; Lee, 
2002). These predictions can be modelled in Bayesian terms as prior beliefs, 
which bias perceptual inference towards solutions that are a priori more likely in 
a given context (Bülthoff, Bülthoff, & Sinha, 1998; Seriès & Seitz, 2013; Trapp & 
Bar, 2015). Predictions, or priors, can have striking effects on perception, 
especially under high sensory uncertainty. For example, ambiguous rotational 
motion can be subjectively disambiguated by prior exposure to rotation 
direction, such that a rotation direction is perceived despite none existing in the 
physical stimulus (Maloney, Dal Martello, Sahm, & Spillmann, 2005). In 
laboratory conditions, such behavioural effects of prediction are typically 
accompanied by increases in BOLD and ERP amplitude, as well as evoked 
gamma power, over sensory (Kouider et al. 2015; Egner et al. 2010; Saaltink et 
al. 2015; Kok et al. 2011; Jiang et al. 2013; Wacongne et al. 2011; Bauer et al. 
2014) and decision-related (Bubic et al., 2009) brain regions - a ‘prediction error’ 
response profile that reflects the discrepancy between internal templates and 
perceptual content.  
The perceptual content that forms the basis of our visual experience is 
accompanied by a degree of subjective confidence. Confidence reflects the 
estimated success of a perceptual choice, and can be seen as a gate for post-
perceptual processes, such as learning and belief-updating (Nassar, Wilson, 
Heasly, & Gold, 2010; Yeung & Summerfield, 2012). The communication of 
decision confidence can also facilitate group decision-making (Bahrami et al., 
2010). Yet, while subjective confidence is an integral part of perceptual 
experience that can be easily probed in human subjects (Fleming & Lau, 2014; 
Overgaard & Sandberg, 2012; Sandberg et al., 2010; Seth et al., 2008; 
Wierzchoń et al., 2014), the construction of confidence remains poorly 
understood. 
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It is clear that confidence increases with evidence in support of the decision 
(Fetsch, Kiani, & Shadlen, 2015; Gherman & Philiastides, 2015; Hebart et al., 
2014; Yeung & Summerfield, 2012). Decision and confidence are thought to 
evolve together until the first-order, objective decision has been made (Kepecs 
& Mainen, 2012; Ratcliff & Starns, 2009), and accordingly, there exists strong 
evidence for a common sensory signal underlying both types of report (Fetsch 
et al., 2014; Kiani et al., 2014; Kiani & Shadlen, 2009). Surprisingly, there has 
been much less research that considers the role of prior expectations on 
subjective confidence. There is converging behavioural evidence for subjective 
confidence increasing with prior evidence in favour of the associated choice 
(see Chapters 4 and 5, and Aitchison, Bang, Bahrami, & Latham, 2015; 
Meyniel, Schlunegger, & Dehaene, 2015), but the neural substrates of this have 
remained unexplored. 
Here we aimed to identify brain regions in which prior perceptual expectations 
are integrated into confidence judgements. Based on previous work, we 
reasoned that confidence should be high when decisions are supported by prior 
knowledge, that is, when the discrepancy between expectation and perceptual 
decision is low. We therefore sought to identify brain regions that, first, are 
sensitive to both prediction error and confidence, and second, in which 
confidence is negatively associated with prediction error. In such a region, 
confidence would be associated with the mismatch between internal templates 
and perceptual report. 
We further hypothesised that regions found to integrate prior expectations into 
confidence judgements (as described above) should be functionally connected 
with two information sources: one that represents the decision evidence, or 
sensory information; and one that represents the prior expectation. As 
confidence increasingly depends on prior expectations, functional connectivity 
with the source of the priors and sensory signals relevant to these judgements 
should increase.  
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6.2 MATERIALS AND METHODS 
6.2.1 PARTICIPANTS 
The study was approved by the Brighton and Sussex Medical School Research 
Governance and Ethics Committee. Twenty-four healthy, English speaking and 
right-handed subjects were tested (age 19-34, mean age = 25 years, 13 
females). Data from five participants were excluded: two whose thresholding 
failed (see section ‘Staircases’, Gabor hit rate = 2%, visual search d’ = -0.1); 
one for revealing abnormal vision only after scanning (and whose estimated 
contrast thresholds were accordingly > 2SD from the mean); one for excessive 
head movement in the scanner such that their T1 scan was unusable; and one 
for failing to respond on 33% of trials (relative to a mean of 3%). This left 19 
participants with normal or corrected-to-normal vision for analysis. All 
participants gave informed, written consent and were reimbursed £50 for their 
time. 
6.2.2 PROCEDURE 
The experiment was conducted over three sessions at least 2 hours apart (no 
participant completed all three on a single day). In session one informed 
consent was obtained. Participants were trained on all tasks before scanning, 
which consisted of on-screen instructions, followed by a minimum of 10 practice 
trials of each task. Participants were encouraged to continue training until the 
task was well understood and response mappings learned. 
To equate performance accuracy across conditions and subjects, participants 
subsequently completed three staircase procedures in the scanner but without 
acquiring echoplanar images (EPIs). Next, two 17 minute runs of experimental 
trials were completed while EPI scans were acquired. Session two did not 
include a training component but was otherwise identical to session one. 
Session three consisted of: 10 minutes for T1 acquisition; 15 minutes of 
retinotopy (data from which is not used in this paper); and, time permitting, one 
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more experimental run. After three sessions participants were compensated for 
their time and debriefed. 
6.2.3 EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
The paradigm used in the present study is adapted from that used in Chapter 4. 
The visual display was identical in all sections of the experiment (training, 
staircase and experimental). It consisted of a central visual search array and the 
presence or absence of a to-be-detected, Gabor patch in the periphery (see 
figure 6.1 and subsection 'Trial Sequence'). 
 In experimental trials, the principal task was Gabor detection and two factors 
were orthogonally manipulated: prior expectations of Gabor presence and 
attention to Gabor detection. Expectations were manipulated block-wise, by 
changing the probability of target Gabor presentation (P(Gabor present) = .25, 
 
 
Figure 6.1. Trial sequence. 
 Blocks began with instructions signalling the expectation and attention condition. 
Here, the block induces an expectation of target absence (Gabor presentation is 
unlikely) and the central visual search task should be ignored (diverted attention 
condition). On each trial a visual search target T was either absent (top) or present 
(bottom) with 50% probability. On each trial a target Gabor was either present (top) 
or absent (bottom) with probability determined according to condition. Response 
cues followed the offset of the stimuli. Staircase trials were identical, except there 
was no condition-specific instruction at the beginning and only task-relevant 
response cues were presented.  
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.50 or .75). The P(Gabor present) = .25 condition induced an expectation of 
Gabor absence, whereas the P(Gabor present) = .75 condition induced an 
expectation of Gabor presence. The P(Gabor present) = .50 condition acted as 
a control (flat prior). Attention was manipulated by instructing participants to 
either perform or ignore a visual search task presented concurrently to the 
Gabor target. This task consisted of detecting target ‘T’s amongst an array of 
distracter ‘L’s. Performing both tasks concurrently diverted attention from the 
Gabor detection task, allowing us to separate effects of expectation from those 
of attention. 
These conditions were manipulated block-wise, in groups of 12 trials. Each 
condition occurred once per scanning run in fully counter-balanced order. 
Before each experimental block began participants were informed of both the 
expectation and attention condition via the presentation of an instruction screen 
presented for 10 seconds. Participants were instructed to always maintain 
fixation at a central cross. 
6.2.4 TRIAL SEQUENCE 
The trial sequence was identical for training, staircasing and experimental trials 
and is shown in figure 6.1. Only instructions varied (see ‘Experimental design’). 
Trials began with a white fixation cross of random duration between 2.5 and 5 
seconds. Next, a visual search array appeared, which consisted of seven 
letters: all white, capital ‘L’s (50% chance), or a white, capital ‘T’ replacing an ‘L’ 
(50% chance). All letters were equidistant from fixation and took an 
independently random orientation. These were subsequently masked by a 
matching array of ‘F’s to increase task difficulty. In total the visual search array 
was present for 1.1 seconds. The stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA) between 
target and masking arrays was titrated for each participant such that accuracy 
was at 78% (see Staircases). 
On some trials a near-threshold (see section Staircases) peripheral Gabor patch 
(orientation = 135°, phase 45° on 50% of trials, 225° on 50% of trials, sf = 2c/°, 
Gaussian SD = 30) was additionally presented. On these trials the stimulus 
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appeared at the same time as the visual search array. To minimise attentional 
capture it was presented over 0.6 seconds in a Gaussian time envelope so that 
it had a gradual onset and offset. Stimulus contrast was titrated to equate 
performance across levels of attention and participants at 78% accuracy (see 
Staircases). 
The interval between offset of the masking array and onset of response prompts 
was jittered during scanning only (i.e. experimental trials) to minimise motor 
cortex activity reflecting response anticipation. Jitter was randomly selected 
from the discrete values 1.3s:0.3s:3.1s. 
Response prompts were presented at the end of the trial. The first prompt 
referred to the Gabor detection task. ‘Absent’ responses were recorded by 
pressing the outer left key and ‘present’ responses, the outer right key. This 
prompt was presented on all trials except those of the visual search staircase 
procedure (only visual search performed). The second prompt asked whether 
participants guessed (inner left) or were confident (inner right) in their Gabor 
detection response (not presented on staircasing trials). The third prompt was 
only presented on trials where participants performed the visual search task. 
This asked whether the visual search target ‘T’ was absent (outer left) or 
present (outer right). Response prompts remained onscreen for 2 seconds and 
responses were coded as missed trials if no response was given within the 
allowed time. 
6.2.5 STAIRCASES 
Prior to each experimental session, three separate adaptive 1-up-3-down 
psychophysical staircase procedures (9 reversals) were completed in the 
scanner. Trials were identical to those in staircase trials (see Trial structure) 
except: there was no manipulation of attention or expectation; the Gabor was 
always present, but randomly oriented either 45° to the left or to the right; the 
Gabor task was 2AFC orientation discrimination instead of target detection; 
confidence ratings were not requested.  
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Staircase 1 titrated Gabor contrast to achieve 78% accuracy under full attention. 
Initial contrast was 1.5%. The visual search array was masked after 0.5 
seconds. Participants were instructed to ignore the visual search array but still 
fixate centrally. 
Staircase 2 titrated the SOA between the visual search array and masking array 
to set performance at 78% (in the visual search task). Initial SOA was 500ms. 
Participants ignored the 2AFC task and performed the visual search task. Here, 
the ignored Gabor was presented at the contrast acquired in staircase 1.  
Staircase 3 titrated Gabor contrast to achieve 78% accuracy (in Gabor 
detection) under diverted attention. Initial contrast was set at that obtained in 
staircase 1 and visual search SOA was set at the value obtained by staircase 2. 
Here, participants performed both the Gabor and the visual search tasks. The 
visual search SOA was set at the value obtained in the previous staircase and 
initial contrast was set at that obtained in the first and titrated over the course of 
the staircase to obtain the diverted attention contrast level.    
6.2.6 STATISTICAL ANALYSES 
Gabor detection sensitivity and decision threshold were quantified by computing 
type 1 signal detection theoretic (SDT) measures d' and c respectively (see 
Chapter 3 for more detail). These are computed by classifying trials as hits (h), 
misses (m), false alarms (fa) or correct rejections (cr). Then, 
𝐻𝑅 =  ℎℎ +  𝑚  𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐹𝐴𝑅 = 𝑓𝑎𝑓𝑎 +  𝑐𝑟  
so that 
𝑑! =  𝑍 𝐻𝑅 − 𝑍 𝐹𝐴𝑅  𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑐 = −𝑍 𝐻𝑅 + 𝑍(𝐹𝐴𝑅)2   
where Z is the inverse cdf of the normal distribution.    
Confidence was computed by calculating the proportion of trials on which each 
subject reported ‘confident’.  
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We also estimated metacognitive bias. In signal detection theory, we can 
represent confidence thresholds that fall on either side of the type 1 criterion, 
representing the additional evidence needed to report “confident no” or 
“confident yes”. These thresholds reflect metacognitive bias. These thresholds, 
are defined as follows: 
𝐶!!+ =  𝑐 +𝑑! +−  𝑐𝑑!  𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐶!!− =  𝑐 −𝑑! −−  𝑐𝑑!   
The plus and minus signs correspond to metacognitive bias for “yes” and “no” 
responses respectively. The values c+ and d’+ are computed by reclassifying 
hits, misses, false alarms and correct rejections according to reported 
confidence. Confident “yes” reports are reclassified as simply “yes” and all 
others as “no”. From these, we obtain c+ and d+’ from the standard equations 
for d’ and c. This process is repeated for “no” responses by setting “no” to be 
“confident no” and “yes” otherwise. These values of metacognitive bias should 
be independent of decision accuracy. High values correspond to thresholds that 
extend far from the type 1 criterion, meaning that metacognitive bias is 
conservative (more likely to report “guess”). The reverse applied for small 
values. 
In the present Chapter, two participants had one extreme value of metacognitive 
bias ( > 20 times larger than their other estimates), resulting from dividing by a 
small response-conditional d’. For these participants, the extreme value was 
replaced with the subject’s mean across the other 11 estimates. 
Behavioural and follow-up statistical tests were run on JASP (Love, et al., 
2015). When the null hypothesis was predicted, Bayesian t-tests and repeated-
measures ANOVAs implemented the JASP default Cauchy prior of 0.7 HWHM 
centered on zero. All results presented were robust to reasonable adjustments 
of this value. Bayes factors greater than 1/3/10/100 are respectively interpreted 
as showing insensitive/moderate/strong/very strong evidence for the alternative 
hypothesis (Kass & Raftery, 1995). Bayes factors less than the reciprocal of 
these values are given the same labels, but refer to the null hypothesis.  
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Unless otherwise stated, all repeated-measures ANOVA results met the 
assumption of sphericity. Where sphericity was violated, corrected degrees of 
freedom and p-values are presented. The Greenhouse-Geisser correction is 
used for small violations (ԑ < .75) and the Huynh-Feldt correction for large 
violations (ԑ > .75).  
6.2.7 MRI ACQUISITION AND PRE-PROCESSING 
Functional T2* sensitive echoplanar images (EPIs) were acquired on a Siemens 
Avanto 1.5T scanner. Axial slices were tilted to minimise signal dropout from 
frontal and occipital cortices. 34 2mm slices with 1mm gaps were acquired (TR 
= 2863ms, TE = 50ms, FOV = 192mm x 192mm, Matrix = 64 x 64, Flip angle = 
90°). Full brain T1-weighted structural scans were acquired on the same 
scanner and were composed of 176 1mm thick sagittal slices (TR = 2730ms, TE 
= 3.57ms, FOV = 224mm x 256mm, Matrix = 224 x 256, Flip angle = 7°) using 
the MPRAGE protocol.  
Functional runs, each lasting 17 minutes, were collected per scanning session. 
Images were processed using SPM8 software 
(http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm/software/spm8/). The first four functional 
volumes of each run were treated as dummy scans and discarded. Images were 
pre-processed using standard procedures: anatomical and functional images 
were reoriented to the anterior commissure; images were slice-time corrected 
with the middle slice used as the reference; EPIs were aligned to each other 
and co-registered to the structural scan by minimising normalised mutual 
information. Next, EPIs were spatially normalised to MNI space using 
parameters obtained from the segmentation of T1 images into grey and white 
matter. Finally, spatially normalised images were smoothed with a Gaussian 
smoothing kernel of 8mm FWHM.  
6.2.8 FMRI STATISTICAL ANALYSIS 
At the participant level BOLD responses were time-locked to the onset of the 
visual search array (which appeared at the same time as the Gabor, if present), 
enabling us to examine BOLD responses to both target present and target 
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absent trials. BOLD responses were modelled in a GLM with regressors and 
their corresponding temporal derivatives for each combination of the following 
factors: Attention (full, diverted), Expectation (25%, 50%, and 75%), Stimulus 
(target present, target absent), Report (yes, no) and Confidence (confident, 
guess). If a certain combination of factors had no associated trials for a 
particular participant, that regressor was removed from the participant’s first 
level model and contrast weights rescaled.  
The reliability of the regression weights was maximised by entering data from all 
runs and sessions together, increasing the trial count per regressor. To avoid 
smearing artefacts, no band-pass filter was applied. Instead, low-frequency 
drifts were regressed out by entering white matter drift (averaged over the brain) 
as a nuisance regressor (Law et al., 2005). Nuisance regressors representing 
the experimental run and six head motion parameters were also included.  
Comparisons of interest were tested by running one-sample t-tests against zero 
at the participant level, then running group-level paired t-tests on the one-
sample maps. Unless otherwise stated, all contrasts at the group level were run 
with peak thresholds of p < .001 (uncorrected) and corrected for multiple 
comparisons at the cluster level using the FDR method.  
We wanted to control for possible confounds between reaction speed and 
confidence (which correlate, see e.g. Grinband, Hirsch, & Ferrera, 2006; 
Petrusic & Baranski, 2003), and between individual or condition-wise 
differences in Gabor contrast and confidence (which correlate, Rahnev et al., 
2011). To do this, a control GLM was computed. Here, each regressor was 
parametrically modulated by both Gabor contrast and reaction time. By design, 
in this model confidence was independent of reaction time and BOLD amplitude 
was independent of individual and condition-wise differences in stimulus 
contrast. The Results section reports analyses on our main model, i.e. the 
model without regressors for Gabor contrast and reaction speed. We did this 
because the control model has a four-fold increase in number of regressors, 
reducing statistical power. Nonetheless, all GLM analyses were replicated under 
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our control model when using a peak threshold of p < .005. Crucially, all results 
under rIFG were also replicated when using a peak threshold of p < .001.  
Functional ROIs were defined using the MarsBaR 0.42 toolbox 
(http://marsbar.sourceforge.net/download.html). Anatomical areas showing 
significant differences in BOLD were identified using the SPM Anatomy toolbox 
(Eickhoff et al., 2005) and Brodmann areas were identified using MRIcro 
(Rorden & Brett, 2000). Results of whole-brain analyses were plotted onto glass 
brains using MATcro (now called MRIcroS, 
https://www.nitrc.org/plugins/mwiki/index.php/mricros:MainPage). 
6.2.9 PSYCHOPHYSIOLOGICAL INTERACTION (PPI) ANALYSIS  
The psychophysiological interaction (PPI) analysis was performed using the 
CONN functional connectivity toolbox (http://web.mit.edu/swg/software.htm). 
The GLM comprised regressors for attention condition (full/diverted), confidence 
(confident/guess) and expectation-response congruence 
(congruent/neutral/incongruent). Nuisance regressors were identical to those 
used in the GLM on BOLD. Again, the signal was not band-pass filtered but 
instead the mean WM drift was entered as a nuisance regressor. The data were 
denoised by regressing out signal from white matter, from CSF and from each 
individual condition, plus signal associated with all nuisance regressors. The 
PPI was run on univariate regression weights to identify effective connectivity 
between a functionally defined seed (rIFG) and remaining voxels. These 
weights were examined in a second level model which used an uncorrected 
peak threshold of p < .005 and FDR cluster corrected threshold of p < .05. 
6.2.10 VOXEL-BASED MORPHOMETRY (VBM) 
T1-weighted structural scans were reoriented to the anterior commissure and 
segmented into grey matter (GM), white matter (WM) and CSF. These were 
normalised to MNI space using DARTEL with SPM defaults and a Gaussian 
smoothing kernel of 8mm FWHM (Ashburner & Friston, 2000). White matter and 
grey matter images were separately compared across participants in a multiple 
regression with age and total intracranial volume (GM + WM + CSF) as 
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nuisance regressors. Gender was not included because this resulted in 
multicollinearity between regressors (older participants were more likely to be 
male). Unless reported otherwise, clusters reported as significantly correlating 
with behaviour survived voxel-wise FWE correction. 
6.4 RESULTS 
6.3.1 EXPECTATIONS LIBERALISE DECISIONS AND ATTENTION INCREASES 
CONTRAST SENSITIVITY 
Our first analyses confirmed the efficacy of our paradigm. To equate difficulty 
across attention conditions and participants, adaptive psychophysical staircases 
identified the stimulus contrast required for 78% accuracy on the Gabor 
detection task (see Methods subsection Staircases). Comparing the acquired 
contrasts in the full and diverted attention conditions revealed that contrast 
thresholds were significantly lower under full than diverted attention, t(19) = 
2.95, p = .014, 95%CI [0.50%, 2.31%], dz = 0.70 (fig. 6.2A). Thus, our paradigm 
successfully manipulated attention. 
To ensure that our staircase procedure successfully equated detection 
sensitivity d’ across conditions we ran a within-subjects Attention (full, diverted) 
x Expectation (25%, 50%, 75%) ANOVA. This revealed no significant difference 
between d’ under full (M = 1.06, SE = 0.14) and diverted (M = 1.21, SE = 0.20) 
attention conditions, F(1,18) = 0.34, p = .569, ηp2 = .02 (fig. 6.2B), and was 
corroborated by a Bayesian repeated-measures ANOVA of the same design 
that revealed moderate evidence for the null hypothesis (BF = 0.240). There 
was also no significant effect of Expectation on d’, F(2,36) = 0.70, p = .505, ηp2 
= .04, BF = 0.07 (strong evidence for the null) and no significant interaction term 
F(2,36) = 0.76, p = .476, ηp2 = .04, BF = 0.016 (strong evidence for the null). 
Our staircases therefore successfully equated d’. 
To determine whether we had successfully manipulated priors, we compared 
signal detection theoretic decision thresholds (c, see Methods) across  
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Figure 6.2. Behavioural effects of expectation and attention on objective and subjective 
decision-making.  
A. Stimulus contrast as a function of attention condition. To achieve 78% correct on the 
Gabor detection task contrast had to be higher under diverted than full attention. 
B. Detection sensitivity d’ as a function of expectation and attention condition. No 
significant differences were found. 
C. Decision threshold c as a function of expectation and attention condition. 
Independently of attention, bias towards reporting ‘yes’ (lower values of c) increases 
with the prior probability of Gabor presence. 
D. Confidence as a function of expectation-report congruence and decision accuracy. 
Independently of accuracy, confidence is higher for congruent that incongruent reports. 
Untransformed data are presented for illustrative purposes.  
Error bars represent within-subjects SEM.  
expectation conditions (see Chapter 4, and also de Lange et al., 2013; Morales 
et al., 2015). As the expectation of Gabor presence over absence increases, 
decision threshold should become increasingly biased towards ‘yes’ responses 
(i.e. liberalised, shown by smaller values of c). This was confirmed in a within-
subjects Attention (full, diverted) x Expectation (25%, 50%, 75%) ANOVA, 
F(1.65, 29.72) = 18.10, p < .001, ηp2 = .50. LSD post-hoc tests revealed a 
greater bias towards reporting ‘yes’ in the 50% (neutral) than the 25% (expect 
absent) condition, p = .010, dz = 1.15, and greater still in the 75% (expect 
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present) than the 50% (neutral) condition, p < .001, dz = 1.39 (fig. 6.2C). We 
found no evidence for attentional effects on decision threshold, F(1, 18) = 3.38, 
p = .083, ηp2 = .16, and no Expectation x Attention interaction, F(2, 36) = 0.37, p 
= .693, ηp2 = .020. Summarising these results, our design successfully 
independently manipulated attention and expectation, while keeping detection 
sensitivity constant across conditions. 
6.3.2 EXPECTATIONS INCREASE CONFIDENCE 
In Chapters 4 and 5 it was shown that subjective confidence increases when 
perceptual decisions are congruent with prior expectations. On this basis, we 
hypothesised that confidence would relate to prediction error signals. To 
determine whether we had replicated this behavioural result, we compared 
confidence for perceptual decisions that were congruent with expectations 
against those that were incongruent. Congruent responses are ‘yes’ reports in 
the 75% (expect present) condition and ‘no reports in the 25% (expect absent) 
condition. The reverse applies for incongruent responses.  
The percentage of high confidence trials were Z-transformed (because 
otherwise confidence is bounded by 0 and 1) and subjected to an Attention (full, 
diverted) x Accuracy (correct, incorrect) x Congruence (congruent, neutral, 
incongruent) repeated-measures ANOVA. Participants appropriately showed 
lower confidence for incorrect than correct reports, F(1,18) = 5.70, p = .028, η2 = 
.241. Confidence was also higher for attended than unattended targets F(1,18) 
= 5.27, p = .034, η2 = .226. Importantly, confidence increased with expectation-
response congruence, F(1.10,19.86) = 6.67, p = .016, η2 = .270 (untransformed 
data plotted in figure 6.2D). Congruence additionally interacted with attention, 
F(2,36) = 6.51, p = .004, η2 = .266, such that inattention only lowered 
confidence when participants had an informative prior (congruent reports p = 
.023, incongruent reports, p = .006 vs. neutral reports, p = .280). There were no 
other significant main or interaction effects (all p > .107, all η2 < .138).  
Next we wanted to determine whether this effect reflected changes in 
metacognitive bias. For each level of attention and expectation, we computed 
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response-specific confidence thresholds over the type 1 SDT model (see 
Methods and Section 3.6.1). We wanted to determine whether confidence 
thresholds for congruent decisions were closer to the type 1 criterion than 
incongruent decisions. Values that are closer to zero indicate that the participant 
reports “confident” with less evidence, thereby indicating a more liberal 
metacognitive bias.  
As shown in figure 6.3, we found a significant expectation by report interaction, 
F(2,36) = 17.16, p < .001, η2 = .488, such that when participants reported “yes”, 
metacognitive bias linearly liberalised with increasing prior probability of target 
presence,  F(1,18) = 6.24, p = .022, η2 = .257, and when they reported “no”, 
metacognitive bias linearly liberalised with prior probability of absence, F(1,18) 
 
Figure 6.3 Response-specific metacognitive bias as a function of 
expectation.  
The red diamonds depict the distance of the normalised confidence 
threshold for ‘yes’ responses from the normalised type 1 threshold. This 
threshold is squeezed towards criterion with increasing probability of 
target presence, representing more liberal confidence. Similarly, for 
targets reported as absent (blue circles), the normalised confidence 
threshold is closer to the normalised criterion with increasing probability 
of target absence. Therefore, expectation-congruent responses require 
less type 1 evidence than incongruent responses to be reported with 
confidence. Error bars represent within-subject SEM.  
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= 24.00, p < .001, η2 = .571. These results indicate that over and above effects 
on type 1 decision threshold, expected percepts may require less type 1 
evidence to be reported with high confidence.  
Finally we asked whether the congruency effect on metacognition found in 
Chapter 4 was replicated. We ran the same analysis as that above, but on type 
2 D’ and meta-d’/d’. Results showed that while type 2 D’ increased with 
expectation-response congruence independently of attention, F(2,36) = 14.25, p 
< .001, η2 = .952, no effect on meta-d’/d’ was found (Expectation x Report,  p = 
.940, Expectation x Report x Attention, p = .284). Thus, we partly replicated 
findings from Chapter 4. 
6.3.3 TWO FORMS OF CONGRUENCY 
To unravel the neural correlates of predictive influences on confidence, we first 
needed to identify brain regions sensitive to perceptual expectations. We 
predicted, based on previous work, that areas sensitive to perceptual 
expectations would exhibit an increased BOLD amplitude for trials on which 
expectations were violated (Egner et al., 2010; Jiang et al., 2013; Kok et al., 
2011; Kouider et al., 2015; St. John-Saaltink et al., 2015). 
There are two possible ways to define expectancy violations here. Because the 
experimental design used near-threshold stimuli, leading to potential 
dissociations between percept and physical stimulus presentation, violations 
could occur with respect to either physical stimulus presentation, or perceptual 
report. We term the neural correlates of these types of incongruence PESTIMULUS 
and PEREPORT respectively. The former reflects the BOLD response to 
discrepancy between internal templates and stimulus presentation, whereas the 
latter reflects the BOLD response to discrepancy between internal templates 
and participants’ reported percept. PESTIMULUS is most often observed at lower 
levels of the perceptual hierarchy (Chennu et al., 2013; Jiang et al., 2013; Kok 
et al., 2011), whereas the decision-related PEREPORT signals are often reported 
in higher-level, decision-related areas (Bubic et al., 2009), though they can be 
observed in visual cortex as well (Pajani, Kok, Kouider, & de Lange, 2015).  
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6.3.4 REPRESENTATION OF PESTIMULUS IN VISUAL CORTEX 
In our first analysis, we searched for regions that are sensitive to discrepancies 
between expectation and stimulus presentation (PESTIMULUS) over whole brain. 
To do this, we computed the contrast unexpected stimulus presentation > 
expected stimulus presentation. Target presence is expected in the 75% 
condition but unexpected in the 25% condition. Target absence is expected in 
the 25% condition but unexpected in the 75% condition. Our analysis identified 
one PESTIMULUS-sensitive area in contralateral occipital cortex (V1 to V3, BA18, 
peak MNI x = -12, y = -80, z = 22, Zpeak = 4.09, 0.66cm3, cluster pFDR = .350, 
puncorr = .023) and one on the ipsilateral side (V1 to V3, BA18, peak MNI x = 8, y 
= -80, z = 18, Zpeak = 3.99, 1.01cm3, cluster pFDR = .205, puncorr = .007). Neither of 
these clusters survived cluster-level correction, so they will not be considered 
beyond this point. They are presented to simply to show consistency with 
previous studies, in which statistical power was improved by constraining the 
analysis with functional localisers (Jiang et al., 2013; Kok et al., 2012, 2011; 
Larsson & Smith, 2012; Smith & Muckli, 2010) .  
The whole-brain contrast PESTIMULUS, attended > PESTIMULUS, unattended yielded 
no significant or marginally significant clusters, indicating no evidence for a 
PESTIMULUS ⨉ attention interaction.  
Using a peak threshold of p < .005 both of these analyses were replicated under 
our control model, which included reaction speed and Gabor contrast as 
parametric modulators (unexpected > expected, contralateral: pFDR = .446, puncorr 
= .014, ipsilateral: pFDR = .446, puncorr = .011).  
6.3.5 REGIONS REPRESENTING PEREPORT 
Next, we searched for regions whose BOLD response reflects the discrepancy 
between expectation and perceptual report (PEREPORT). Expectation-congruent 
reports are 'yes' responses in the 75% (expect present) condition and 'no' 
responses in the 25% (expect absent) condition. The reverse applies for 
expectation-incongruent reports. These definitions differ from those in the 
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previous analysis, because they consider perceptual report instead of stimulus 
presence or absence. 
The contrast expectation-incongruent report > expectation-congruent report was 
computed over whole-brain. This revealed eight significant clusters, distributed 
throughout cortex (figure 6.4A and table 6.1). Our control analysis revealed that 
this difference was not driven by differences in Gabor contrast or reaction speed 
(all remained significant after cluster correction at the p < .05 level).  
We found no significant clusters for the reverse contrast, even with a more 
liberal peak threshold of p < .005 uncorrected.  
 Regions exhibiting a PEREPORT pattern should show heightened BOLD for 
incongruent responses irrespective of whether that response was a ‘yes’ or a 
‘no’ (Kok et al., 2011). To test this in the above ROIs, median regression 
coefficients were extracted as a function of attention, expectation and report, 
and subjected to separate repeated-measures ANOVAs. Results are depicted in 
figure 6.4B and statistics are presented in table 6.2. All regions exhibited a 
significant PEREPORT response for both ‘yes’ and ‘no’ judgements, except middle 
orbital gyrus and left inferior frontal gyrus. As a result these are not considered 
regions representing PEREPORT. All significant results here were replicated (at 
least at marginal significance) under our control model (for rIFG, our critical 
region, pFDR = .044). Results were fully replicated when using a peak threshold 
of p < .005. We have therefore identified six regions signalling PEREPORT. These 
are: right middle temporal gyrus (rMTG); right superior medial gyrus (rSMG), 
right inferior frontal gyrus (rIFG); right angular gyrus (rAG); and bilateral 
supramarginal gyrus (SG). These results implicate this set of regions as having 
sensitivity to the discrepancy between perceptual expectations and perceptual 
choice. 
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Figure 6.4. Report prediction error. 
 A. Results of contrast incongruent response > congruent response over whole 
brain. Only clusters surviving FDR cluster-correction are shown. B. PEREPORT 
(incongruent – congruent), by region and perceptual report. BOLD has been 
averaged over levels of attention. Stars represent whether PEREPORT is significantly 
different from zero. Error bars represent SEM * p < .05, ** p < .01,   *** p < .001  
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Table 6.1. Results of whole-brain analysis expectation-incongruent report > 
expectation-congruent report 
Region BA Side Volume (cm3) 
Peak 
Z pFDR 
Peak MNI 
x y z 
MTG 21 R 2.29 4.78 .007 54 -30 -2 
SMG 9/10 R 4.15 4.54 < .001 12 58 32 
IFG 47/48 R 2.70 4.45 .004 56 12 -2 
MOG 47/46 R 2.08 4.33 .009 40 50 -6 
AG 39 R 1.21 3.95 .044 46 -64 36 
SG 40 R 1.21 3.91 .044 58 -40 40 
IFG 47 L 1.90 3.79 .012 -38 26 -4 
SG 40/48 L 1.60 3.75 .021 -54 -46 34 
MTG = middle temporal gyrus, SMG = superior medial gyrus, IFG = inferior 
frontal gyrus, MOG = middle orbital gyrus, AG = angular gyrus, SG = 
supramarginal gyrus 
 
 
 
 
Table 6.2. Effect of expectation, separately for ‘yes’ and ‘no’ reports. Both 
effects should be significant for the region to be deemed a PEREPORT region 
Region Reported ‘no’ Reported ‘yes’ PEREPORT F P η2 F p η2 
Middle temporal gyrus 8.82 .008 3.29 5.83 .006 .245 Yes 
Superior medial gyrus 8.10 .001 .310 4.46 .014 .213 Yes 
Inferior frontal gyrus (R) 4.70 .015 .207 3.45 .041 .162 Yes 
Middle orbital gyrus 1.95 .157 .098 3.42 .044 .160 No 
Angular gyrus 3.52 .040 .164 4.07 .025 .185 Yes 
Supramarginal gyrus (R) 4.71 .044 .207 7.17 .015 .285 Yes 
Inferior frontal gyrus (L) 5.62 .008 .238 2.87 .070 .137 No 
Supramarginal gyrus (L) 5.39 .032 .230 6.04 .005 .251 Yes 
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6.3.6 HIGH CONFIDENCE IS ASSOCIATED WITH AN ATTENUATED PEREPORT 
RESPONSE IN RIGHT IFG 
Our main hypothesis was that high confidence would be associated with low 
PEREPORT. However, confidence can be also influenced by attention (Rahnev et 
al., 2011) and tracks accuracy (Dienes, 2008; Pleskac & Busemeyer, 2010). To  
test whether any PEREPORT region represented confidence after controlling for 
these potential confounds, median regression weights from each PEREPORT 
region were extracted as a function of confidence, attention and decision 
accuracy. These regression coefficients were then subjected to separate 
Bayesian repeated-measures ANOVAs. We were looking for regions whose 
BOLD response (in these regions, representing PEREPORT) differs with 
confidence. Note that we could not test for a PEREPORT x Confidence interaction 
because the participant has signalled low confidence yes/no decisions as 
unreliable, that is, their perception of Gabor presence or absence does not 
necessarily correspond to their report.  
Only one region exhibited a BOLD response (i.e. PEREPORT amplitude) that 
differed as a function of subjective confidence: rIFG. Here, supporting our 
hypothesis, BOLD amplitude was higher for guess than confident reports (figure 
6.5A). Crucially, the analysis revealed substantially more evidence for modelling 
rIFG BOLD as a function of confidence alone (BF = 13.620) than as a function 
of just accuracy (BF = 0.877), just attention (BF = 0.711), or as a combination of 
confidence and any other factors (BF = 0.003 - 2.069, see table 6.3 for 
summary of results from all ROIs). A frequentist ANOVA gave the same result: 
a significantly higher BOLD amplitude for guess than confident responses, 
F(1,18) = 6.04, p = .024, η2 = .251, 95% CI [0.10, 1.28]. These results are 
depicted in figure 6.5B. 
Next, we wanted to confirm that the effect of confidence on rIFG BOLD indeed 
reflects changes in PEREPORT. To do this, we restricted our analysis to confident 
responses and asked whether PEREPORT decreases as expectations exert 
stronger influences on behavioural confidence. This would show that high  
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Figure 6.5.The relationship between confidence and report prediction error.  
(A) BOLD as a function of confidence in each PEREPORT region. BOLD is 
significantly higher for guess than confident responses in rIFG only. (B) rIFG 
BOLD is higher for guess than confidence responses independently of attention 
and decision accuracy. (C) Brain-behaviour correlation. The higher the PEREPORT 
response (confident reports only), the less expectations increased confidence. 
Error bars represent SEM. * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
confidence is associated with low PEREPORT amplitude (i.e. a low expectation- 
report mismatch response). Furthermore, it would show that our behavioural 
effect of expectation on confidence is reflected in rIFG BOLD. 
To test this, we calculated the percentage increase in confidence when reports 
were congruent relative to incongruent. We denote this ΔConfidence. This 
quantity reflects the extent to which confidence judgements are shaped by 
expectations. Next, we computed the BOLD difference between incongruent  
 
Table 6.3. Results of Bayesian Confidence x Accuracy x Attention 
repeated-measures ANOVAS.  
Bayes factors correspond to the evidence for the listed model relative to the 
evidence for all other models 
 Bayes factors  
Region Confidence Accuracy Attention Confidence 
+ others 
Null 
MTG 0.14 0.68 4.96 0.01 - 2.26 1.00 
SMG 0.85 1.79 1.96 0.03 - 2.67 1.11 
IFG (R) 13.62 0.88 0.71 <  .01 - 2.07 3.96 
AG 1.35 9.83 0.53 0.01 - 3.42 3.47 
SG (R) 2.64 0.84 2.42 <  .01 - 1.13 10.07 
SG (L) 1.74 5.52 1.84 < .01 - 1.17 10.22 
MTG middle temporal gyrus, SMG superior medial gyrus, IFG right  
inferior gyrus, SG supramarginal gyrus, AG angular gyrus 
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and congruent reports (PEREPORT), restricted to confident responses. Results 
showed that these quantities were negatively correlated, ρ = -.512, p = .027 (fig. 
6.5C), confirming our finding that high confidence is associated with low 
PEREPORT in rIFG: the more expectation increased confidence behaviourally, the 
more confidence was associated with low rIFG PEREPORT.  
To ensure that these differences were not driven by differences in reaction 
speed or Gabor contrast, we extracted data from the cluster revealed by our 
control GLM. This revealed that even after controlling for these possible 
confounds, rIFG BOLD was significantly higher for guess that confident 
responses t(18) = 2.21, p = .041, dz = 0.44. The significant brain-behaviour 
correlation was also replicated, rho = -.575, p  = .014.  
Together, these analyses reveal that subjective confidence is reliably 
associated with PEREPORT in right IFG, even after controlling for attention, Gabor 
contrast, decision accuracy and reaction speed. 
6.3.7 SOURCES OF PRIORS AND SENSORY SIGNALS FOR CONFIDENCE.  
We have shown that rIFG activity associates response prediction error with 
confidence. Assuming a model in which decision confidence is a weighted 
function of top-down expectations and ‘bottom-up’ sensory signals (or decision 
evidence), we asked whether we could identify sources of these variables. To 
do this we ran a seed-to-voxel psychophysiological interaction analysis (PPI), 
with rIFG as a functionally defined seed.  
We were interested in regions communicating predictive information, and 
therefore regions of interest would demonstrate functional connectivity with rIFG 
that differs for congruent and incongruent reports. Furthermore, we wanted to 
determine the source of information that is used to shape confidence 
judgements. This can be captured by searching for regions whose congruence-
dependent connectivity with rIFG is predicted by the effect of expectations on 
confidence. We hypothesised that expectations would be represented in frontal 
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regions and sensory signals would be represented in visual cortex, and both of 
these information sources would be communicated to rIFG. 
To test this hypothesis we used a behavioural covariate of interest – the 
influence of expectations on metacognitive bias. As in section 6.3.2, we took as 
our measure the extent to which expectations induce a liberal shift in confidence 
thresholds (C’1+ and C’1-) over the type 1 axis. Specifically, we computed the 
(mean-centred) difference between metacognitive bias for congruent and 
incongruent reports. This measure quantifies the reduction in type 1 evidence 
required to report congruent (versus incongruent) decisions with high 
confidence. It is independent of decision bias and accuracy. We denote this 
variable ΔC1. Higher values signify that expectations liberalised metacognitive 
bias more.  
Sources of predictive information for confidence were identified by computing 
the contrast incongruent ≠ congruent, with ΔC1 as a between-subjects covariate 
of interest. As shown in table 6.4 and figure 6.6, the PPI analysis revealed four 
significant clusters: bilateral frontal pole (FP), right orbitofrontal cortex (rOFC), 
and right occipital pole (rOP). Increased functional connectivity between each of 
these regions and rIFG was associated with a stronger effect of expectations on 
metacognitive bias. Note that each correlation remained significant after 
excluding the four participants scoring highest on ΔC1. Next we determined what 
the role of these regions might be. We extracted median beta weights from each 
region and subjected them to separate repeated-measures ANOVAs.  
Table 6.4 PPI results. 
Regions exhibiting a significant congruence x ΔC1 interaction 
Region Side Volume (cm3) 
pFDR Peak MNI 
 X Y Z 
Frontal pole R 6.76 < .001 46 40 -20 
Orbitofrontal cortex R 5.64 < .001 20 26 -26 
Frontal pole L 3.58 .002 -40 44 -22 
Occipital pole R 3.05 .004 2 -94 20 
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Figure 6.6 Occipito-frontal network revealed by PPI analysis 
Regions revealed by PPI analysis. These are bilateral frontal pole (FP), right 
orbitofrontal cortex (rOFC) and right occipital pole (rOP). Each scatterplot 
depicts the brain-functional connectivity (FC) relationship for each region. 
Clockwise, these are lFP, rOP, rOFC and rFP. On the x-axis is the 
behavioural covariate of interest, ΔC1. On the y-axis is the difference in FC 
with rIFG and each region between congruent and incongruent responses. 
Each scatterplot shows that increasing connectivity with rIFG is associated 
increasing liberalisation of metacognitive bias by expectation. 
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Figure 6.7. Analyses on regions in occipito-frontal network  
(A) Significant attention by accuracy interaction in lFP. Correct but not incorrect 
decisions are associated with sensitivity to attentional state. (B) Significant effect of 
attention (left) and confidence by attention interaction (right) in rOFC. The left panel 
shows rOFC represents prior information. The right panel shows that attention 
reverses the relationship between confidence and BOLD. (C) Significantly greater 
rFP BOLD on guess than confident trias. (D) Significant confidence by accuracy 
interaction in right occipital pole. When confident, occipital pole BOLD is higher on 
correct than incorrect trials. There is no significant difference on guess trials. Error 
bars represent within-subjects SEM. 
In left frontal pole, attention and accuracy interacted, F(1,18) = 5.99, p = .025, 
ηp2 = .250, such that correct decisions were associated with sensitivity to 
attentional state, t(18) = 2.34, p =.031, but erroneous decisions were not, t(18) = 
1.27, p = .221 (fig. 6.7A). Thus, decision accuracy was predicted by this region’s 
sensitivity to attention.  
In right OFC, expectation demonstrated a ‘U’-shaped relationship with BOLD, 
F(1,18) = 5.33, p = .033, ηp2 = .228, meaning that this region represented the 
prior (fig. 6.7B, left). This follows because BOLD is higher when there is an 
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expectation (25% and 75% conditions) than in the control condition (50%). In 
this region there was also an attention by confidence interaction, F(1,18) = 7.67, 
p = .013, ηp2 = .299, such that attention reversed the BOLD response to 
confidence (fig. 6.7B, right). BOLD was higher on confident than guess trials 
under full attention, t(18) = .260, p =.018. This pattern was reversed under 
diverted attention, but did not reach significance, t(18) = 1.82, p = .085. This 
pattern is consistent with what would be expected from (reverse) uncertainty 
associated with attentional state. Finally, we found a significant attention by 
accuracy attention, F(1,18) = 6.72, p = .018, ηp2 = .272, whereby BOLD was 
higher for erroneous decisions under full, t(18) = 2.27, 95%CI [1.57, 2.28], p = 
.035, but not diverted, t(18) = 2.27, 95%CI [1.57, 2.28], p = .314, attention. 
Thus, rOFC represented prior information, attentional state and decision error.  
As shown in figure 6.7C, right FP represented confidence, such that high 
confidence was associated with lower BOLD amplitude than guess responses, 
F(1,18) = 6,63, p = .019, ηp2 = .269. Finally, in occipital pole, stimulus 
presentation and confidence interacted. Here, confident percepts were 
associated with a BOLD response that distinguished between correct and 
incorrect judgements, t(18) = 2.96, p = .008, whereas this was not the case for 
guess responses, t(18) = 1.11, p =.281. Thus, this region represents signals for 
perceptual sensitivity.  
One might wonder whether the frontal areas directly signal priors to occipital 
lobe, or vice versa for sensory signals. This was not the case. Re-running the 
PPI analysis in the same way, but with each cluster as our seed revealed no 
significant connectivity with any other. We also re-ran the analysis using the 
change in raw confidence by expectation-response congruence as our 
behavioural covariate. Results were broadly consistent with those in the present 
analysis, revealing an occipito-frontal network recruited when expectations are 
integrated into subjective judgements. Specifically, we found a significant cluster 
in right orbitofrontal cortex (MNI x = 10, y = 28, z = -18, pFDR = .024), left 
orbitofrontal cortex (MNI x = -36, y = 38, z = -18, pFDR = .008) and in 
intracalcarine sulcus (MNI x = 6, y = -58, z = 12, pFDR = .004).  
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Taken together, these results show that the integration of expectations into 
confidence judgements recruits an occipito-frontal network that represents top-
down influences of attention and expectation in frontal regions, and decision-
related signals in sensory cortex.  
6.3.7 THE CONTRIBUTION OF VISUAL REGIONS AND OFC TO CONFIDENCE IS PREDICTED 
BY WHITE MATTER DENSITY 
Our connectivity analyses revealed that OFC/FP and visual cortex represented 
top-down and bottom-up signals respectively, and that the recruitment of these 
regions was predicted by the effect of confidence on metacognitive bias. The 
presence of these individual differences motivated an exploratory follow-up 
analysis that asked whether they are reflected in brain structure. More 
specifically, we considered whether the weighting of top-down predictions and 
bottom-up signals was a function of white or grey matter (WM and GM 
respectively) density of the source regions. 
The BOLD response of our cluster in OFC reflected an effect of perceptual 
expectations on objective decision. The behavioural correlate of this is therefore 
Δ c = c25% - c75%, - the extent to which perceptual expectations bias (yes/no) 
decision. We performed a whole-brain multiple regression analysis on WM 
density, with total intracranial volume and participant age as nuisance 
covariates, and with Δc as the regressor of interest. This analysis revealed that 
propensity to incorporate low-level priors into decision-making, as measured by 
Δc, was negatively correlated with rOFC white matter density (fig 6.8A and B, 
peak MNI x = 23, y = 30, z = -14, 11.51cm3, Ppeak-FWE = .030, Z = 5.08). The 
same analysis for GM yielded no significant results. 
Given that both rOFC and rIFG BOLD predicted confidence we performed the 
same analysis, but this time with mean confidence as the regressor of interest. 
Mean confidence represents one’s overall belief in their perceptual 
performance, or self-efficacy. Higher values correspond to higher confidence in 
one’s decision-making ability (versus trial-by-trial performance). This revealed a 
significant cluster in contralateral occipital lobe. Here, increasing WM density  
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Figure 6.8. VBM results. 
 A. White matter density in right orbitofrontal cortex negatively predicts 
the effect of expectation on perceptual decision. B. White matter 
density in contralateral occipital pole is positively correlated with mean 
confidence across trials. 
significantly predicted greater confidence at the cluster, but not the peak level 
(figure 6.6C and D peak MNI x = 0, y = -87, z = 16, 6.40cm3, ppeak-FWE = .789, 
pFWE  = .028).  
Together these results suggest that the dependence of confidence on functional 
connectivity with source regions is reflected in anatomical indications of that 
connectivity: WM density in OFC was negatively predicted by its functional 
correlate; and increasing occipital pole WM density was associated with mean 
confidence, that is, beliefs of better perceptual performance.  
6.4 DISCUSSION 
In the present paper we have shown that behavioural confidence in perceptual 
decision increases when decisions are supported by (or congruent with) prior 
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expectations. Crucially, we show that this predictive information is, at least in 
part, integrated into confidence in right inferior frontal gyrus (rIFG).  
We have shown that unexpected percepts, taken with respect to the decision or 
report, are associated with a heightened BOLD response (termed here 
PEREPORT) in a distributed set of frontal, parietal and temporal decision-related 
regions. Interestingly, this expectation-sensitive set resembles those implicated 
in other forms of ‘top-down’ processing such as modality-independent sensory 
change detection (Downar, Crawley, Mikulis, & Davis, 2000), response inhibition 
(Criaud & Boulinguez, 2013; Verbruggen & Logan, 2008), and detection of 
behavioural salience (Jonathan Downar, Crawley, Mikulis, & Davis, 2002).  
Our crucial result was that the contribution of top-down expectations to 
subjective confidence judgements was reflected in fMRI BOLD, specifically in 
right inferior frontal gyrus (rIFG). Here, high confidence was associated with a 
lower prediction error response profile. Furthermore, the more that confidence 
was shaped by expectation behaviourally, the more that confidence was 
associated with low prediction error signals in this area. Our results therefore 
indicate a central role for rIFG in perceptual decision making in which the 
‘match’ between internal templates and perceptual content is integrated into 
subjective confidence judgements.  
Under an alternative account, the sensitivity of rIFG to confidence would be an 
indirect effect of sensitivity to task difficulty. For example, rIFG may infer task 
difficulty from the degree to which the percept is surprising. However, this 
interpretation was ruled out by control analyses, which showed that the 
PEREPORT-confidence relationship was not driven by choice accuracy.  These 
control analyses additionally excluded attention, stimulus contrast, and reaction 
speed as driving the observed relationship between PEREPORT and confidence in 
rIFG.   
This process of relating predictive information into confidence judgements 
recruited both occipital lobe and frontal regions bilateral frontal pole (FP) and 
right orbitofrontal cortex (rOFC). In left occipital lobe, decision-related signals 
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were represented. Interestingly, connectivity between rIFG and contralateral 
occipital lobe was not found. One possibility is that contralateral occipital lobe is 
functionally connected with rIFG independently of expectation effects; another 
possibility is that statistical power was too low to detect connectivity reflecting 
the neural response to a small stimulus in retinotopically-organised space. We 
interpret the functional connectivity with occipital lobe as the communication of 
sensory signals. By contrast, we found the representation of top-down 
influences in frontal regions. In particular, right OFC represented prior 
information, consistent with previous work (Schoenbaum & Roesch, 2005; 
Trapp & Bar, 2015; Wallis, 2007), and white matter density in this area even 
predicted behavioural effects of expectation on objective decision. Right OFC 
was also sensitive to attentional state.  Here, representation of the prior required 
attention, and furthermore, the BOLD response to decision confidence reversed 
with attention. Under full attention rOFC BOLD was higher for guess responses 
than confident responses, as is usually found (Fleming et al., 2012; Hilgenstock, 
Weiss, & Witte, 2014). However, under diverted attention this pattern reversed, 
possibly indicating that rOFC represents the uncertainty associated with 
attentional state: high under full attention, but low under diverted attention.  
Altogether, we interpret these results as showing that subjective confidence is 
represented in rIFG as a combination of both stimulus-driven signals, 
communicated from occipital lobe, and shaped by top-down perceptual 
expectations and attention, communicated from OFC and frontal pole. OFC has 
been repeatedly been shown to reflect reward expectations and beliefs (De 
Martino et al., 2013; Kepecs et al., 2008; Kim, Shimojo, & O’Doherty, 2011; 
Lebreton et al., 2015), however here we place OFC belief representations within 
a larger hierarchical structure for perceptual processing, generating predictions 
(Stalnaker, Cooch, & Schoenbaum, 2015; Trapp & Bar, 2015) that constrain 
subjective confidence judgements in perceptual decision.  
Importantly, our PPI analysis cannot determine the directionality of functional 
connections in this network. One possibility is that rIFG is involved in 
constructing confidence from an integration of PEREPORT signals and top-down 
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expectations. Here our occipito-frontal network would be sending signals to 
rIFG. However, another possibility is that bottom-up signals are passed from 
occipital lobe to rIFG, and an initial transformation of PEREPORT into confidence 
is signalled to the frontal regions of this network. Under such an account, the 
role of rOFC and/or frontal pole may be one which transforms the confidence 
estimate represented in rIFG into a reportable judgement, based on the 
mismatch between the estimate, expectations, and potentially, attentional state 
(Lebreton et al., 2015). Further studies will be needed to disambiguate these 
possibilities. 
Our results are readily interpretable from Bayesian brain perspectives (Clark, 
2013; Friston, 2009; Lee, 2002; Yuille & Kersten, 2006b). These propose that 
perceptual inference is a weighted integration of sensory evidence and prior 
beliefs about the cause of the sensation, such that the perceptual report 
corresponds to the belief with the greatest posterior probability. The posterior 
probability increases as the correspondence between prior and sensory signal 
increases. Therefore, inference is deemed ‘successful’, and so should be 
associated with high confidence, when we see a low ‘prediction error‘ response, 
as we saw here (Meyniel, Sigman, et al., 2015). Neuronal representations of 
prediction errors are well-established in the reward domain (Bayer & Glimcher, 
2005; Nakahara et al., 2004), but in the perceptual domain evidence remains 
restricted to BOLD correlates such as PEREPORT. Under such a Bayesian brain 
account, our connectivity results suggest that occipital lobe sulcus passes 
sensory signals to rIFG, and frontal pole/OFC passes top-down predictions and 
weightings of attentional state. In this view, the finding that PEREPORT amplitude 
in rIFG was lower for confident responses is consistent with the representation 
or construction of the posterior belief in this region. This in turn is in line with 
empirical evidence for rIFG encoding of the decision variable, either in Bayesian 
form (the posterior; d’Acremont et al. 2013) or as decision evidence (Hebart et 
al., 2014), which are mathematically equivalent, (Bitzer et al. 2014).   
Previous work has separately implicated rIFG in the representation of both the 
decision variable (Bubic et al., 2009; d’Acremont et al., 2013) and expectation 
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violation in a range of modalities, from speech perception (Clos et al., 2014) to 
the auditory (Garrido, Kilner, Kiebel, & Friston, 2009), visual (Bubic et al., 2009), 
and tactile (Allen et al., 2016) domains. Previous work has also implicated rIFG 
in the representation of subjective uncertainty (Fleck, Daselaar, Dobbins, & 
Cabeza, 2006; Fleming & Dolan, 2012). However, to our knowledge these 
functions of rIFG have not been related to each other before. Right IFG has also 
been implicated in a wide range of related executive processes such as novelty 
detection (Hampshire, Chamberlain, Monti, Duncan, & Owen, 2010), change 
detection (Beck, Rees, Frith, & Lavie, 2001), and behavioural relevance 
(Hampshire et al., 2010). Furthermore, it has been implicated in detecting or 
resolving response conflict (Casey et al., 2000; Hampshire et al., 2010), and is 
a key component of the response inhibition network (Criaud & Boulinguez, 
2013; Verbruggen & Logan, 2008). This raises the intriguing possibility of a 
functional overlap between resolution of response conflict and the formation of 
confidence. 
These roles could be unified by considering rIFG as the region in which the 
posterior is computed (at least for perceptual tasks), because the posterior 
belief on sensory causes affords a hypothesis space for adaptive, plausible 
actions (Mansouri, Tanaka, & Buckley, 2009). Such a view is consistent with 
evidence for rIFG in appropriately acting on perceptual choices (Suzuki & 
Gottlieb, 2013), computing behavioural significance (Sakagami & Pan, 2007) , 
computing action-outcome likelihoods that modulate motor cortex (Morris, 
Dezfouli, Griffiths, & Balleine, 2014), and representing the posterior (d’Acremont 
et al., 2013). It has even been shown that the rIFG BOLD response to decision 
errors is associated with both the valence of the decision outcome, and the 
optimism of the participant (‘self-belief’; Sharot et al. 2011), consistent with a 
view of rIFG in which high-level, abstracted posteriors are computed from 
beliefs and errors. Anatomical considerations support such a view, since the 
rIFG is directly connected with regions relevant for both cognitive and motor 
control (Petrides & Pandya, 2002). We leave open for future research the 
question of whether and how rIFG relates perceptual confidence to action 
outcomes.  
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6.5 SUMMARY 
In summary, we have shown that top-down expectations are integrated into 
decision confidence, and have shown that this occurs in a functional network 
consisting of rIFG, bilateral frontal pole, right OFC and occipital lobe. Here, top-
down perceptual expectations and bottom-up sensory inputs are integrated into 
a subjective sense of perceptual confidence. Together, our data reveal a crucial 
role of top-down influences in the mechanism by which perceptual decisions 
become available for conscious report. 
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7 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
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7.1 OVERVIEW 
Subjective perceptual confidence is an integral component of visual 
consciousness, which in part reflects the strength of perceptual experience 
(Fleming & Lau, 2014). As such, understanding how confidence is constructed 
may help us to get closer to understanding the mechanisms underlying 
subjective experience. In parallel, by understanding how the correspondence 
between confidence and accuracy arises we can better understand the 
mechanisms underlying our ability to introspect upon and evaluate our 
decisions.  
A large portion of the literature on perceptual confidence considers how sensory 
information shapes these judgements, and the conditions under which 
confidence and accuracy dissociate. However, the contribution of top-down 
influences to the formation of subjective judgements has remained 
understudied. This is surprising, despite the fact that their contribution to the 
formation of objective decisions are of great interest. To this end, the work in 
this thesis has investigated how perceptual confidence is shaped by top-down 
perceptual expectations, or priors. A novel behavioural paradigm has been 
introduced, which consistently shows that confidence and metacognitive bias 
increase, and metacognition improves, for perceptual decisions that have a high 
prior probability, that is, are expectation-congruent. Using EEG and fMRI, 
Chapters 5 and 6 examined how these priors are integrated into confidence 
before and after target onset. This discussion chapter will consolidate the 
empirical findings presented, and suggest a plausible extension of Bayesian 
brain frameworks into the domain of subjective reports. 
7.2 KEY RESULTS 
7.2.1 SUBJECTIVE JUDGEMENTS ARE SHAPED BY EXPECTATIONS, NOT 
ATTENTION. 
Interest in how expectations shape visual consciousness is growing, and we 
now know that percepts receive preferential access to awareness when they 
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are predicted in either content (Chang et al., 2015; Melloni et al., 2011; Pinto et 
al., 2015; Sterzer et al., 2008) or time (Mathewson et al., 2012; Wyart & Tallon-
Baudry, 2009). These effects may arise at the level of objective perception, 
improving the fidelity of the perceptual representation itself. Alternatively (or 
additionally) effects of expectation could reflect changes in the threshold for 
awareness, such that more probable percepts are advantaged in their access to 
visual consciousness. Finally, given that attended objects are more likely to 
reach awareness (Kanai, Tsuchiya, & Verstraten, 2006; Kanai et al., 2010; 
Lavie, 2006; Wyart & Tallon-Baudry, 2008), top-down influences of expectation 
may simply reflect attentional effects. The work presented here has investigated 
subjective confidence judgements while factorially manipulating attention and 
expectation.  
Work here has shown that perceptual decisions that are more a priori probable, 
that is, are expectation-congruent, are associated with both liberalised 
metacognitive bias (confidence) and improved metacognitive accuracy. While 
attention exerts a strong effect on detection sensitivity (as measured by contrast 
thresholds), its relationship with subjective measures is less clear. 
Metacognitive bias, that is, the tendency to report decisions with high 
confidence (independently of accuracy) became more liberal with expectation 
independently of attention. However the relationship between attention, 
expectation and the proportion of confident trials was less stable. It may be that 
the dependence of expectation on attention depends on stimulus contrast. As 
shown in table 7.1, Chapters in which the effect of attention on contrast 
sensitivity was stronger revealed a dependence of expectation effects on 
attention. Such an explanation for the relationship between attention and  
Table 7.1 Interactions between attention and expectation by Chapter 
 Effect of inattention on 
expectation-confidence 
relationship 
Stimulus contrast (attended 
vs. unattended) 
Chapter 4  Eliminates relationship 8% vs. 3% (62% change) 
Chapter 5 Dampens relationship 19% vs. 25% (24% change) 
Chapter 6 Relationship still present 5% vs. 4% (20% change) 
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contrast would be consistent with recent work, which shows subjective visibility 
ratings of unattended targets to be largely insensitive to signal strength (Rahnev 
et al., 2011). Rahnev and colleagues’ data reveal that that as signal strength 
increases, attended targets will (unsurprisingly) be associated with higher 
confidence, yet confidence for unattended targets remain unaffected. 
We therefore see an effect of attention on confidence that increases in 
magnitude with stimulus contrast. Under such an account, expectations do not 
require attention to shape confidence as such. Rather, interactions between 
attention and expectation are driven indirectly, by failures to incorporate signal 
strength into confidence judgements under inattention. 
Consistent with this interpretation, the neural mechanisms underlying 
expectancy effects on confidence were largely independent of attention. Pre-
stimulus alpha oscillations, previously implicated in top-down attentional effects 
on sensitivity (Busch & VanRullen, 2010; Landau & Fries, 2012; Mazaheri, 
DiQuattro, Bengson, & Geng, 2011; Rohenkohl & Nobre, 2011; Zumer et al., 
2014), are here shown to be involved in effects of expectation, not attention. 
The phasic modulation of both objective and subjective perception by alpha 
oscillations persisted when attention was diverted from the task. Similarly, the 
neural response to violations of expectations – perceptual ‘prediction error’ – 
and its negative relationship with confidence is independent of attention. 
This does not mean that confidence is wholly independent of attention. For 
example, results showed that right orbitofrontal cortex exhibited opposing 
responses to confident versus uncertain decisions, depending on attentional 
state.  Neither do these results mean that attention and expectation do not 
interact. Indeed, Chapter 4 shows that perceptual sensitivity for task-relevant 
decisions is increased when perceptual decisions on a secondary task are 
shaped by valid priors, suggesting that correctly predicting unattended 
perceptual content reduces the associated processing load and frees up 
resources for primary tasks (Hohwy, 2012; Sy, Guerin, Stegman, & Giesbrecht, 
2014).  
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These results implicate top-down attention primarily in shaping objective 
perception, whereas the effects of top-down expectation appear to permeate 
into the domain of subjective perception as well. To the extent that perceptual 
metacognition can be used as a proxy for visual awareness (Dienes & Seth, 
2010a; Fernandez-Duque et al., 2000; Kentridge & Heywood, 2000; Kunimoto 
et al., 2001; Sandberg et al., 2010; Seth et al., 2008, but see Jachs et al., 2015), 
these results suggest that top-down attention may act at the level of sensory 
representation, while expectations bias objective and subjective thresholds so 
that probable perceptual inferences receive preferential access to visual 
consciousness. 
These conclusions about expectation and attention are more directly applicable 
to metacognition. The data presented here consistently reveal an interaction 
between expectation and perceptual decision, indicating that metacognition 
arises, at least in part, from some comparison process between the perceptual 
decision and its prior probability, akin to what is thought to occur for objective 
perception (Summerfield & de Lange, 2014), and consistent with evidence for 
confidence tracking posterior probabilities (Aitchison et al., 2015; Feldman & 
Friston, 2010; Meyniel, Schlunegger, et al., 2015). While the effects of 
expectation on subjective judgements are somewhat dampened under diverted 
attention, attention does not appear to be necessary for appropriately placing 
confidence thresholds.  
It is important to note that, while not the focus of this thesis, strong conclusions 
about whether metacognitive accuracy increases with expectations cannot be 
drawn. When estimating metacognition separately for yes and no reports, meta-
d’ is neither robust to changes in metacognitive bias (confidence) nor to 
changes in decision thresholds (Barrett et al., 2013; Evans & Azzopardi, 2007; 
Fleming & Lau, 2014). Type 2 ROC curves, though invariant to changes in 
metacognitive bias by design, are also inappropriate for the data presented here 
because they are biased by decision thresholds (Galvin et al., 2003).  
The effect of expectation-response congruence on confidence is easily 
accommodated by normative perceptual decision-making models. In evidence 
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accumulation terms, the prior on some perceptual choice is generally modelled 
as its initial evidence, C0.(Dunovan, Tremel, & Wheeler, 2014; Wyart et al., 
2012). This means that at point of decision, evidence for probable percepts will 
be higher if the initial evidence had favoured the unselected choice. To the 
extent that confidence can be formulated as decision evidence, expectation-
congruent reports will therefore be associated with higher confidence than their 
incongruent counterparts (Ratcliff & McKoon, 2008; Vickers, 1970; Wong, 
2006). This account is easily reformulated in Bayesian terms. To the extent that 
confidence can be modelled as a function of the posterior belief (Feldman & 
Friston, 2010; Hangya, Sanders, & Kepecs, 2016; Hebart et al., 2014; Meyniel, 
Sigman, et al., 2015; Pouget et al., 2016), confidence will increase with 
increasing prior probability of that decision. On both accounts, the behavioural 
and pre-stimulus effects of expectation on confidence presented in this thesis 
can be explained in terms of by biases at the beginning of the evidence 
accumulation process. However, this account cannot explain why confidence 
thresholds over the type 1 axis also changed with expectation. While further 
work is needed to assess the behaviour of this confidence measure in depth, 
results here suggest that the threshold for reporting decisions with confidence 
changed over and above changes in type 1 criterion.  
The extent to which this account can explain effects of congruence on 
metacognition is unclear. The analyses here largely used the measure meta-
d’/d’ to measure metacognitive accuracy, which should be invariant to 
differences in d’, decision threshold c, and metacognitive bias C (Barrett et al., 
2013; Maniscalco & Lau, 2012). In theory, this should mean that effects of 
expectation on metacognition cannot be explained by changes in confidence 
thresholds alone: meta-d’/d’ should be invariant to decision and confidence 
biases. One issue is that when meta-d’ is estimated separately for “yes” and 
“no” judgements, as was necessary here, the measure loses its invariance to 
bias (Barrett et al., 2013). Therefore the results found under metacognitive 
accuracy might in fact be biased by changes in decision and confidence 
thresholds. Indeed, this is how the results were modelled in Chapter 4.  
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A second possible issue is that expectations might have changed decision 
accuracy, despite seeing no differences in d’. By design, expectation-congruent 
decisions are more likely to be correct because the expectation is valid. To 
illustrate, ‘yes’ responses have an a priori 75% chance of being correct in the 
‘expect present’ condition but only a 25% chance of being correct in the ‘expect 
absent condition’. While meta-d’ can be computed separately for yes and no 
responses, d' cannot. This means that response-conditional meta-d’/d’ values in 
these studies may also be dependent on accuracy, because d’ cannot capture 
sensitivity on congruent versus incongruent trials. Future research could 
investigate these possibilities in a number of ways. The most straightforward 
approach would be to use a paradigm that manipulates expectation without 
relying on response-conditional measures, for example, by measuring 
metacognition while environmental statistics are learned. Alternatively, false 
perceptual beliefs could be induced. This latter manipulation should decouple 
accuracy from predictability, because expected percepts would be not be more 
likely to be correct.  
7.2.2 FRONTAL AND SENSORY CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE INTEGRATION OF 
TOP-DOWN INFLUENCES ON CONFIDENCE 
Chapters 5 and 6 investigated the neural mechanisms that underlie top-down 
effects on confidence. Chapter 5 showed that the influence of perceptual priors 
can be predicted by ongoing brain activity, such that sorting trials according to 
stages of the pre-stimulus alpha cycle reveals certain phases that are 
associated with stronger effects of expectation on both decision and on 
confidence. The phases at which decision thresholds were most biased by 
expectations were also those at which confidence thresholds were most biased 
by expectation-response congruence. This suggests that at the decision stage, 
confidence judgements incorporated the expectancy information that had been 
made available pre-stimulus: stronger prior evidence for the decision increased 
confidence, whereas stronger prior evidence against the decision decreased 
confidence. 
  
	
184 
In turn, these results show that the propensity to integrate priors into decisions 
is dependent on fluctuations in cortical excitability over visual regions (Lindsley, 
1952). Expectations maximally bias decisions by expectation every 100ms, and 
these 10Hz cycles in which top-down (versus bottom-up) signals dominate 
objective decision-making support the view that oscillations may carry prior 
information to task-relevant brain areas (Bastos et al., 2012; Engel et al., 2001; 
Friston, 2012; van Kerkoerle et al., 2014; von Stein et al., 2000).   
So, what process is reflected in the alpha cycle? One possibility is that alpha 
oscillations reflect the recruitment of prior evidence to visual regions. Such an 
account is consistent with proposed role of alpha oscillations in long-range 
communication across cortical areas and in top-down control (Arnal & Giraud, 
2012; Engel et al., 2001; Fries, 2005; Palva & Palva, 2007; Womelsdorf & Fries, 
2007). From an evidence accumulation stand-point, this could correspond to a 
shift in baseline evidence, such that the relevant neural populations need less 
sensory evidence to fire (Summerfield & de Lange, 2014). In Bayesian terms, 
this could correspond to fluctuations in the mean of the prior belief, itself leading 
to fluctuations in the posterior. On an alternative view of the alpha cycle, 
decision threshold fluctuations may correspond not to the availability of prior 
evidence, but to the weighting of prior evidence. Under this account, the prior 
probability would be constant with respect to alpha phase, however sensory 
precision would be subject to 100ms cycles. Phases at which sensory signals 
are represented with higher fidelity may be associated with a reduced effect of 
expectation. This model would be consistent with previous evidence for pre-
stimulus phase- modulation of visual attention using spatial cueing paradigms 
(Busch & VanRullen, 2010; Frey, Ruhnau, & Weisz, 2015; Landau & Fries, 
2012).  
Under both accounts there exist optimal levels of cortical excitability for the 
incorporation of priors into decision. Both accounts also suggest that 
expectations modulate cortical excitability in order to adaptively facilitate or 
inhibit neural responses to forthcoming signals, and both accounts propose the 
existence of an optimal level of cortical excitability that depends upon whether 
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stimulus presentation is expected or not. However the data presented here 
cannot distinguish between the fluctuation-in-mean and fluctuation-in-precision 
explanations. Future work could address this question by, for example, using 
model-based EEG to estimate trial-by-trial values of both mean and weighting 
(precision, e.g. modelling the data under the hierarchical Gaussian Filter, 
Mathys et al. 2014). Alternatively, these two variables could be manipulated 
orthogonally in the direction of dots presented in a random dot kinematogram 
(RDK), so that participants learn to expect a particular distribution of dot motion. 
If alpha phase reflects precision then it should predict the influence of expected 
variance (sensitivity), whereas if alpha phase reflects the prior then it should 
predict the influence of expected mean (bias). 
Using fMRI, Chapter 6 revealed a range of cortical regions that are sensitive to 
the mismatch between percept (decision) and prior, and one of these regions – 
right inferior frontal gyrus (rIFG) – represented a confidence signal that was 
dependent upon this signal. Here, lower mismatch responses (‘prediction error’) 
predicted higher confidence. This results is consistent with a role of rIFG in non-
spatially re-orienteering attention to targets whose improbability signals 
behavioural relevance (Corbetta & Shulman, 2002), and in integrating sensory 
and motivational information to drive goal-directed behaviour (Sakagami & Pan, 
2007). This process of integrating priors and sensory signals into confidence 
recruits occipital lobe, the source of bottom-up signals, bilateral frontal pole 
(FP), representing confidence and attentional state, and right orbitofrontal cortex 
(OFC), which represented both priors and representations of attentional state. 
Specifically, OFC activity for confident versus guess responses reversed under 
diverted attention, so that BOLD was higher for guess responses under full 
attention, but higher for guess responses otherwise. These results suggest that 
OFC may track the uncertainty arising with attentional state, either 
communicating this to rIFG or shaping confidence signals from rIFG.  
Do these findings – of pre-stimulus modulation by expectations in occipital 
areas, versus the representation of expectations in rIFG and OFC in the post-
stimulus period – conflict? One might imagine that OFC should have shown 
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functional connectivity with occipital lobe, reflecting the ongoing (i.e. pre-
stimulus) communication of priors that periodically shape decision-making. 
These results are interpreted as reflecting distinct processing stages. While the 
EEG results of Chapter 5 implicate priors in periodically altering baseline 
evidence for probable decisions, the fMRI results of Chapter 6 implicate OFC in 
communicating priors that are matched against the sensory signals (in sensory 
regions) by rIFG. Dunovan and colleagues have shown that priors are indeed 
incorporated into decision-making at two stages. First, baseline evidence is set 
according to perceptual priors, and weighted by the reliability of that prior. 
Secondly, evidence accumulation rate is determined dynamically, according to 
the correspondence between evidence and prior (Dunovan et al., 2014). 
Together, these results suggest that initial evidence may indeed be 
communicated to visual areas, possibly by OFC, prior to target onset, but 
following target onset, priors are continually compared against sensory 
evidence in rIFG, with evidence being accumulated faster for high match trials, 
i.e., expectation-congruent responses.  
7.3 CONFIDENCE IN THE BAYESIAN BRAIN: A FRAMEWORK 
How might perceptual priors shape confidence? The work in this thesis 
suggests that perceptual expectations bias the evidence for the chosen sensory 
hypothesis in favour of more probable sensory hypotheses, and that this is 
instantiated by both sensory and frontal regions. These results support the 
widely held view that decision and confidence are based, at least in part, upon a 
common evidence source (Kepecs & Mainen, 2012; Kiani et al., 2014; Ratcliff & 
Starns, 2013). However, the work in Chapter 6 suggests that the evidence 
source that is relevant for confidence is not just sensory information, but also a 
re-representation of the decision itself (Cleeremans, 2011): the discrepancy 
between expectation and choice.  
Computational models of decision-making make the intuitive proposition that 
perceptual choices will correspond to the option with the most decision 
evidence, the ‘balance of evidence hypothesis’. In Bayesian terms, this 
proposition corresponds to the sensory cause associated with the peak of the 
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posterior probability distribution, that is, the belief with the greatest posterior 
probability (Meyniel, Sigman, et al., 2015; Pouget et al., 2016). On one 
Bayesian account of confidence, confidence is the variance, or precision of this 
distribution (Meyniel, Sigman, et al., 2015). This ‘distributional confidence’ 
seems to capture uncertainty rather than choice confidence. The variance of the 
posterior pdf is orthogonal to the mean, so here, confidence is not defined in 
terms of the decision to which it pertains, going against common conceptions of 
choice confidence (Kvam, Pleskac, Yu, & Busemeyer, 2015; Pouget et al., 
2016).  
A popular alternative proposes that confidence corresponds to the posterior 
probability of the decision, given the evidence. This formulation captures the 
definition of choice confidence well: the subjective probability of the decision 
having been correct. Where confidence judgements are collected on a scale, 
the assumption is that there exists some threshold such that if the posterior 
probability exceeds the threshold confidence is reported as ‘high’, and otherwise 
it is deemed to be ‘low’. This process of bifurcating continuous representations 
of confidence onto a reportable scale has been linked to orbitofrontal cortex 
(Lebreton et al., 2015). But how is this threshold set? Modelling confidence in 
terms of the posterior belief alone does not address the question of how 
decision confidence is computed and made available for report. 
While the perceptual decision-making literature considers confidence as a 
product of the objective decision-making process, other domains conceive 
confidence as a ‘second-order’ decision-making process. Here, confidence 
judgements are considered to be 'meta-decisions' in the sense that they are 
inferences on the accuracy of one’s decision. Some previous attempts to 
explain confidence have indeed proposed a 'read-out' of first order evidence. 
For example, type 2 signal detection theory (Evans & Azzopardi, 2007; Galvin et 
al., 2003) assumes an internal representation of being objectively correct, while 
higher order thought theory posits that conscious states correspond to 'higher-
level representations' of first order states (Gennaro, 1996; Lau, 2007; 
Rosenthal, 2000; Timmermans, Schilbach, Pasquali, & Cleeremans, 2012). The 
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problem here is that such accounts require some monitoring or 'read-out' 
system, meaning that as representations become more abstracted, the system 
must accommodate an increasing number of monitoring layers. To illustrate, I 
may be confident in a choice I have made, but feel that my sense of confidence 
is not a good predictor of positive outcomes. While one monitoring layer (for 
confidence judgements) may be neurobiologically plausible, as more become 
necessary the plausibility of such a system decreases.  
Hierarchical Bayesian frameworks circumvent this issue of requiring specialised 
modules for decisions at each level of abstraction. When processing is 
hierarchically organised, it can move into increasing levels of abstraction and 
re-representation without requiring any additional mechanisms, because for any 
decision the output of each hierarchical stage (its inference) will be a function of 
its inputs (top-down priors and bottom-up data). Here, there is no ‘monitoring 
layer’, as such, because every layer in every processing stream both receives 
input from subordinate levels, but also constrains levels above: every layer is a 
monitoring layer. Crucially, there is no upper-most layer, because the topology 
of the predictive coding hierarchy is more akin to a torus (doughnut), 
instantiating interdependent inferences across the brain. Thus, hierarchical 
predictive coding implicitly incorporates monitoring layers, but here these layers 
are embedded within a neurobiologically plausible system. 
Higher-order decisions (‘meta-inference’) in a hierarchical Bayesian framework 
should be computationally and mechanistically analogous to lower-order 
decisions. They only require the capacity for representing the relevant prior.  For 
example, orientation discrimination requires the relative probability of leftwards 
orientation in V1. However for subjective confidence judgements, the relevant 
priors must pertain to that confidence judgement – the prior probability of the 
decision having been correct. 
 Figure 7.1 presents a broad overview of how the construction of confidence 
could be achieved in a hierarchical Bayesian scheme. The proposed model 
assumes a predictive coding scheme, in which priors are passed via feedback 
connections and prediction errors are passed feed-forward. Following previous  
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Figure 7.1. A model for subjective confidence in Bayesian schemes.  
The type 1 decision is constructed in the manner predicted by hierarchical 
predictive coding models. At level k of the perceptual hierarchy, top-down 
priors are received from level k+1, and bottom-up prediction errors are 
received from level k-1. The inference at level k corresponds to the 
hypothesis with maximal posterior probability, given the prediction error. 
This posterior belief will form an empirical prior on the inference at level k-
1. Bottom-up input to level k+1 will be the remaining prediction error. The 
type 2 decision is constructed from a top-down ‘meta-prior’ – the prior 
probability of making a correct report – and bottom-up prediction error, 
corresponding to the discrepancy between the perceptual decision (given 
by the posterior) and perceptual prior (prior probability of the selected 
sensory cause). 
work, the model assumes that each level within the perceptual hierarchy 
receives bottom-up signals (here, prediction errors) and relevant top-down 
priors, and integrates them in order to identify the hypothesis with maximal 
posterior probability.  This hypothesis (the posterior belief) becomes an 
empirical prior for the level below, and any remaining discrepancy between data 
and posterior belief becomes the prediction error for the level above. This part 
of the model is taken directly from previous work (Friston, 2009; Knill & Pouget, 
2004; Lee & Mumford, 2003; Spratling, 2016; Yuille & Kersten, 2006). 
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The extension of this framework into confidence judgements is straightforward. 
While yes/no reports are determined according to the posterior belief of target 
presence, confidence in that judgement is determined according to the posterior 
belief of being correct. Given that the goal is to infer the accuracy of a decision, 
the relevant prior will be the prior probability of making a correct decision. 
Similarly, the bottom-up information will be the prediction error from the level 
below: the sensory evidence unexplained by the reportable perceptual decision.  
This variable is simply a predictive coding formulation of ‘decision evidence’. So, 
while objective perceptual decisions pertain to the mean of the posterior belief 
on sensory causes, conditioned upon sensory evidence and perceptual priors, 
confidence will be the mean of the posterior belief on decision accuracy, 
conditioned upon decision evidence and expected task performance, or self-
efficacy. The framework presented here bears similarity to the Radical Plasticity 
Thesis of Cleeremans and colleagues (Cleeremans, 2011; Timmermans et al., 
2012), who propose that metacognitive processes arise from a subpersonal re-
representation of lower-order states. They propose that objective decisions are 
determined according to the activity of a first-order layer, and its outputs form 
the inputs of a second layer that learns to predict the errors in the first.  
It is important to note that because the empirical chapters of this thesis did not 
manipulate prior beliefs about performance, the data presented in this thesis 
cannot support or refute this model. The data in this thesis only support the 
notion that perceptual priors shape confidence, most likely at the level of the 
first-order inference (Chapters 5 and 6). Under the model proposed here, 
perceptual priors shape the posterior belief, and so only indirectly shape 
confidence. This model motivates the hypothesis that manipulating beliefs about 
perceptual performance, for example by giving blockwise feedback, would 
shape confidence more than sensitivity. It also motivates the hypothesis that 
trial-by-trial retrospective confidence can be modelled as an integration of 
prospective confidence and decision evidence. 
 Another way of probing beliefs about task performance is to estimate 
confidence thresholds, averaged over all conditions and responses. This 
  
	
191 
measure represents participants’ overall belief that they have given a correct 
response. Exploratory correlations on each node of the occipito-frontal network 
against mean confidence threshold (defined over the type 1 axis) revealed that 
left frontal pole and right orbitofrontal cortex may represent these ‘self-efficacy’ 
priors (figure 7.2), though this should be confirmed with further research. 
How might these self-efficacy priors – that is, expected decision accuracy – be 
learned? Hierarchical predictive coding recruits the notion of ‘empirical priors’, 
where each prior is constrained by the inferences at higher hierarchical stages. 
 
Figure 7.2 Self-efficacy (mean width of confidence thresholds) in left frontal 
pole. 
Exploratory correlations showing the relationship between self-efficacy, as 
defined by overall confidence bias (width of confidence thresholds), and BOLD 
responses in each node of the functional network revealed in Chapter 6. 
Relevant BOLD responses for confidence judgements are (i) the difference 
between guess and confident responses, (not shown – all n.s.) and (ii) the 
effect of attention (shown). The former reflects sensitivity to subjective 
judgement whereas the latter reflects sensitivity to uncertainty or task-
relevance (see Chapter 6). Results show that perceived self-efficacy is 
associated with attentional responses in left frontal pole, and marginally in right 
OFC. 
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Confidence is shaped by reward and value (De Martino et al., 2013; Hebart et 
al., 2014), which themselves are contextual and thus shaped by the perceptual 
systems. Thus, one possibility is that priors for confidence arise via interactions 
with decision-making mechanisms in seemingly parallel domains. 
Another possibility recruits counterfactual predictions and sensorimotor 
contingencies (Seth, 2014a) into an ‘error-detection’ mechanism. To illustrate, 
suppose I see a figure in the fog. If I believe that figure to be cause by a fox 
running towards me, I may have a counterfactual prediction that at time t + 1, 
the fox will have advanced towards me at a fox-like speed. My posterior belief 
inferred at time t + 1 can then be compared to the posterior belief I would have 
expected, had the figure indeed been a fox. My prior in my decision accuracy 
can then be updated with the outcome of this comparison process. More 
formally, this process can be described as one in which counterfactual 
predictions associated with the posterior belief are tested against the world, and 
if those counterfactual predictions hold, the aforementioned posterior belief is 
likely to have been correct. 
7.4 FUTURE DIRECTIONS  
The empirical work in this thesis has revealed that confidence is strongly 
shaped by the extent to which perceptual decisions are supported by prior 
expectations. Perceptual expectations begin to shape subjective confidence 
prior to the appearance of a stimulus, and are integrated into confidence 
judgements in rIFG by comparing the associated perceptual decision against 
the prior evidence in its favour. Section 7.3 has proposed a Bayesian brain 
model, in which confidence is constructed from a ‘second-order’ inference, and 
that posits a mechanism for the construction of confidence from decision 
evidence and expected ‘self-efficacy’. However, many questions pertaining to 
the role of top-down influences in construction of confidence remain. This 
section will outline some directions for future research, namely, on the role of 
attention in confidence judgements, on the difference between confidence and 
uncertainty, and on whether non-perceptual priors shape confidence. 
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First, while the primary aim of manipulating attention here was to isolate effects 
of expectation, understanding the construction of confidence requires 
understanding the role of attention as well. The work here did not find a strong 
effect of attention on the influence of expectations. However, we know that 
sensory uncertainty and perceptual sensitivity have powerful effects on 
subjective visibility. Moreover, we know that even though the ideal Bayesian 
observer will use expectations more when sensory signals are imprecise (under 
inattention), empirical work finds that attention amplifies or optimises 
expectancy effects (see section 2.2.3), if it has any effect at all. So, why did 
attention have so few effects on subjective perception here?  
One possibility is that the dual-task paradigm suppressed attentional effects that 
may otherwise have been present, because though the expected task demands 
were different, task difficulty was equated across trials. It may be that allowing 
top-down attention to shape the difficulty of the task leads to this perceived 
difficulty shaping decision confidence even after accounting for changes in 
perceptual sensitivity. Another possibility is that top-down attention is involved in 
inferring sensory noise, which was kept constant across participants in these 
studies. Recent work has shown that, as expected, confidence decreases with 
increasing sensory variance after equating sensitivity (Spence et al., 2015), yet 
variance is systematically underestimated (Zylberberg et al., 2014). This 
underestimation may be associated with changes in the reliability of prior 
evidence, as would be predicted by ideal Bayesian observer models. One 
avenue for future research could be to factorially manipulate the expected mean 
and variance of an RDK to determine how confidence is shaped by each of 
these predictive pieces of information. Investigating the role of top-down 
attention within such a factorial design may help elucidate its role in the 
construction of confidence. 
 It is clear that uncertainty – about the sensory signals, internal state or action 
outcomes – strongly shapes perceptual decision-making and confidence, and 
that these distinct forms of uncertainty are represented in process-specific brain 
regions (Bach & Dolan, 2012). The incorporation of uncertainty also tends to be 
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optimally incorporated into objective decisions (Knill & Pouget, 2004). The 
studies in this thesis show that confidence in perceptual decision-making under 
sensory uncertainty is shaped by prior expectations, such that in the post-
decision period confidence is represented as perceptual ‘prediction error’ in right 
inferior frontal gyrus. These results are explained by appealing to the notion that 
template-response matching contributes to the construction of confidence. 
However, on an alternative view expectations shape decision confidence only 
indirectly, with this effect being driven by changes in representational 
uncertainty (e.g. the variance of the posterior pdf). In other words, do 
expectations shape decision confidence over and above their effects on 
uncertainty, or can expectancy effects on decisional certainty account for all 
effects on decision confidence? Teasing apart choice confidence and decisional 
uncertainty may then reveal neural mechanisms that are implicated specifically 
in the construction of confidence, but not its antecedents or ensuing processes. 
Finally, future research could investigate the role of prior beliefs that are not 
perceptual in nature. The model presented in section 7.6 proposes a critical role 
for priors about perceptual performance, or ‘self-efficacy’, yet the empirical work 
in this thesis has not manipulated these priors explicitly.  Recent work has 
shown that optimism influences how priors are used in decision-making and 
updating beliefs: optimistic individuals are more prone to update beliefs on the 
basis of positive information (Sharot et al., 2011) and to have higher priors on 
reward (Stankevicius, Huys, Kalra, & Seriès, 2014). Similarly, encoding fluency 
– believing that a stimulus is easily learned - is associated with higher 
judgements of learning (the easily learned = easily remembered effect, Koriat 
2008). This suggests that task-specific beliefs about performance are 
associated with higher confidence, at least in the memory domain. This effect is 
further constrained by the finding that an even more abstracted beliefs: 
believing that effortful decisions are a result of task ability is associated with a 
stronger relationship between encoding fluency and judgements of learning 
(Miele, Finn, & Molden, 2011).  
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So, would priors on perceptual performance shape perceptual confidence? In 
the memory domain, prospective confidence judgements do correlate with 
retrospective trial-by-trial confidence judgements, even in non-human primates 
(G. Morgan, Kornell, Kornblum, & Terrace, 2014), indicating that we can model 
prior beliefs about performance. Moreover, recent work has used reinforcement 
learning models to capture the effects of expected confidence – a function of 
recent confidence judgements – on trial-by-trial confidence (Guggenmos et al., 
2016), revealing a key role of striatum in the representation of what is referred 
to here as  expected ‘self-efficacy’. Are prospective and retrospective perceptual 
confidence judgements represented in different brain areas? Can retrospective 
confidence be modelled as a function of perceptual prediction error and 
prospective confidence? Model-based fMRI could test these questions explicitly, 
by formulating retrospective confidence as a ‘second-order’ posterior: the 
probability of being correct, given the decision evidence (‘first order’ posterior) 
and prior (prospective confidence).  
7.5 CONCLUSIONS 
This thesis has addressed the question of whether and how perceptual prior 
expectations shape confidence judgements. Results show that subjective 
confidence increases with increasing prior probability of the decision. The 
process by which confidence is shaped by perceptual priors begins before 
stimulus onset, where the weighting of priors on decision and confidence is 
determined according to the phase of ongoing occipital alpha oscillations. Right 
inferior frontal gyrus then integrates neural responses to expectation-report 
mismatch into confidence signals, recruiting both visual and frontal regions. 
Together, these results show that top-down influences of expectation shape our 
perceptual experience in a similar manner to that seen in objective perception, 
such that we largely see what we believe to be true.  
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